



This impressive book introduces a new model for studying media use and 
political participation. The authors introduce an original research design 
that combines generational analysis of media preferences with a compelling 
framework for mapping a broad spectrum of political participation. The 
resulting analyses shows how diferent generations of citizens are defned by 
their media habits, and how those communication preferences ofer difer-
ent pathways into politics. 
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Rich in data and full of big ideas, Generational Gaps in Political Media Use 
and Civic Engagement tells the story of remarkable diferences in patterns 
of media use and political engagement across fve generations. The authors 
paint a largely hopeful portrait of the continued importance of news use in 
democracy, while ofering warnings to us all of the potential dangers posed 
by our increasingly fragmented, personalized media environment. The book 
is a must for anyone who cares about safeguarding the political voice of 
emerging generations. 
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With the changing media landscape creating new patterns of information 
consumption and opportunities for a great number of actors to express 
themselves and reach others in ways that were previously impossible, 
understanding the efects of exposure to political information on political 
participation is critical for assessing the health of our democracy. Theo-
retically innovative and conceptually rich, Generational Gaps in Political 
Media Use and Civic Engagement, brings together three diferent types of 
data collection to explore the interplay between information consumption, 
participation and engagement by the young and the elderly. Providing new 
insights about how a variety of types of exposure experienced by fve gen-
erations afect diferent types of input to the political system, Andersen and 
colleagues’ book adds important new empirical evidence for understand-
ing participation and active citizenship in a changing political information 
environment. 
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This book investigates news use patterns among fve diferent generations in 
a time where digital media create a multi-choice media environment. 
The book introduces the EPIG model (Engagement-Participation-
Information-Generation) to study how diferent generational cohorts’
exposure to political information is related to their political engagement and
participation. The authors build on a multi-method framework to determine
direct and indirect media efects across generations. The unique dataset allows
for comparison of efects between legacy and social media use and helps to
disentangle the infuence on citizens’ political involvement in nonelection as
well as during political campaign times. Bringing the newly of-age Generation
Z into the picture, the book presents an in-depth understanding of how a
changing media environment presents diferent challenges and opportunities
for political involvement of this, as well as older generations. 
Bringing the conversation around political engagement and the media 
up to date for the new generation, this book will be of key importance to 
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1 Times are changing 
Saturday morning at a family breakfast table: as the eating winds 
down, father Peter picks up the printed broadsheet newspaper. The 
family have been subscribers to the same morning newspaper for 
years, the same paper that Peter’s and mother Sarah’s parents read 
when Peter and Sarah were kids. An independent business owner, 
Sarah quickly skims through the paper’s business section on her tab-
let, using the newspaper’s app, then checks her ftness app and departs 
for a yoga class. Their three children each have their smartphones out. 
The youngest, age 11, is picking up a game that was paused when 
breakfast started. The middle child, 13, is in a lengthy Snapchat ses-
sion. The oldest, 17, is scrolling through a long stream of Instagram 
posts. Before taking of for feld hockey, in response to an Instagram 
post, she comments on how much water is needed to produce a kilo 
of meat. 
The scene is a snapshot of the rapidly changing information ecology. The 
way in which—and the degree to which—citizens in today’s democracies 
consume and expose themselves to political information is fundamentally 
diferent from how things were only a couple of decades ago. Younger 
generations grow up in a high-choice environment that would have been 
inconceivable to their parents. Parents in their 40s today were children of 
black and white television, landline telephones, nightly television news pro-
grammes, free print newspapers, and—in their late youth—the arrival of 
the internet and its initial afordances. They are typically avid users of Face-
book. Their teenage children, born after 2000, however, have grown up in 
the mobile and visual age: cell phones, smartphones, tablets, media hybrid-
ity, and social media platforms. Social media to them means WhatsApp, 
Instagram, and Snapchat. 
The generations each have their own set of opportunities to inform them-
selves. At the same time, each cycle of life comes with a diferent set of 
 
 
2 Times are changing 
opportunities. Parents of today grew up in newspaper households. Typi-
cally, they engaged less with newspapers during the adolescent years before 
becoming newspaper users themselves, albeit at a much lower level than 
their own parents. These ‘media life histories’ illustrate the fundamental 
change in the information ecology. The supply of political information has 
never been bigger, the time spent with media has never been longer, and at 
the same time, it has never been easier to avoid political information while 
still being connected. 
The changing media landscape has ofered a new opportunity structure
for citizens; as the media landscape has changed, so has the opportunity 
for citizens to engage and express themselves and to participate politically. 
Political involvement is of key importance in a well-functioning democracy, 
and in this book, we argue that news media use is vital to understand how 
people are involved politically. The changing environment for media use 
and political participation, with the changing opportunity structures that 
follow, needs to be unpacked. How do these changes afect the way that 
citizens engage in society and politics? We approach this key question from 
a generational perspective: what are the consumption, engagement, and par-
ticipation patterns across diferent generations? And is the impact of expo-
sure to political information diferent for citizens in diferent cycles of life? 
In this chapter we frst unpack the changing media landscape and the new 
opportunities for political involvement. We then focus specifcally on the 
generational perspective in understanding the relationship between media 
use and political involvement. Finally, we outline the structure of the book’s 
remaining chapters. 
Understanding political information consumption in today’s 
communication ecology 
The supply side of political information has changed. Research spanning 
decades shows that the supply of news has increased in traditional media 
like television (see Esser et al., 2012) and newspapers, with more free news-
papers entering the market (e.g., Bakker, 2008). At the same time, the online 
presence of traditional news organizations has burgeoned, and new infor-
mation brokers have become popular. Platforms like Facebook and Twitter 
are now central to the news ecology, and personal messaging services like 
WhatsApp are also increasingly important for understanding the political 
information landscape. In addition, traditional genre-determined bound-
aries have shifted, resulting in a wider mix of diferent types of content, 
often combining harder, factual news with softer entertainment features. 
As a consequence, citizens can easily create their own personal media diets 
with varying degrees of political information based on individual prefer-



























Times are changing 3 
The demand side has also changed. Subscriptions to newspapers have 
been decreasing for years. Some groups have become political news junkies, 
while sizeable parts of the electorate are opting out of news consumption 
(Bos, Kruikemeier, & de Vreese, 2016). Yet others have migrated towards 
relatively brief news encounters, almost ‘news snacking,’ thanks to gener-
ators and social media sites. These changes in the demand side vary sig-
nifcantly across generations, with younger news consumers, for example, 
consuming most of their news online only (Newman, Fletcher, Kalogero-
poulos, Levy, & Nielsen, 2018). 
These developments in the media landscape, on both the supply and the
demand sides, are not linear or uniform across generations. They represent
a general development in the past two decades, but recent data show addi-
tional nuances and even, in some cases, reversals. The 2018 Reuters report
(Newman et al., 2018) notes that the use of social media is falling for the
frst time in years, whereas the use of messaging apps (like WhatsApp) is
increasing. This change might suggest a migration from more public plat-
forms to more private platforms when it comes to political information,
but it is still too soon to tell. Another example is the increasing number of
digital newspaper subscriptions in the past couple of years. This increase
breaks the curve of virtually across-the-board decline. Again, however,
it is too early to determine whether this reversal is temporary and what
it looks like across countries. Likewise, we do not know if this develop-
ment has been brought about by traditional news consumers—who in the
past tuned out of paying for news but have now returned—or by new and
younger news consumers. Whether we look at long-term trends or some
of the more recent fuctuations, in all cases we see diferences between
generations. 
Underlying some of these user data are more structural transforma-
tions in the news ecology, being part of larger changes in political com-
munication altogether (see Van Aelst et al., 2017). These changes do
not apply only to supply and demand but also to discussions about the
quality and trustworthiness of news; the value of information and the
ongoing misinformation crisis; the increasing concentration of media
ownership; increasing audience fragmentation and polarization of
political attitudes; increasing relativism and questioning of authority,
truth, and authenticity; and the increasing inequality in political knowl-
edge between news users and non-users. Such tendencies also capture
the concerns of misinformation and limited media literacy in today’s
media landscape. These larger changes form the backdrop against
which we study political information exposure and address the ques-
tions of whether consumption patterns are different across generations
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Changing political involvement? 
‘More than 15,000 litres of water for a kilo of beef?’ The family looks 
up from their newspapers and smartphones when the 11-year-old 
expresses surprise about the number that the older sibling has just 
picked up on an Instagram post. A friend shared this post, in which an 
NGO calls for signing a petition against factory farming. The 13-year-
old responds with rolling eyes and feels supported in her decision to 
boycott meat for the past three years. ‘We should eat less meat,’ one 
of their parents mumbles. ‘That would still not change the conditions 
in which most animals are held,’ the oldest child responds. ‘Such fac-
tories will change only if we stand right in front of their doors and 
demonstrate for the rights of animals.’ The other parent now joins the 
debate: ‘These farmers are only doing their job within the framework 
that politics gives them. If you really want to change something, you 
should join a party that aims at changing the relevant legislation.’ 
As citizens’ opportunity structure—in terms of both political information 
supply and demand—has changed so too have patterns of political par-
ticipation. Citizen participation in political processes is at the core of all 
conceptions of liberal democracies (Strömbäck, 2005). Central scholars like 
Schumpeter (1942) and Schattschneider (1975) all emphasize the impor-
tance of citizen participation. They diverge, however, in their conception of 
how much and what type of participation is needed in a healthy democracy. 
Competitive democracy is seen as a means to aggregate voters’ individual
preferences when competing elites supply policy packages on the political mar-
ket and voters buy their preferred package with their votes (Held, 1987). This
model of representative democracy presupposes multiple elites that, through
competition, keep each other at bay. Citizens’ political participation is linked
to turnout at elections but is neither needed nor desirable between elections— 
for instance, during the formulation of party policies. The normative role of
the mass media in a competitive democracy is to provide information to citi-
zens on central political and social challenges, on how political parties have
performed since the last election, and on what their policy packages consist
of in order that citizens can make informed vote choices (Strömbäck, 2005). 
At the other end of the scale, so to speak, participatory democracy consid-
ers citizens’ active participation not only a means to obtain authoritative deci-
sions for society but also a goal in itself: besides infuencing political decisions,
popular participation has an educational function in that it teaches citizens
how to take part in public debate, how to form opinions on societal problems,
and how to solve conficts on mutual matters, thus turning them into politi-
cally competent citizens. These arguments are used, among others, by Alexis
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of local government, which gives citizens a chance to learn the skills neces-
sary to run a well-functioning democracy. Participatory democracy does not
imply that free elections are obsolete but rather that citizens must constantly
act out democracy. Just think of recent examples like the Fridays of Future,
Black Lives Matter, or #MeToo movements, where protest participation is
changing not only the public debate but also current legislation in many coun-
tries. What happens between elections thus becomes of utmost importance
for the well-being of democracy (Held, 1987). Equally important, in a well-
functioning democracy, all parts of the citizenry participate politically—not
only the elderly but also the youth. Just as in a competitive democracy, the
media in a participatory democracy are normatively obliged to provide politi-
cal information to citizens in a manner that enables them to make informed
choices. In addition, the media are also obliged to encourage the greatest pos-
sible participation by citizens not only in public debate but also in democratic
decision-making in all its forms (Strömbäck, 2005). 
The normative literature diverges both on how much citizens are to partici-
pate in a healthy democracy and on how they are to participate. Some argue
that deliberation is key to democracy and therefore put a premium on col-
lectivistic activities with some element of deliberation—for instance, member-
ship of a political party or participation in election meetings or demonstrations.
However, in recent decades, many new forms of more individualistic politi-
cal activities without active deliberation have emerged, for instance, signing of
online petitions, crowdfunding, or boycotting of products. Both collectivistic
and individualistic forms of participation create a political ‘we’ that is intended
to infuence authoritative decisions—the former, primarily through deliberation
(a collectivistic ‘we’), the latter, primarily through aggregation of interests (an
individualistic ‘we’). In sum, assessing the amount and type of political partici-
pation in healthy democracies and whether the media performs its democratic
role satisfactorily depends on the normative democratic standards applied. 
Generally speaking, the empirical study of political participation is of con-
tinuous importance since it is an indicator of the quality of democracy (Theo-
charis & van Deth, 2016). As opportunity structures in the media landscape
change, so do opportunity structures for political participation. The ways in
which citizens can express opinions, show political engagement, and partici-
pate in decision-making processes are constantly evolving. In the past 20 years,
opportunity structures have changed rapidly. New participatory activities— 
such as supporting crowdfunding campaigns or signing online petitions—are
now part of the mainstream participation repertoire. Indeed, some of the most
important new ways of participation are digital (Theocharis, 2015). 
Our aim in this book is to ofer a new perspective, in the broadest sense, 
on the relationship between exposure to political information in the media 
and political involvement, with a specifc focus on generational diferences. 
Our task implies a further refection on the conceptualization and ultimately 
the measurement of political participation. We supply defnitions in more 
detail in Chapter 2, but sufce it to say for now that we intend the concept 
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of political participation to be inclusive and to refect digitally networked or 
other more recent forms of participation. Since voting turnout is remarkably 
high and stable in Denmark, the case country of this book, we have chosen 
to focus on other types of political participation for which the opportunity 
structures of participation have changed, both in non-election times and 
in times of election campaigns. Again, our core interest will be how these 
diferent types of participation relate to political information exposure in 
the media, most importantly, whether these aspects are diferent between 
generations and whether specifc generations are more susceptible to media 
efects than others. 
Why the youth? 
Scholars often argue that the world is changing—and not for the better. One 
particular group of citizens, the youth, has caught a noticeable amount of 
scholarly attention. On the one hand, some scholars—often focusing exclu-
sively on traditional participation opportunities such as voting behaviour— 
paint a pessimistic picture of the future and of the young generation. After 
all, young people turn away from traditional news media and focus on 
online or digital platforms (Mindich, 2005). They drop out of society rather 
than participating in it—at least traditionally (Putnam, 2000). On the other 
hand, other scholars take a more optimistic approach and suggest that the 
young generation use other types of media to obtain information, most 
notably social media (Xenos, Vromen, & Loader, 2014). They participate— 
but diferently—and particularly on social media platforms. The question is 
whether today’s youth are inherently diferent or simply use other sources 
and platforms in these changing times. 
In our analysis of the generation factor, we consider both generational 
efects and life-cycle efects. On the one hand, it might be a nonconsequen-
tial truism that younger people participate less than older groups and that 
they have diferent political information habits. They are simply concerned 
with receiving an education, fnding a place to live, and starting a career and 
a relationship—just like younger generations of the past. Soon, they will 
start to behave like the older generations. This life-cycle perspective, how-
ever, is challenged by the generational perspective that assumes that each 
generation is composed diferently, has a diferent formative experience, and 
will ultimately behave diferently. 
We focus on diferences regarding media consumption and the type and 
level of participation as well as how media exposure afects participation 
and vice versa. The book’s core starting point is thus to ask, how diferent 
are younger generations compared to older generations in regard to media 
use and political involvement? While asking this question, we think hard 
about the best way to conceive and to tap political information exposure in 
the media and diferent forms of political participation, all from a genera-
tional comparative perspective. 
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In Chapter 2, we elaborate more on our classifcation of generations. 
Diferent studies have applied diferent starting and cut-of points. Broadly 
speaking, we distinguish fve generations: Traditionalists (born between 
1922 and 1944), Baby Boomers (1945–59), Generation X (1960–79), Mil-
lennials (i.e., Generation Y; 1980–94), and the emerging Generation Z (born 
after 1995). We have a specifc interest in the younger generations and are 
keen not to study them in isolation but to ofer a comparative perspective to 
their attitudes and behaviour. 
Generational diferences in opportunity structures 
Earlier, we outlined opportunities for obtaining information about politics 
via the news media expanding beyond traditional media outlets to online 
platforms with an infnite number of news outlets as well as new social 
media platforms, which may direct citizens to—or away from—the news 
media. We now start by getting a better sense of media consumption. We 
focus on Denmark, where our elaborate multi-wave panel study is situated 
(see Chapter 3). 
Looking at Danish data from the Reuters 2016 Digital News Report 
(Newman, Fletcher, Levy, & Nielsen, 2016), we fnd that Baby Boomers, 
Traditionalists, and, almost to the same extent, Generation X consume news 
a lot; they access it daily, and most of them even do so multiple times per 
day. Millennials and Generation Z also score relatively high on news con-
sumption but access news less frequently, and a sizeable group (about one-
ffth) consume news only once a week or less frequently. In terms of news 
interest, Millennials and members of Generation Z are typically ‘somewhat 
interested’ in news, while older generations are very to extremely interested 
in news. This pattern is also found for interest in political news, in particu-
lar, though the level of interest is lower across generations. 
Turning to specifc media, we observe some interesting generational dif-
ferences. Only half of the younger generations (Millennials and Generation Z)
watch television news, whereas the vast majority (73 to 86 percent) of older 
generations do so. Printed newspapers are used mostly by Traditionalists 
and Baby Boomers (57 and 44 percent, respectively), while Generation X 
are at 25 percent, Millennials at 13 percent, and Generation Z at 18 per-
cent. The slightly higher number for Generation Z is most likely due to 
this generation continuing to live at home (with Generation X parents) in 
newspaper-subscribing households. 
Looking at television or radio news websites, we see no generational dif-
ferences, indicating that audio-visual online news content is equally appeal-
ing across generations. Finally, looking at social media usage, we see a 
reverse linear trend, with two-thirds (66 percent) of Generation Z accessing 
news via social media compared to a still noticeable 39 percent of Tradition-
alists at the other end of the spectrum. In sum, we see a news consumption 
pattern that is largely afected by generational diferences. Older generations 
 
  
























Tradi˜onalists Baby Boomers Genera˜on X Millennials Genera˜on Z 
Figure 1.1 News media use across generations 
Source: Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2016 (Newman et al., 2016) 
Notes. Respondents were asked if they had used the following sources to access news in the last 
week: television news bulletins or programmes; printed newspapers; websites/apps of newspa-
pers; websites/apps of TV and radio companies. The Y-axis shows the mean media use during 
the past week, where 0 = they have not used any of the sources and 1 = they have used all of 
the sources. The estimates are displayed with a 95 percent confdence interval. N: Traditional-
ists = 96, Baby Boomers = 579, Generation X = 819, Millennials = 407, Generation Z = 119, 
Total = 2,020. 
simply turn to the news more, almost regardless of the medium (see the 
summary scores in Figure 1.1). Newspaper reading is mostly found in older 
generations. Television news usage is relatively high across the board but is 
also tilted towards the older generations. Social media usage, however, is 
much more pronounced among the younger generation. These descriptive 
fndings give more than good reason to examine the efect of diferent news 
consumption patterns on political participation. 
We take a broad and inclusive approach to understanding not only media 
consumption but also political participation. As outlined earlier, in some 
models of democracy, voting behaviour is key; in others, political participa-
tion is more than simply voting behaviour. What does political participation 
in Denmark look like? 
At frst glance (Figure 1.2) generations in Denmark do not look so dif-
ferent when we examine the general frequency of participating in diferent 
































Tradi˜onalists Baby Boomers Genera˜on X Millennials Genera˜on Z 
Figure 1.2 Political participation across generations 
Source: European Social Survey 2014 
Notes. Respondents were asked if they conducted any of the following political activities
during the past 12 months: contacted politician or government ofcial; worn or displayed
campaign badge/sticker; signed a petition; taken part in lawful public demonstration; boy-
cotted certain products. The Y-axis indicates the mean political participation during the past
12 months, where 0 = they did not conduct any of the activities and 1 = they conducted all
the activities. The estimates are displayed with a 95 percent confdence interval. N: Tradi-
tionalists = 211, Baby Boomers = 369, Generation X = 499, Millennials = 305, Generation
Z = 58, Total = 1,442. 
closer look at some of these activities, however, reveals greater generational 
diferences. Generation Z (9 percent) and Millennials (15 percent) contact 
politicians less often than do, for example, the Baby Boomers (24 percent). 
Boycotting products for political reasons is less common among Tradition-
alists and Generation Z, compared to Baby Boomers, Generation X, and 
Millennials. Generation Z are the cohort that signed petitions in the last 
12 months most often (44 percent), with numbers declining linearly for each 
generation, ending with 15 percent for Traditionalists. The same patterns 
evolve when looking at participation in lawful demonstrations, with 18 per-
cent of Generation Z reporting to have done so, whereas the numbers for all 
other generations range between two and eight percent. 
Clearly, diferent generations fnd distinct ways of becoming politically 
active. However, we look at only a small number of ways that participation 
takes place today. We therefore assess political participation among difer-
ent generations in an inclusive—yet theoretically distinct—way that helps 
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us to examine the meaning of participation patterns in diferent models of 
democracy. In doing so, we also investigate how generational diferences in 
news consumption and political participation are related. 
Outline of the book 
Our starting point is the changing media landscape and the changing oppor-
tunity structures for political involvement today. In Chapter 2, we develop 
a generational perspective on the relationship between exposure to political 
information in the media and political involvement. We outline a theoretical 
model that guides our further inquiry. In Chapter 3, we describe the empiri-
cal basis for our book. This chapter, though sometimes somewhat technical, 
is an important one. It highlights our unique design and the nature and 
quality of our data. 
In Chapter 4, we examine who gets exposed to political information and 
what the key determinants of that (non-)exposure are. In Chapter 5, we 
look at the consequences of exposure in terms of political interest, politi-
cal knowledge, and feeling politically efcacious. In Chapters 6, 7, and 8, 
we turn to the relationship between political information exposure and 
participation targeting the political system (Chapter 6), the local commu-
nity (Chapter 7), and other activities done for politically motivated reasons 
(Chapter 8). In all chapters, we look specifcally at generational similarities 
and diferences. 
In Chapter 9, we focus more specifcally on the role and afordances of 
social media vis-à-vis diferent generations. In Chapter 10, we delve more 
deeply into the periods around an election. These times are arguably special 
in a democracy and might reveal other communication and participation 
patterns for diferent generations. 
In Chapter 11, we conclude by summarizing our key fndings and ask 
whether the youth are diferent or not. We also relate our fndings to broader 
















2 The EPIG model—political 
information exposure and
political involvement in a 
generational perspective 
Political engagement and participation are potential outcomes and/ 
or the antecedents of exposure to political information in the news 
media or on social media. Taking a generational perspective to this 
two-sided relationship is benefcial if we want to achieve an in-depth 
understanding of the democratic dynamics that follow recent changes 
in both media consumption and political involvement. A generational 
perspective enables us to explore diferences in levels of—and relation-
ships between—exposure to political information in the media and 
political involvement. It enables us to assess how the future might look 
for mobilizing citizens to take part in democracy through the media. 
In order to facilitate such an examination, we defne key concepts and 
relationships and present the Engagement-Participation-Information-
Generation (EPIG) model. 
The ways in which citizens consume political information on the one hand
and involve themselves in politics on the other hand are both in fux (see
Chapter 1). With the technological transformation of society in the past
several decades, the availability of news media outlets has proliferated (e.g.,
Williams & Delli Carpini, 2011). In addition, social media platforms, such
as Facebook and Twitter, have become key sources of information about
politics (Newman et al., 2018). As a consequence, citizens can easily create
their own personal media diets with varying degrees of political informa-
tion based on individual preferences (Arceneaux & Johnson, 2013; Prior,
2007). Political involvement has likewise been transformed. For exam-
ple, political participation no longer includes only traditional activities,
such as voting or attending public demonstrations (e.g., Zukin, Keeter,
Andolina, Jenkins, & Delli Carpini, 2006). Instead, political participation
has broadened in scope and takes place both ofine and online (Gibson
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in political involvement raise highly pertinent questions about the future
functioning of our democracies: How does the shift in news consumption
from traditional news media outlets to social media afect the mobiliz-
ing role of the media? How do new forms of—and opportunities for— 
political participation alter this role? And do new opportunities lead to
smaller or greater gaps in democratic behaviour? Answering such ques-
tions will allow us to understand whether the consequences are favourable
or unfavourable for democracy and whether we should push for changes
in certain directions rather than others. 
In order to better understand the consequences of these changes, we
need to take a comprehensive model of engagement, participation, and
political information through the media into account, and we must do so
by applying a generational perspective. This approach will provide valu-
able insights into the relationships between news consumption and politi-
cal participation and the way they manifest themselves in contemporary
Western democracies, enabling us to access the participatory status of such
societies. In a well-functioning democracy, all parts of the citizenry par-
ticipate politically—not only the elderly but also the youth. All genera-
tions need to voice their opinions, and by doing so, they participate in the
society in which they live. 
However, some scholars suggest that younger generations turn away
from traditional news media (Blekesaune, Elvestad, & Aalberg, 2012)
and that they do not participate politically to the same extent as do older
generations (Franklin, 2004). Others argue that the youth simply obtain
political information in a diferent manner and participate diferently in
society (e.g., Kahne & Bowyer, 2018; Loader, Vromen, & Xenos, 2014).
We want to contribute to this debate by exploring whether younger gen-
erations are exposed diferently to political information and whether they
engage and participate diferently. Last but not least, we are also inter-
ested in whether the relationships between political information in the
media and political involvement are diferent among younger compared
to older generations. 
In the following, we frst provide detailed defnitions of our key concepts. 
We then discuss existing models of the relationship between media con-
sumption and political involvement and highlight how political engage-
ment and participation can function as antecedents of exposure to political 
information in the media and, subsequently, as efects of this exposure. We 
therefore introduce the Engagement-Participation-Information (EPI) frame-
work, which focuses on the interplay between these three elements. Lastly, 
we introduce the generational perspective, which we employ to study these 
key democratic behaviours and the relationship between them. The gen-
erational component extends the EPI framework, creating the Engagement-
Participation-Information-Generations (EPIG) model, according to which 
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Defning key concepts 
In order to present our theoretical framework, we begin by defning our key 
concepts: frst, exposure to political information in the media and second, 
political involvement, which we use as a collective term for political engage-
ment and political participation. 
Exposure to political information in the media 
Few citizens have frst-hand experience with the political world. Instead,
the vast majority are informed about politics through the media (Ström-
bäck, 2008; Zaller, 2003). In other words, politics is a mediated experi-
ence, traditionally dominated by newspaper and TV news consumption.
However, with the changing media environment, citizens increasingly
experience politics on social media platforms such as Facebook (New-
man et al., 2018; see also Chapter 1). We therefore examine the roles of
traditional news media (both ofine and online) as well as social media
because both provide political information. When doing so, we distinguish
between exposure to political information in the news media—or political
news exposure—and exposure to political information on social media—or
political social media exposure. 
This broad conceptualization of political information exposure covers a 
hybrid media ecology, where information comes in various forms and from 
a number of diferent actors. What counts as news and political informa-
tion is therefore not easily defned (Edgerly & Vraga, 2020). Nevertheless, 
journalists and audiences in general agree on what news is (Costera Mei-
jer, 2007; Shoemaker & Cohen, 2006), often conceptualizing it from the 
‘news-democracy narrative’ (Woodstock, 2014), according to which news 
is a crucial component of a healthy democracy, enabling citizens to take an 
active part in society. Even in today’s hybrid media ecology, where formerly 
distinct genres mix and the boundaries of news are blurring, what is com-
municated and by whom are still important factors in determining relevant 
information (Edgerly & Vraga, 2020). In consequence, we will examine 
political information as it is disseminated by legacy news media but also 
examine political information on social media, which is likely becoming an 
increasingly important actor in fostering political involvement. 
To distinguish political from non-political information, we follow Easton’s 
(1953, p. 146) well-known defnition of politics. He describes it as a situa-
tion in which somebody attempts to infuence the authoritative allocation 
of values in a society, be they material or immaterial. This process includes 
not only politicians but also, for instance, interest organizations, frms, and 
ordinary citizens. Political information in the media refers to information 
that covers the political process. Political information may mobilize citi-
zens to engage in society (Lemert, 1984; Schuck, Vliegenthart, & de Vreese, 
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2016; see also Druckman, 2005), and in this respect, the media may be seen 
as mobilizing agents (Norris, 2000). 
Political engagement 
Political engagement entails individual motivations, abilities, and attitudes 
that refect citizens’ involvement with politics. Political engagement may 
both infuence and be infuenced by exposure to political information. We 
focus on three key dimensions of political engagement—namely, politi-
cal interest, political knowledge, and political efcacy. All three dimen-
sions have received much scholarly interest, and studies have linked them 
to media exposure and political participation (e.g., Moeller, Kühne, & de 
Vreese, 2018). Importantly, common for all dimensions, they are intrin-
sic in nature. That is, they manifest themselves within each individual and 
not necessarily by the individual interacting with his or her context. Being 
politically interested, knowledgeable, or efcacious is likely to lead to politi-
cal participation in society but does not necessarily do so. Thus, in con-
trast to political participation, political engagement is not defned by actual 
behaviour. 
Political interest is the degree to which politics arouses a citizen’s curios-
ity. As such, political interest can be defned as ‘an intrinsic motivation to 
pay attention to and engage in politics—not because of external pressures 
or as a means to achieve distinct outcomes, but for personal pleasure and 
the inherent satisfaction of doing so in itself’ (Shehata & Amnå, 2017, p. 3; 
see also Prior, 2018). Citizens with high political interest are more likely to 
both seek out political information and participate in politics. Thus, politi-
cal interest is often seen as ‘the most powerful predictor of political behav-
iours that make democracy work’ (Prior, 2010, p. 747). 
Political knowledge can be divided into knowledge about (1) the politi-
cal system—often obtained through education—and (2) current political 
afairs knowledge—that is, knowledge about recent happenings in politics 
and society (Barabas, Jerit, Pollock, & Rainey, 2014). We focus on the lat-
ter since current political afairs knowledge is more likely to be a product of 
media use and to infuence subsequent political participation related to the 
topics about which knowledge is accumulated. For the sake of parsimony, 
however, we will use the more general term political knowledge to refer to 
current political afairs knowledge. 
Political efcacy is normally defned as having an internal and an external 
dimension (Balch, 1974; Converse, 1964; Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 1991). 
Internal political efcacy refers to ‘individuals’ self-perceptions that they 
are capable of understanding politics and competent enough to participate 
in political acts,’ while external political efcacy is defned as ‘the feeling 
that an individual and the public can have an impact on the political pro-
cess because government institutions will respond to their needs’ (Miller, 
Goldenberg, & Erbring, 1979, p. 253). Much research has already shown 
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that internal political efcacy, in particular, is important to understand 
who participates and why (e.g., Moeller, de Vreese, Esser, & Kunz, 2014), 
whereas external political efcacy can be translated less directly into either 
media consumption or political participation (e.g., Gil de Zúñiga, Weeks, & 
Ardèvol-Abreu, 2017; Pollock, 1983). We therefore focus on internal politi-
cal efcacy in our analyses. When doing so, for brevity we use the general 
term political efcacy. 
Political participation 
In contrast to political engagement, which refers to intrinsic motivations, 
abilities, and attitudes, political participation refers to an outreaching and 
behavioural component of political involvement. Political participation can 
be defned as activities that citizens perform when seeking to afect politics 
(van Deth, 2014, p. 351). More formally, political participation involves 
activities that have ‘the intent or efect of infuencing government action— 
either directly by afecting the making and implementation of public policy 
or indirectly by infuencing the selection of people who make these policies’ 
(Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995, p. 38). Yet, how citizens participate in 
society is not stable, in terms of neither level nor type of activity. As Dalton 
(2008) has argued, ‘the trends in political activity represent changes in the 
style of political actions, and not just changes in the level of participation’ 
(p.  94). Just like the media environment has changed, forms of political 
participation have changed (see also Chapter 1). The opportunity structures 
for political participation have changed radically—for example, with the 
emergence of the internet—which provide new participation platforms that 
are less demanding and time consuming (e.g., ‘liking’ a politician on Face-
book or signing an online petition) compared to more traditional participa-
tion (i.e., joining a demonstration). These changes have led to new debates 
about how to defne and conceptualize political participation (e.g., Gibson 
& Cantijoch, 2013). 
Especially in the context of younger generations, participation is often 
used as a blanket term that is not sufciently specifed (Literat, Kligler-
Vilenchik, Brough, & Blum-Ross, 2018). Following Verba and Nie’s (1972) 
understanding of political participation as multidimensional (for an over-
view, see also Fox, 2014), several empirical typologies have been developed. 
Bakker and de Vreese (2011), for example, address the observation that 
some political activities come at higher costs than others (see also Bode, 
2017; Christensen, 2011; Morozov, 2009) by distinguishing between active
versus passive participatory activities. Active participatory activities include 
contacting ofcials or attending demonstrations, whereas passive activities 
include visiting political websites or reading political books. Loader et al. 
(2014), in turn, distinguish between participation pursued individually or 
as a group. Individual engagement encompasses activities such as boycot-
ting products or infuencing others to vote, whereas joining or working 
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for political groups is labelled collective engagement. The most prominent 
distinction in recent participation research is between activities conducted 
with the use of the internet and those conducted without. The online versus 
ofine distinction for political participation has been proposed and applied 
by a number of recent studies (Gibson & Cantijoch, 2013; Gil de Zúñiga, 
Jung, & Valenzuela, 2012; Teorell, Torcal, & Montero, 2007). It was fur-
ther advanced by, for example, Visser and Stolle (2014), who diferentiate 
between Facebook participation, other online participation and ofine par-
ticipation. Inglehart (1990, pp. 335–336) proposes what is perhaps the most 
comprehensive categorization by distinguishing between elite-directed activ-
ities (i.e., voting, party membership, other party-mediated activities, and 
union membership) and elite-directing activities (i.e., political discussion, 
participation in new social movements, and protest activities such as dem-
onstrations, boycotts, signing petitions, occupations, and unofcial strikes). 
We follow Van Deth’s (2014) theory-driven conceptualization of four 
forms of political participation. Instead of classifying participation activi-
ties according to time-bound phenomena such as channels (e.g., online and 
ofine) and activity costs (e.g., high and low), van Deth’s classifcations rely 
on three aspects of participation: the sphere, the target, and the intention 
of an activity. Political Participation I refers to activities within the political 
system (e.g., voting behaviour, party membership). Political Participation II 
refers to activities targeting the political system (e.g., citizens demonstrating 
for a political cause and trying to infuence the political system) and comes 
close to institutionalized participation as framed by McLeod, Scheufele, and 
Moy (1999) or to elite-directed participation (Inglehart, 1990). Political 
Participation III refers to activities targeting the community, often referred 
to as civic participation, which approaches Easton’s defnition of politics 
(1953). Last but not least, Political Participation IV refers to politically 
motivated but non-political actions that take a more global approach and 
are only loosely tied to the mechanisms of a political system (e.g., expressing 
viewpoints in social media forums or wearing a badge for a specifc cause). 
As discussed in Chapter 1, this book focuses on non-electoral participation 
and therefore includes Political Participation II, III, and IV, while leaving 
aside Political Participation I. 
The relationship between media consumption 
and political involvement 
Having defned our key concepts, we now turn to the relationships between 
exposure to political information in the media and political involvement. 
We are not the frst to investigate these relationships. While political sci-
ence often does not address the role of the media at all (as an example, see 
Grasso’s [2016] recent comparative analysis), communication science has 
ofered diferent perspectives and models in which the role of the media 
is theorized and tested but the generational perspective neglected. Often, 
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studies focus on one generation—mostly the young—but do not include 
other age groups (Towner & Muñoz, 2018). Before presenting our model, 
we therefore highlight three prominent models that have contributed to our 
understanding of the link between news media and political involvement: the 
Communication Mediation Model, the Orientations-Stimulus-Reasoning-
Orientations-Response (O-S-R-O-R) perspective, and the Opportunity-
Motivation-Ability (OMA) framework. 
As media research began to view media efects as being indirect in nature, 
the Communication Mediation Model (Shah et al., 2017) gained in prom-
inence. This model focuses particularly on political discussion as a vari-
able mediating between political news and participation. The model ‘places 
conversation in a mediating position between news consumption and civic 
engagement, theorizing that use of informational media does not directly 
infuence citizen learning and participatory behaviours, but rather works 
through political discussion’ (Shah et al., 2017, p. 492). A recent update 
of the model emphasizes citizens’ capability to select politically congenial 
news. The new information ecology in combination with the ability to 
express oneself politically via social media lead the authors to conclude that 
‘rather than a pathway from news to talk, the relationship is now more 
clearly reciprocal and interdependent, with social media dynamics shaping 
news content and interpretation, just as news shapes social media reactions 
and discussion’ (Shah et al., 2017, p. 493). 
In a similar vein, Cho and colleagues (2009) introduced the O-S-R-O-R 
perspective as a model of indirect media efects on political engagement. 
The efect of news (S) on political engagement (second R) is infuenced by 
initial orientations (frst O) that precede media use, which results in changes 
in attitudes (second O) and thus behaviours. A reasoning process (frst R), 
consisting of interpersonal and intrapersonal communication, functions as 
a mediator between news use and cognitive- and behaviour-engagement 
outcomes. 
Other research places a premium on the development of political knowl-
edge as a stepping-stone towards political participation. The OMA frame-
work focuses on citizens’ opportunities, motivations, and abilities and 
highlights individual diferences in the likelihood of involvement. As Prior 
(2007) and others have pointed out, changes in the media landscape in the 
past decade have increased citizens’ opportunities to inform themselves, 
acquire knowledge, and ultimately participate in politics. However, in a 
high-choice environment, the degree of learning and participation depends 
largely on citizens’ motivation and ability to learn and participate. 
What unites the Communication Mediation Model, the O-S-R-O-R per-
spective, and the OMA framework is the understanding that media and 
communication are central to political engagement and participation. More-
over, the models acknowledge that the relationship is a process in which the 
selection of media and political information is one part of a relationship, 
and the potential efects are another. While the Communication Mediation 
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Model and the O-S-R-O-R perspective provide a number of important entry 
points—such as the role of political talk and discussions—we build on their 
argument of indirect efects and combine this idea with the key roles played 
by individual predispositions. As such, we are not criticising these previous 
models. Instead, we use their general line of reasoning for building a model 
that captures media use and efects across generations—a perspective that 
is not captured by these models. In our model, we see political involvement 
(political engagement or participation) as both an antecedent and a conse-
quence of exposure to political information in the media. When examining 
how exposure to political information in the media afects citizens’ demo-
cratic involvement, it is crucial to account for the selection process that 
precedes the potential efects. 
All these models, however, expect relationships between key concepts to 
be universal across diferent age groups. Building on research that describes 
the centrality of socialization experiences for citizens’ media consumption 
and their political behaviours, in this book we integrate a generational per-
spective into a model that examines conditions and outcomes of news con-
sumption. Only when we consider the antecedents and efects of exposure 
to political information in the media and distinguish between cohorts with 
diferent socialization experiences do we get closer to a full picture of the 
dynamics at stake. 
Antecedents of exposure to political information in the media 
It is costly to seek out political information in the media, and therefore not 
all citizens are equally likely to do so. Thus, citizens with higher political 
involvement are more likely to turn to the media to get informed about 
politics. The OMA framework (Luskin, 1990; Prior, 2007) can help explain 
this dynamic. It posits that any given behaviour is more likely to take place 
when citizens have many opportunities to engage in that behaviour and
when their motivation and ability to do so are high. 
However, according to Prior (2007), the role of motivation and ability in 
this regard is contingent on opportunities. In earlier times of limited media 
supply, citizens had no choice but to be exposed to political information 
if they used the media. Thus, motivation and ability did not play a crucial 
role in determining the extent to which citizens were exposed to political 
information in the media. However, in today’s high-choice media environ-
ment, citizens have more opportunities than ever before to either seek or 
avoid political information. Given that today’s media environment is char-
acterized by tsunamis of not only political but various other information 
(including a lot of entertainment), motivation and ability are all the more 
important for seeking out information that corresponds to one’s prefer-
ences. Diferent dimensions of political engagement and participation have 
thus become more important for explaining exposure to political informa-
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As a result of recent developments in the media environment, citizens 
with higher political involvement (both political engagement and political 
participation) will be more likely to seek out political information from 
the media since they have more motivation and abilities to do so. In other 
words, citizens who have a higher interest in politics, know more about 
politics, feel more capable of participating, and participate more in difer-
ent political activities are more likely to turn to the media to get informa-
tion about politics (Elenbaas, de Vreese, Schuck, & Boomgaarden, 2014; 
Kruikemeier & Shehata, 2017; Lecheler & de Vreese, 2017; Prior, 2005, 
2007; Reichert & Print, 2019). These selection mechanisms are illustrated 
in Figure 2.1. 
Efects of exposure to political information in the media 
We now move from the antecedents of exposure to political information 
in the media to the subsequent efects of this exposure on political involve-
ment. Considerable scholarly attention has been devoted to whether media 
consumption has a positive impact on political involvement. Focusing frst 
on the consequences of general media use, it has been argued, on the one 
hand, that the media leave people inactive in front of TV sets (Putnam, 
2000). This argument was based on relatively crude measures of time spent 
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that the media play an important role by mobilizing citizens to become 
involved in politics (Norris, 2000). The explanation for these contradicting 
arguments seems to be that the specifc content rather than the medium itself 
makes the diference. Thus, exposure to political information, often opera-
tionalized at news exposure, has been found to be positively related to dif-
ferent dimensions of political involvement (e.g., Norris, 2000; de Vreese & 
Boomgaarden, 2006). In the following, we begin by discussing the potential 
efects of such exposure on political engagement before moving to efects on 
political participation. 
A fundamental part of a well-functioning democracy is that its citizens
have the necessary motivation, knowledge, and competence to understand
and participate in politics (Dahl, 1989; Easton & Dennis, 1967; Zaller,
1992). Citizens need to be knowledgeable in order to make informed deci-
sions (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). And if citizens do not feel competent to
participate, they may have little incentive to participate in politics (Abramson
& Aldrich, 1982). Thus, the decision about participating politically is ideally
based on a sufcient level of political interest, knowledge about politics, and
political efcacy (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). If a person is uninterested
in politics, knows little about politics, or feels incapable of participating,
it makes less sense for that person to act politically. In this way, political
engagement can be seen as a crucial forerunner to political participation. 
It is to be expected that exposure to political news increases political
engagement. Thus, exposure to political information is likely to increase citi-
zens’ political interest as they become informed about diferent political issues
(Boulianne, 2011; Kruikemeier & Shehata, 2017; Lecheler & de Vreese, 2017;
Shehata & Amnå, 2017; Strömbäck & Shehata, 2010). Likewise, exposure
to political information—which includes recent happenings in politics and
society more broadly—will increase citizens’ political knowledge (Barabas &
Jerit, 2009; Kenski & Stroud, 2006; Moeller & de Vreese, 2019; de Vreese &
Boomgaarden, 2006). Following the previous line of reasoning, exposure to
political information is also likely to increase citizens’ feeling of being capable
of participating (Kenski & Stroud, 2006; Moeller et al., 2014). 
Just as exposure to political information is likely to foster political engage-
ment, it is also likely to foster participation in diferent political activities. 
By increasing citizens’ political engagement—through fostering political 
interest, knowledge, and efcacy—the media provide them with a valuable 
currency, which they can exchange for potential political infuence through 
participation in various activities. Several previous studies have shown how 
the news media can have a positive impact on political participation (e.g., de 
Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2006; Eveland & Scheufele, 2000; McLeod et al., 
1999; Newton, 1999). 
Some literature on the news media’s mobilizing role has explored potential 
indirect efects through political engagement on political participation more 
explicitly, in relation to political interest, knowledge, and efcacy (Ander-
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& Wilkes, 2014; Jung, Kim, & de Zúñiga, 2011; Kenski & Stroud, 2006; 
McLeod et al., 1999; Moeller et al., 2014). We will also examine these 
potential indirect efects in our empirical studies. The efect of exposure to 
political information on political engagement and participation as well as 
the indirect efects are illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
A few previous studies have simultaneously taken both selection and 
media efects into account, examining the potential reciprocity in the rela-
tionship between media use and various dimensions of political involvement 
(Eveland, Hayes, Shah, & Kwak, 2005; Kruikemeier & Shehata, 2017; 
Moeller & de Vreese, 2019; Strömbäck & Shehata, 2010, 2018). Though 
taking reciprocity into account in a more comprehensive fashion is valu-
able, our intention is to unfold the process and examine the selection efects
and media efects in more detail. We therefore use a step-by-step approach, 
in order to gain a better understanding of how these processes play out 
across diferent generations. In our EPI framework, we frst look at how 
engagement and participation are part of the selection mechanism of politi-
cal information. We then look at how exposure to political information in 
the media afects engagement and participation. 
The G in EPIG: unpacking the generational perspective 
Knowing that engagement and participation are potential antecedents and 
outcomes of exposure to political information in the media, we return to the 
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generations. As outlined in Chapter 1, younger generations use difer-
ent media to receive political information compared to older generations.
They have access to more political information than any other generation
before them and hence should be better equipped than older generations
to act politically (Dalton, 2017). At the same time, the participation pat-
terns of younger generations notably difer from those of older genera-
tions. These diferences make it worth exploring whether generational
diferences in upbringing and media use are related to distinct participa-
tion patterns. 
Previous research has mainly focused on the conditions for participa-
tion among the younger age cohorts (e.g., Bennett, 2008; Dalton, 2009;
Loader et al., 2014). In contrast, we argue that a comparative perspec-
tive across all generations is valuable if we want to assess how the future
might look for mobilizing citizens to take part in democracies in response
to exposure to political information in the media. In this section we begin
by discussing generational versus life-cycle efects and by defning how
we perceive diferent generations. We move on to focus on how the gen-
erational perspective can be used to explore diferences in the relation-
ship between exposure to political information in the media and political
involvement. 
Cohort versus life-cycle efects 
Research on political behaviour across age groups points to diferences in 
terms of cohort efects and life-cycle efects (Grasso, 2016; Osborne, Sears, 
& Valentino, 2011; Van der Brug & Kritzinger, 2012). Both theories depart 
from the notion of age being the main determinant of diferences in political 
behaviour. On the one hand, citizens have their frst experiences with the 
political system during their adolescence, which leaves a permanent mark 
on their future political engagement. On the other hand, diferent stages in 
life also determine the levels and types of political behaviour among citi-
zens. All generations might not use the new information environment or 
engage and participate similarly (e.g., Bhatti & Hansen, 2012; Briggs, 2017; 
Franklin, 2004; Kleinberg & Lau, 2019; Konzelmann, Wagner, & Rattinger, 
2012). 
The life-cycle efects perspective points towards circumstances that
change over the course of an individual’s life as the main determinants
of diferential political participation across generations. Citizens’ stage of
life infuences their political attitudes and behaviour. For instance, the fre-
quency of participation increases from early adulthood onwards and only
drops in the very last stages of life. In younger years, immediate life chal-
lenges, such as education, career planning, dating, and identity building,
make political involvement less of a priority. When people take on the
responsibilities of adulthood, such as starting a family, work, and paying
taxes, political decisions become more relevant in their lives. Most people
 
 
The EPIG model 23 
therefore start participating more frequently in politics (Dalton, 2017;
Grasso, 2016). 
The cohort efects perspective, in contrast, focuses on how sociohistorical 
events have a special infuence on young citizens who are in their formative 
years compared to other generations (Mannheim, 1928). Citizens’ levels of 
education, the norms and values of their time, and their political socializa-
tion create a ‘generational imprint’ that shapes their political participation 
throughout life. Lower levels of education, for example, may prevent older 
generations from participating in more resource-demanding political activi-
ties (Dalton, 2017). Growing up in times of high educational levels, afu-
ence, and social security may increase the prominence of postmaterialistic 
and self-expressive values among generations that are coming of age, fuelling 
participation in expressive and elite-challenging political activities (Ingle-
hart, 1990). As time goes by, their way of expressing themselves becomes 
habitual and defnes the way a generation engages in politics (Wass, 2007). 
Early experiences with the political system will therefore leave a perma-
nent mark on adolescents and young adults that afects their future political 
behaviour (Davis, 2004; Sears & Valentino, 1997). This perspective thus 
acknowledges that each generation develops its own profle and culture and 
defnes for itself what it sees as important, including in regard to politics 
(Quintelier, 2007). 
It is beyond the purpose of this book to distinguish whether diferences 
in exposure to political information and political involvement are driven 
by cohort or life-cycle efects. Generally, it is very difcult to distinguish 
between cohort and life-cycle efects in the absence of a truly long-term, 
longitudinal research design and long-term data collection (Stubager & 
Hansen, 2013; Walczak et al., 2012). We will thus refrain from making 
any defnitive conclusions on whether the diferences in political behaviour 
between generations are due to cohort or life-cycle efects. Instead, we want 
to draw on both perspectives to argue why generation matters for the rela-
tionship between exposure to political information in the media and politi-
cal involvement. This approach furthermore allows us to detect whether the 
new opportunity structures in media use and political participation intro-
duce or shape inequalities for some generations more than for others (Thor-
son, Xu, & Edgerly, 2018). Before we turn to these arguments, we will frst 
look at what characterizes the diferent generations. 
The fve generations 
In order to understand the beneft of the generational perspective, we need 
to understand how diferent generations have been brought up and hence 
how their socialization into society can be characterized. Defning the exact 
cut-of points for the years of birth for each generation is a challenge. Par-
ticularly for the younger generations, viewpoints vary on when one gen-
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are usually divided into four generations: Traditionalists, Baby Boomers, 
Generation X, and Millennials, also known as Generation Y (e.g., Howe & 
Strauss, 2007). In addition to these four generations, we include the latest 
generation, Generation Z. In order to be at the forefront of determining 
potential diferences among generations, this new generation is especially 
relevant to our examination. Thus, we look at fve diferent birth cohorts: 
Traditionalists (born between 1922 and 1944), Baby Boomers (1945–64), 
Generation X (1965–79), Millennials (1980–94), and Generation Z (born 
1995 and after). Below, we briefy outline the characteristics for each of 
these generations. 
Traditionalists are defned as the birth cohort between 1922 and 1944.
They experienced both the Second World War and the Great Depression
and can generally be argued to respect authorities through values like
obedience, diligence, and duty. Staying true to these values, they built a
great deal of the societal structures that we still live in today (Mangelsdorf,
2014). 
The Baby Boomers, being born at high birth rates between 1945 and 
1964, are characterized as clear opposites to their parental generation: 
optimistic, collectivistic, and embracing the free expression of opinion. In 
contrast to the Traditionalists, they grew up in politically stable and eco-
nomically prosperous times. This prosperity afects their societal engage-
ment: they have been recognized as the frst generation who used their newly 
won spare time for voluntary societal engagement (Howe & Strauss, 2007; 
Mangelsdorf, 2014). 
Generation X refers to citizens born between 1965 and 1979, who grew
up in a highly modern world with less stable social structures, in which
the individual has to choose his or her own education, job, sexuality, fam-
ily type, lifestyle, friends, and so on, with no clear path to follow (Gid-
dens, 1991). During these times, societal fault lines became more obvious:
working families had less time to dedicate to the upbringing of their chil-
dren, and a higher number of divorces and single parents challenged the
traditional family image. Instead of respecting authorities, Generation X
are characterized as independent and autonomous. They have less faith
in political and economic promises and are known as the frst generation
to regard political protest as an appropriate means of political expression
(Mangelsdorf, 2014). At the same time, they accept social diversity over
uniformity. 
Millennials, also known as Generation Y (or ‘why?’ due to their ques-
tioning nature), include citizens born between 1980 and 1994 (Hurrel-
mann & Albrecht, 2014). Their coming-of-age years are characterized
by media coverage about permanent threats: global warming, terror
attacks, and school shootings. Hence, they do not take stability and eco-
nomic well-being for granted but nonetheless decide to keep an optimistic
pace in life. Their upbringing in a globalized world goes hand in hand
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received strong support from their parents and, early on in life, became
used to their opinions being heard during decision-making (see Mangels-
dorf, 2014). 
While Millennials were introduced slowly to the new media environment
with online and digital platforms, Generation Z were born into this new
information age. Those citizens, born after 1995 (also the cut-of age used
by the Pew foundation, for example), are oftentimes referred to as ‘digital
natives’ (Prensky, 2001). Their upbringing in a digital media environment
makes it especially easy for them to operate on social media platforms
(Palfrey & Gasser, 2010; Thomas, 2011). Growing up in the aftermath
of the 9/11 terror attacks and in the middle of the 2008 economic depres-
sion made them perceive the world as rather unsafe but at the same time
sharpened their global awareness (Turner, 2015). This global connection
through digital means feels natural to them and lets them believe in the
power of the network, also when it comes to political participation and
civic engagement. 
Potential diferences across generations 
Two arguments can be made as to why exposure to political information
in the media and political involvement as well as the relationships between
these concepts could potentially vary across generations. First, drawing
on the cohort perspective, diferent generations have experienced difer-
ent societal changes in their formative stages of life. We argue that these
diferences may infuence how citizens navigate the current information
environment and how the information they receive infuences their involve-
ment in society. While older generations have been socialized to use more
traditional media outlets to access political information, younger genera-
tions have been socialized to use new platforms, particularly social media
sites, to access this information (see also Shah, McLeod, & Yoon, 2001).
The digital information age is likely to infuence all generations but is per-
haps more accessible and appealing to the youngest generations. Younger
cohorts may also use the information available to them diferently. For
example, younger people tend to forget knowledge obtained by the media
more quickly than older generations but make up for it through their
skilled use of online source access (Kleinberg & Lau, 2019). The same
applies to political involvement. In particular, the changing forms of par-
ticipation may be more easily accessible to the younger generations rather
than the older ones, who were not brought up with similar participation
opportunities. 
Second, drawing on the life-cycle perspective, in their formative stages of 
life, young citizens are typically more curious and search for ways to express 
or promote themselves, which may infuence both their search for political 
information and their reactions to this information. Further, since attitudes 
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to be more susceptible to media information, whereas older citizens will 
have more stable habits and thus be less susceptible to changes in media use 
and political involvement (Valkenburg & Peters, 2013). 
In sum, one may think about the levels of—and relationships between— 
exposure to political information in the media, political engagement, and 
political participation in the following way. Regarding levels, a life-cycle 
perspective provides the most likely explanation for diferences in legacy 
news media consumption, political engagement, and more traditional forms 
of participation. For example, exposure to political information, engage-
ment, and participation is likely to be higher among Traditionalists and 
Baby Boomers, who are in relatively established stages of their lives. By con-
trast, a cohort perspective more likely explains the higher uptake of political 
information on social media and newer, digitally driven forms of political 
participation among younger generations. 
Regarding relationships between political involvement and exposure to
political information in the media, the life-cycle perspective probably pro-
vides the most likely explanation for diferences that run along generational
lines. For instance, we may, ceteris paribus, expect younger individuals to
be more malleable in their attitudes, implying that they are more likely
to respond to—and be afected by— new political information. Cohort-
specifc relationships, in turn, would be evident, for instance, in the strong
or weak reactions of the various generations to information from some
media sources but not from others. The relevance of cohort and life-cycle
efects for explaining levels of—and relationships between—exposure to
political information in the media and political involvement is illustrated
in Figure 2.3. 
Following this argument, we aim at exploring whether exposure to politi-
cal information and political involvement—and the relationship between 
these two—difer across generations. The generational perspective has been 
integrated into our EPI framework, resulting in the EPIG model, which is 
illustrated in Figure 2.4. We believe that examining the generational per-
spective is of crucial importance to understanding the current confguration 
of our democracies. In addition, it lays the groundwork for understanding 
what may lie ahead. 
Cohort effects Life-cycle effects 
Levels X 
Relationships X 
Figure 2.3 The relevance of cohort and life-cycle efects for explaining levels of— 
and relationships between—exposure to political information in the 
media and political involvement 
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Tradi˙onalists Baby Boomers Genera˙on X Millennials Genera˙on Z 
Antecedents Eects 
Figure 2.4 The Engagement-Participation-Information-Generation (EPIG) model 
Notes. The model illustrates the addition of the generational perspective to the levels of—and 
relationships between—exposure to political information in the media, political engagement, 
and political participation 
Summing up 
In this chapter we have presented the theoretical argument for the rela-
tionship between exposure to political information in the media and 
political involvement—understood as political engagement and political 
participation—across diferent generations. We have focused both on the 
antecedents that determine citizens’ exposure to political information in the 
media and on the subsequent efects of this exposure on political involve-
ment. We have used a framework that we dub the Engagement-Participation-
Information-Generations—or EPIG—model. Approaching these democratic 
behaviours and the relationships between them from a generational perspec-
tive enables us to explore questions of whether and how the youth, in par-
ticular, receive political information diferently from the elderly and whether 
and how this exposure fosters political involvement in society diferently 
across generations. 
3 A multi-methods research design 
In order to examine how exposure to political information in the 
media afects political involvement across generations and vice versa, 
we rely on a comprehensive multi-methods design. In this chapter we 
describe how we combine a fve-wave online survey and a three-wave 
smartphone-based survey, both of a large representative sample of a 
national population, with an automatic content analysis of the major 
news media. We also describe how we operationalize our key concepts 
and conduct our statistical analyses. 
To address the question whether political information and young people’s 
participatory behaviour today are diferent from those of other generations, 
a comprehensive research design is necessary. This chapter unravels the 
methodological approaches applied throughout the book and introduces 
the research design combining multi-wave online surveys and mobile panel 
surveys with content analysis. We provide readers with an overview of the 
data collection procedures and the operationalization of key variables. We 
also provide the information needed to understand our statistical analyses. 
Before doing so, we introduce the Danish case. 
The Danish case 
To comprehensively study the efect of exposure to political information in 
the media on political involvement across diferent generations, we focus on 
a mature democracy, namely Denmark, in which there is ample variation 
in the supply side of political information as well as in the opportunity to 
engage and participate in politics (see also Chapter 1). 
In Denmark, which is characterized by a democratic corporative media 
system (Hallin & Mancini, 2004), news media play an important role in 
informing the public about political afairs. In 2014, the year in which 
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of television on a regular day, spent 117 minutes listening to the radio, 
and about 2 million out of 5.5 million Danes read a newspaper on a daily 
basis (Danish Ministry of Culture, 2015; Danmarks Radio, 2014; see also 
Chapter 1). The relatively high number of Danes consuming news via tra-
ditional media channels is an important precondition for the exploration of 
news-consumption efects on citizens’ levels of political involvement since 
it allows media consumption to have an impact. With 96 percent of house-
holds having internet access and 83 percent of citizens using the internet on 
a daily basis in 2014, online media are evidently widely used in Denmark 
(Danish Ministry of Culture, 2015; World Bank, 2018). With more than 
one-third of citizens accessing news media in 2014 via social media plat-
forms and almost 50 percent via mobile devices, Denmark can be described 
as a digital frontrunner (Danish Ministry of Culture, 2015; Newman, Levy, 
& Nielsen, 2015). Thus, Denmark is an ideal choice to study the efects of 
social media news consumption patterns on political involvement. 
Denmark has two strong public service TV broadcasters (DR and TV 
2), seven national daily newspapers (Politiken, Berlingske, Jyllands-Posten, 
Kristeligt Dagblad, Information, BT, and Ekstra Bladet), a number of local 
and regional newspapers, and a few specialized newspapers (e.g., the fnan-
cial newspaper Børsen). As seen in other countries, younger generations are 
more often early adopters when it comes to technological innovations and 
increasingly turn to digital media, such as news websites, streaming services, 
or social network platforms. Though young people still watch conventional 
fow television and read printed newspapers, the proportion doing so is 
declining (Danish Ministry of Culture, 2017). Since these trends of media 
consumption are in line with those of other Western democracies, Denmark 
is a good case for studying the efects of generational diferences of media 
usage. 
Furthermore, adding to this advantage are a well-functioning democracy
and a broad spectrum of participatory activities that citizens can engage
in. With turnout rates at national elections constantly reaching more than
85 percent, the political consciousness of Danes is high. This is also true of
the younger age brackets, with most young citizens turning out at their very
frst chance to cast their votes (Danmarks Statistik, 2015). The important role
of elections and the strong, concomitant belief in a well-functioning political
system make other types of political participation less pronounced, though a
wide range of possibilities for political expression and activity exists. 
Given that both political information in the media and ways to act politi-
cally are broadly available, opportunity structures for news exposure and 
political participation in Denmark are high. However, the relative unim-
portance of political participation, apart from voting, makes Denmark an 
interesting case for observing media efects on political involvement because 
the threshold for political information to spark engagement is rather high. 
The strong digital media environment is helpful to discover generational 























30 A multi-methods research design 
media usage. This combination makes Denmark an especially interesting 
object of study. 
Design 
To study the relationship between exposure to political news and political
involvement, we apply a comprehensive panel design. First, between Novem-
ber 2014 and November 2015, we conducted a fve-wave online survey of a
representative sample of the Danish population; three waves were conducted
during non-election times and two around the 2015 Danish national election.1 
To obtain a more precise estimate of the amount of political information the
respondents were exposed to, survey measures of media exposure were linked
with an automated content analysis at the media outlet level. In addition, a
subsample of the panellists participated in a mobile media diary survey that
was conducted on their smartphones, which aimed at tapping exposure to
political information on social media. This dynamic, multi-methods research
design helps make frmer causal interpretations of news selection and media
efects by following changes in the key variables over time (Slater, 2007, 2015). 
Sample 
To tap citizens’ exposure to political information in the media and their 
political involvement, we use original, national, online survey data. Since 
96 percent of Danish households have access to the internet (World Bank, 
2018), online surveys are an appropriate research strategy. Due to well-
known difculties in ensuring decent numbers of respondents in survey 
research, a multiple-sample strategy was used. Figure 3.1 illustrates the dif-
ferent samples and their response and retention rates throughout the fve 
online and the three mobile survey waves. 
Online survey sample 
Starting with the online panel survey, the upper part of Figure 3.1 shows that
the respondents consist of a general population sample, a sample of elderly
citizens (older than 61 years) and a youth sample (17–21 years). We col-
laborated with the Danish pollster company Epinion to conduct the surveys.
The general and the elderly samples were recruited from Epinion’s database,
with representative characteristics of the Danish population. Since Epinion
mainly conducts market research, their panellists are less likely to be biased
towards politically interested citizens. Their database is invitation-only and
is maintained using face-to-face, web, and telephone interviews. The sam-
pling strategy used a light quota on age and gender. Email invitations and
reminders were sent out in four batches during the frst wave to adjust for
potential biases in these quotas. A total of 10,315 people were invited for the
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To secure the inclusion of citizens from the youngest generations, a ran-
dom sample of 9,000 citizens aged 17–21 years who were eligible to vote for 
the frst time in the upcoming national elections were invited to participate 
in the survey. These young respondents were randomly sampled through 
the Danish Civil Registration (CPR) system, which is a complete register of 
all residents in Denmark. The representative sample of frst-time voters was 
invited by letter to participate in the survey. The letters included a unique 
username and password as well as a link and QR code to access the online 
survey. Where possible, Epinion subsequently registered respondents’ tele-
phone numbers (approximately 70 percent). This part of the sample received 
reminders via telephone calls and text messages. The remaining part of the 
sample received reminders by letter. 
In order to secure a broad and diverse starting sample for our data col-
lection, the feld period for the frst wave started in late November 2014 
and ran over a longer period, until the beginning of January 2015. A total 
of 9,125 respondents participated in this frst wave, with response rates 
ranging from 19 percent among the youth sample to 45 percent in the gen-
eral sample and 59 percent in the elderly sample. The second wave was 
conducted approximately four months later in mid-April 2015. In late May 
and at the start of June, wave 3 was conducted as a pre-election wave. This 
wave was felded as the prime minister called the election to be held on 
June 18, 2015. National elections in Denmark can be called at any time 
with a minimal three-week notice. Starting right after election day, wave 
4 was conducted as a post-election wave in late June. Lastly, wave 5 was 
conducted approximately four months after the election in late October to 
the start of November. Highest retention throughout the feld period was 
achieved among elderly respondents (83 to 93 percent), followed by the 
general sample (74 to 91 percent) and the youth sample (53 to 85 percent). 
The analytic approach applied in this book relies on the participation 
of respondents in all fve survey waves. Therefore, the results presented 
throughout the book are based on a total number of 3,490 respondents. The 
average age of this sample is 55 years, with 52 percent of respondents being 
female. In regard to education, 41 percent had fnished primary, vocational, 
or high school; 37 percent, a short- or medium-cycle higher education; and 
21 percent a long-cycle higher education. Though the sample refects general 
population data closely, retaining only a share of the respondents through-
out the fve panel waves leaves us with some bias in the sample’s composi-
tion (see Tables A3.1 and A3.2 in the Appendix). 
Mobile survey sample 
Media exposure is subject to recall bias, especially when it comes to short-
time social media exposure (Slater, 2004; Ohme, Albæk, & de Vreese, 
2016). By including a mobile media diet study in our design, we were able 
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information on social media. We asked respondents on a total number of 35 
days to report their political social media exposure in a smartphone-based 
media diary. The days were spread over three waves that were diferent 
from the online survey waves. To increase the number of potential respon-
dents, the smartphone-based media diary was accessible to the respondents 
via an app or in their smartphone’s mobile browser. The app was developed 
in close collaboration with the pollster so that design and layout of the 
mobile browser version and the app were almost identical. Respondents 
could choose which of the two platforms they wanted to use for the mobile 
diary survey and were contacted via text message or push message, respec-
tively. On each day of the study, we sent out invitations at 9:45 p.m. The 
time was chosen based on a pre-test in which late send-outs resulted in 
higher response rates than early send-outs in the morning (Ohme, de Vreese, 
& Albæk, 2017). To facilitate the ubiquitous mobile measurements—to be 
taken anywhere, anytime—the diary survey was designed for rapid comple-
tion by respondents, while they were on the go or had little time at home. 
Subsequently, the average response time was 1 minute and 33 seconds. 
The sample characteristics for the mobile survey are reported in the lower 
part of Figure 3.1. Participants were recruited from our total online sample 
in wave 1. About half of the respondents agreed to be invited to participate 
in the mobile media diary study. The feld periods of the three mobile waves 
are diferent from the original online survey waves, as can be seen in Fig-
ure 3.1. In wave 1 of the mobile survey, which was conducted at the end 
of February 2015, more than half of the invited respondents participated 
at least once. In the subsequent waves, 84 to 90 percent of the respondents 
were retained. Wave two of the mobile survey was conducted in June 2015 
during election time, and wave 3 in October 2015. To develop a solid mea-
surement based on the daily survey answers, we decided to include only par-
ticipants who responded to the mobile surveys on four or more days of each 
mobile wave. Furthermore, to have all data needed for our analysis at hand, 
only respondents who participated in all fve waves of the general online 
survey and in mobile waves one, two, and three were included in the analy-
ses. These restrictions leave us with a total number of 534 respondents, for 
which we have all the necessary information to analyze the predictors and 
efects of their political social media usage. 
The subsample for the mobile survey consists of respondents with an aver-
age age of 50 (min = 18, max = 80), with 48 percent of them being female. As
for our main online sample, most respondents’ highest educational achieve-
ment was a primary, vocational, or high school degree (44 percent), fol-
lowed by 31 percent with a short- or medium-cycle higher education, and
25 percent with a long-cycle higher education. If we compare these main
characteristics of our subsample with the main online sample characteristics,
only slight diferences are visible. Since the subsample relied on the use of
smartphones, we tested further for diferences in mobile internet use between
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of their internet time was spent on their mobile phones. In our subsample,
the number is 40 percent. Though the diference is not large, we have to keep
this characteristic of the subsample in mind when interpreting the results. 
Having described the sample in detail, the chapter proceeds with a descrip-
tion of the operationalization of the key variables: political news exposure, 
political social media exposure, political engagement, political participa-
tion, and the diferent generations. Descriptive statistics of all variables can 
be seen in Table A3.3 in the Appendix. 
Media consumption: assessing exposure to political information 
The ways in which citizens receive information about political afairs nowa-
days have changed signifcantly, as have the possibilities to assess and ana-
lyze media exposure (de Vreese & Neijens, 2016; see Chapter 1). We try to 
address the challenges of measuring media consumption in a ‘high-choice 
media environment’ (Prior, 2007), in which a more diversifed selection of 
media outlets results in more fragmented audiences (Bennett & Iyengar, 
2008). This book looks at two concepts of political media use. ‘Political 
news exposure’ describes the frequency of exposure to a list of media chan-
nels and outlets, weighted by the amount of political content present in the 
relevant time period of the investigation. ‘Political social media exposure’ 
specifes the relative exposure to political information on social media plat-
forms during each of the three waves with smartphone-based media diaries. 
Political news exposure 
To capture an inclusive picture of people’s news media usage, the frequency 
of exposure to a comprehensive list of 14 newspapers, websites, and tele-
vision newscasts was measured (Andersen, Albæk, & de Vreese, 2016; 
Dilliplane, Goldman, & Mutz, 2013). More specifcally, we asked about 
exposure to the three most read national broadsheet newspapers (Berling-
ske, Jyllands-Posten, and Politiken), the two most read national tabloids 
(BT and Ekstra Bladet), and the newscasts of the two national broadcasters 
(DR and TV 2) as well as their respective online appearances (bt.dk, ber-
lingske.dk, dr.dk, ekstrabladet.dk, jp.dk, politiken.dk, tv2.dk). These survey 
measures were combined with an automated content analysis of the respec-
tive media outlets to create a measure of how much political information 
the respondents were exposed to in the news media. This procedure helps 
to ensure that we investigate efects of exposure to content with political 
relevance, rather than relying on ‘empty exposure’ measures. The connec-
tion of survey data with content analysis (also known as linkage analysis) 
is recommended and has been successfully applied in previous media efects 
research (de Vreese et al., 2017; Scharkow & Bachl, 2016; but see Fazekas 
& Larsen, 2016). This elaborate procedure is benefcial for this book’s pur-
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media environment and ensures focusing on media efects that are specif-
cally evoked by political content. 
In order to capture the amount of political information, an automated
content analysis based on keywords was conducted, which allows us to col-
lect a large amount of data efciently (de Graaf & van der Vossen, 2013;
Matthes & Kohring, 2008). The automated content analysis was conducted
using the online database Infomedia, which stores all Danish news items.
Through three steps, the search string was specifed by defning the concepts,
identifying and specifying search words, and programming the rules, using
a series of iterations to increase precision in the fnal search string (Matthes
& Kohring, 2008; Shah, Watts, Domke, & Fan, 2002). Following Easton’s
(1953, p. 146) well-known defnition of politics as dealing with the authori-
tative allocation of scarce goods, we understand politics as a situation in
which actors (e.g., politicians or interest organizations) try to infuence this
allocation of goods in society. A list of keywords was identifed based on
readings of relevant books, journal articles, and several random news items
to identify words signalizing politics (e.g., party names, political institutions
and positions). The search string specifed that at least one political keyword
had to be present in the news items for political information to be present (see
Figure A3.1 in the Appendix; see also Bjarnøe, de Vreese, & Albæk, 2020). 
To test the quality and reproducibility of the content analysis, an inter-
coder reliability test was conducted to secure that, within a tolerable margin
of error, a human being would agree with the data provided by the search
string. Two human coders manually coded 63 random news items for whether
they contained political information. The sample was drawn on three ran-
dom days between November 23, 2014 and December 27, 2015, in which
three news items were randomly selected in each of three national broadsheet
newspapers (Politiken, Berlingske, and Jyllands-Posten), two national tab-
loid newspapers (Ekstra Bladet and BT), and two national television news
shows (DR at 6:30 p.m. and TV 2 at 7:00 p.m.). The results between the two
human coders were highly satisfying, with a Krippendorf’s alpha score of
.90, while it was acceptable, though lower, between one of the authors and
the machine (the search string) with a score of .74, indicating satisfying data
quality (De Swert, 2012; Krippendorf, 2003). 
The amount of political information was calculated as the average
amount of news items containing political information of the total num-
ber of news items in each news outlet in a specific period.2 In the sur-
veys, the respondents reported their media usage during the last seven
days. Our weight for political information was based on the seven days
leading up to the first day that the survey was running and the follow-
ing three days (ten days in total) since most respondents reported their
media use during those days. The amount of political information in all
news outlets is illustrated in Figure 3.2. Generally, the national broad-
sheet newspapers and television newscasts, both offline and online, have
the highest amount of political information, followed by the national
 
  
















Berlingske Tidende, W1 
Berlingske Tidende, W2 
Berlingske Tidende, W3 
Berlingske Tidende, W4 




































Ekstra Bladet, W1 
Ekstra Bladet, W2 
Ekstra Bladet, W3 
Ekstra Bladet, W4 






DR1 TV Avisen (6.30 pm), W1 
DR1 TV Avisen (6.30 pm), W2 
DR1 TV Avisen (6.30 pm), W3 
DR1 TV Avisen (6.30 pm), W4 






TV 2 Nyhederne (7.00 pm), W1 
TV 2 Nyhederne (7.00 pm), W2 
TV 2 Nyhederne (7.00 pm), W3 
TV 2 Nyhederne (7.00 pm), W4 



























































































A multi-methods research design 37 
tabloid newspapers, both ofine and online. However, in wave 4 (the post-
election wave) and wave 5, the amount of political information in the two 
television newscasts was noticeably high. Taken together, our content analy-
sis shows variation in the amount of political information both across out-
lets and over time. In other words, it matters for our respondents’ level of 
exposure to political information which news media outlets they utilized. 
The actual linkage of the survey and the content analysis was done by 
multiplying exposure to specifc media outlets with the amount of politi-
cal information in that media outlet. Afterwards, these weighted exposure 
measures were combined to an index with a theoretical range from zero to 
100. However, since none of the news outlets contained 100 percent politi-
cal information, the empirical range is lower and varies from wave to wave, 
dependent on the coverage. 
Political social media exposure 
In today’s hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2013), particularly young peo-
ple increasingly access media information via intermediaries like social net-
work sites (Newman, Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos, & Levy, 2017). Hence, it is 
important to assess social media news use in a detailed manner. However, 
this comes with a number of challenges: short-term exposure to content 
that respondents can hardly recall, a greater amount of available informa-
tion sources than could ever be listed, and the difculty of disentangling on 
which platform information has actually been received. 
To obtain a reliable assessment of citizens’ social media exposure to polit-
ical information, respondents used a media diary with daily surveys on their 
smartphones. The daily questions were structured according to reception 
modes (listening, reading, watching) and helped extract the consumption 
of political information via links on social media from other media sources 
(Engel & Best, 2012; Ohme et al., 2016). The full list of questions can be 
found in Figure A3.2 in the Appendix. 
Each participant of the frst survey wave was invited to take part in short
surveys on his or her smartphone, in which questions about the participant’s
social media use on the respective day were asked.3 The respondents had the
opportunity to take the diary surveys in an especially developed app or via
their mobile browsers and were issued an invitation every night at 9:45 p.m.
via push message or text message, respectively. Asking about political content
rather than ‘news’ has been shown to be more reliable when investigating news
media exposure on social media (Vraga, Bode, Smithson, & Troller-Renfree,
2016). People were asked whether they had heard, read, or watched ‘some-
thing about politics’ on social media on the given day. To account for the
varying days of participation, a relative exposure measure was calculated.4 
The relative measure ranged from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating exposure to politi-
cal content on social media on all days that the respondent had participated.
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participated four or more days were included in the analysis (see Figure 3.1).
Due to the multiple political information sources citizens have at hand on social
media, we refrained from conducting a subsequent content analysis. Instead,
we applied an innovative questioning strategy that helped citizens determine if
they had been exposed to political content via social media or not. 
Political engagement 
We concentrate on three dimensions of political engagement that have 
received high attention as antecedents and outcomes of political media con-
sumption in previous research: political interest, political knowledge, and 
political efcacy (see also Chapter 2). 
Political interest is a psychological state of mind referring to a person’s 
curiosity about politics. It is understood as an intrinsic motivation and is 
expressed by personal self-rating (Shehata & Amnå, 2017; see also Lazars-
feld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1948; van Deth, 1990). In each wave, we there-
fore asked respondents to rate their general political interest between not 
interested at all (0) and very interested (10), which is a standard measure in 
public opinion research (Shani, 2009). 
Political knowledge in this book is defned as people’s knowledge about 
recent happenings in politics and society (Barabas et al., 2014). This 
approach is appropriate when we study the process leading to changes in 
political engagement because it taps current political developments and 
ongoing learning acquired from the media (Barabas & Jerit, 2009). In order 
to measure this concept, in each wave respondents were asked four ques-
tions that covered similar topic areas and had a comparable level of dif-
fculty but asked for diferent content. With few exceptions, each question 
had four answer categories and a ‘don’t know’ category, and participants 
had 20 seconds to respond. ‘Don’t know’ responses and missing values were 
coded as incorrect answers. In total, 20 questions were asked across the fve 
waves (see all questions in Table A3.4 in the Appendix). 
Political efcacy is generally understood as the feeling a person has that 
his or her political activities have—or can have—an impact on the political 
system (Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1954). Efcacy was measured in all 
waves by asking respondents how strongly they agreed or disagreed with a 
battery of fve standard statements on a fve-point scale. Subsequently, an 
additive index was formed and showed satisfying reliability (see full list of 
statements in Table A3.5 in the Appendix). 
Political participation 
To assess the relationship between media consumption and political behav-
iour, we are inspired by van Deth’s (2014) distinction between four types of
participation: namely, political participation that (1) takes place in the politi-
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community issues (PP III), and (4) is a non-political but politically motivated
activity (PP IV). The latter two types have received signifcant attention and
are often subsumed under terms like ‘civic engagement’ (Zukin et al., 2006)
or ‘unconventional participation’ (Linssen, Schmeets, Scheeper, & te Groten-
huis, 2014). In particular, young people fnd such forms of political partici-
pation attractive, and it is therefore important to apply a broad concept of
participation to detect participation diferences between generations. 
To operationalize the framework suggested by Van Deth (2014) and its
extension by Theocharis (2015), 23 items were assigned to four diferent
types of political participation (see Table A3.6 in the Appendix). We included
a similar number of digital and non-digital activities undertaken at both the
local and the national levels of government. The activities were selected from
previous studies and surveys (Ekström & Östman, 2015; Ekström, Olsson,
& Shehata, 2014; GLES, 2013; Portney & O’Leary, 2007; Stolle, Hooghe,
& Micheletti, 2005; Yndigegn & Levinsen, 2015). Activities referring to
participation within political institutions or stipulated as constitutional
decision-making were identifed as specimens of PP I (e.g., voting, being a
party member). Activities are targeting the political sphere (PP II) if they refer
directly to political institutions (e.g., visiting a politician, signing a petition)
or happen in a state-guaranteed framework of protest (e.g., participating in a
demonstration). Activities address issues at a community level (PP III) if they
refer to a direct action with immediate outcomes on a local level (e.g., sup-
porting a community’s crowdfunding project, volunteering in a local organi-
zation). For non-political but politically motivated activities (PP IV), pertinent
considerations and the political purpose need to be emphasized (e.g., boycot-
ting products for political purposes, expressing an opinion on social media
about a political issue). A confrmatory factor analysis was undertaken based
on the data from the frst survey wave and revealed a sufcient distinctiveness
between the four types of political participation (Ohme, de Vreese, & Albæk,
2018a; see Figure A3.3 in the Appendix for full model and factor loadings). 
In addition to these four types of political participation, we also measure 
campaign participation during election time. We used two diferent opera-
tionalizations of campaign participation. In both operationalizations, we 
asked if the respondents planned or had conducted 12 political activities 
during the election. In the post-election wave 4, we asked respondents to 
indicate if they had engaged in particular behaviours during the election on 
a dichotomous scale (No/Yes). The answers were then summarized in a cam-
paign participation index indicating average amounts of the types of partici-
pation in which the respondents had been involved during the election. In 
wave 3 (pre-election), we asked the respondents to assess the probability of 
conducting a specifc type of behaviour on a scale from 1 (not likely at all) 
to 11 (very likely). An overview of the items used and their frequencies is 
found in Table A3.7 in the Appendix. The answers were summarized in an 
index indicating the average probability of participating during an election. 




40 A multi-methods research design 
participation indexes were rescaled to a 0–1 continuous variable, where 0 
indicates the lowest level of (intended) participation and 1, the highest. We 
reconstructed the two indexes as a relative measure to make the two difer-
ent operationalizations comparable. 
Age and generations 
Our analyses rely on a distinction between fve diferent generations: Tradi-
tionalists (born between 1922–44), Baby Boomers (1945–64), Generation 
X (1965–79), Millennials (1980–94; also known as Generation Y), and the 
latest Generation Z (born 1995 and after). Defning exact cut-of points 
for the years of birth for each generation is a challenge; particularly for the 
younger generations, opinions difer as to when one generation ends and 
the next one begins. The Pew Centre recently described 1996 as the last 
year of birth for members of the Millennial cohort (Dimock, 2018). While 
it initially refrained from giving the youngest generation a name (Dimock, 
2018), the term ‘Generation Z’ has recently established itself in the inter-
national literature (Dimock, 2019; Mangelsdorf, 2015), and we therefore 
also use it. Broad agreement is found for the existence of the four other 
generations: Traditionalists, Baby Boomers, Generation X, and Millennials 
(Dimock, 2018; Howe & Strauss, 2007). 
To determine which generation respondents belonged to, we asked for 
their year of birth and sorted the answers in the generation brackets (see 
Chapter 2). As mentioned in the sample description, we intentionally overs-
ampled younger and older citizens in our study to secure a reliable age dis-
tribution on both ends of the generational spectrum. As seen in Table 3.1, 
Table 3.1 Age span and number of respondents per generation 
Generation Born Age in Percentages Percentages Number of 
2014 (number) of (number) of respondents 
respondents in respondents in in relation 
wave 1 wave 5 to number 
of years in 
age bracket 
Traditionalists 1922–1944 92–70 14.2 % (1,297) 17.9 % (626) 27,2 
Baby Boomers 1945–1964 69–50 33.8 % (3,083) 43.6 % (1,520) 76,0 
Generation X 1965–1979 49–35 11.4 % (1,039) 19.4 % (679) 45,3 
Millennials 1980–1994 34–20 19.7 % (1,793) 12.6 % (440) 29,3 
Generation Z 1995–1997 19–17 20.1 % (1,906) 6.5 % (225) 75,0 
Notes: The number of respondents in relation to age brackets is calculated by dividing the total 
number of respondents included in the analysis of the book by the number of years that the age 
Final number of respondents 
bracket spans over. The equation is as follows: . In the case of
Number of years in age bracket 
Generation Z, our fnal n = 225 and the age bracket spans over three years. Therefore, we have 
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this efort was successful when we look at the age distribution of our origi-
nal sample in the frst wave. When it comes to the numbers of respondents 
who participated in all fve waves (the sample analyzed in this book), the age 
distributions shift. Due to panel attrition, we lose more participants from 
the two youngest generations, while the percentage of Traditionalists, Baby 
Boomers, and Generation X increases. However, the age span is diferent 
for each generation bracket. If we compare the number of participants from 
each generation to the number of years that the age brackets cover, (see the 
last column in Table 3.1.), sufcient numbers of participants are included 
in our analysis. 
Analytic approach 
Our comprehensive multi-methods design provides us with solid data to ana-
lyze cross-generational diferences in the efects of media exposure to political
information on political involvement and vice versa. In each of the follow-
ing empirical chapters, we will explore these diferences using roughly the
same analytic structure. In general, we rely on respondents participating in all
fve online survey waves (N = 3,490). For the analysis relying on the mobile
survey, respondents were included only if they, in addition to the fve online
survey waves, had also participated in at least four mobile surveys (N = 534). 
In each chapter, we frst examine how the average level of the main vari-
able under consideration varies across generations and over time. In other 
words, we examine how levels of exposure to political information in the 
media, political engagement, and political participation difer across the fve 
generations over the fve online waves and the three mobile waves. 
Second, we examine how the relationship under consideration difers 
across generations on a static and a dynamic level. In order to do so, we 
nest waves within each respondent and use OLS regressions to analyze how 
the relevant independent variables correlate across generations when con-
trolling for other variables (static models) and how the relevant independent 
variables afect changes over time in the main dependent variable under 
consideration (dynamic models). Changes in the main variable are analyzed 
by including a lagged dependent variable. By doing so, we utilize the panel 
feature of our data to examine how diferences in levels of the relevant inde-
pendent variable explain changes in levels of the dependent variable (Finkel, 
1995; Markus, 1979). 
Lastly, in the chapters examining political participation, we utilize struc-
tural equation modelling with group comparison (Acock, 2013; van Spanje 
& Azrout, 2019) to examine the potential indirect efects of exposure to 
political information in the media on political participation through politi-
cal engagement. When doing so, we likewise nest time within individuals 
and explore both static and dynamic relationships, using a bootstrap resam-
pling technique (Hayes, 2013). 
From an analytical point of view, when analysing age efects on the basis 
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case, it is difcult to distinguish between generation or life-cycle efects (see 
also Chapter 2). The problem arises because pre-adulthood socialization 
is known to afect people’s political behaviour later in life. As such, any 
diferences in media use or political involvement across generations at the 
time of measurement can be explained partly by preferences that meet the 
demands of people’s current situation (life-cycle efects) or by opinions that 
were developed during people’s formative youth (cohort efects) (Stubager 
& Hansen, 2013; Walczak, Van Der Brug, & de Vries, 2012). We will thus 
refrain from making any defnitive conclusions on whether the diferences in 
political behaviour between generations are due to generation or life-cycle 
efects. However, we discuss the likelihood of these two options more spe-
cifcally when the results are presented in subsequent chapters. 
Summing up 
The analyses presented in the remaining part of the book rely on a multi-
methods design consisting of a fve-wave online survey, a three-wave mobile 
survey, and an automated content analysis, all conducted in Denmark. The 
measurements of the key variables of interest are detailed, providing us with 
elaborate information on respondents’ exposure to political information in 
the media and on their political involvement. Together, this sophisticated 
setup provides us with comprehensive data for analysing how these behav-
iours and the relationships between them vary across generations and over 
time. 
Notes 
1 Two additional waves conducted around the 2015 Danish European Union opt-
out referendum and the 2017 Danish local elections were part of this project but 
are not included in the analyses in this book. A number of survey experiments 
were also part of the research project; the results of these experiments are likewise 
not discussed in this book. 
2 The mathematical equation is as follows: The amount of political information , where 
˛x x x x x x x x x x˙ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10the numbers refer = ˙ + + + + + + + + + /10  to˙ ˘˝n n n n n n n n n n ˇ1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
day 1, day 2, and so on; n, to the total number of news items in a day; and x, to 
the number of news items containing political information. 
3 The daily surveys also asked about political information exposure on platforms 
other than social media. The analysis in this book, however, relies only on the 
social media-related exposure measures. 
Daysof exposure
4 The equation is as follows: 
Daysof participation 
4 Being exposed to political 
information in the media 
Being exposed to political information in the media is of key impor-
tance for getting involved in politics. In this chapter we show that the 
level of political information that citizens are exposed to in the news 
media and on social media varies over time, markedly increasing dur-
ing election time. Furthermore, we show that exposure to political 
information is dependent on which generation citizens belong to and 
on their political engagement and participation. While older genera-
tions have a higher use of political news media, younger generations 
are more exposed to political information on social media platforms. 
Further, political engagement and participation have positive efects 
on political news media use but less so on political social media use. 
Citizens in modern Western democracies live in a world saturated with 
information—both political and non-political. Given society’s technologi-
cal transformation during the past decades, the availability of news media 
outlets has proliferated. In addition, with the rise of social media sites, 
new opportunities for gaining information about politics have appeared. 
On Facebook, for example, citizens can choose to follow diferent groups 
and pages to obtain information about politics. Consequently, citizens in 
contemporary Western democracies are in a position where they can create 
their own personal media diets with varying degrees of political informa-
tion corresponding to their individual preferences (Arceneaux & Johnson, 
2013; Prior, 2007). If people have a high preference for seeking out politi-
cal information, they can easily do so; they can fnd political information 
in numerous television news shows or newspapers, they can access this 
information from news outlets’ online websites, or they can get exposed to 
such information on social media sites. Citizens cope with increasing choice 
through diferent strategies. Some develop ways to fnd reliable sources that 
ft their needs, while others lack the skills to do so. For the latter, being 











44 Being exposed to political information 
altogether (Edgerly, 2017). Especially among the youth, a major share 
report low levels of news use and are consequently termed ‘news avoid-
ers’ (Edgerly, Vraga, Bode, Thorson, & Thorson, 2018). In a high-choice 
environment, citizens having no preference for news can fnd alternative 
media content very easily. For example, they can watch series or movies on 
television channels devoted to such content, or they can subscribe to services 
such as Netfix or HBO, which provide endless amounts of entertainment. 
Alternatively, they can follow pages or be part of groups on Facebook or 
other social media sites devoted to precisely the type of content that they 
most like. 
In this chapter we examine what determines whether people are exposed 
to political information in the news media and on social media. In order to 
do so, we address three questions. First, we examine how saturated the news 
media is with political information and whether the amount of political 
information varies over the time of the investigation. Second, we examine 
whether the amount of political information that citizens are exposed to 
in the news media and on social media difers across generations. Third, 
we examine how each generation’s political involvement (i.e., their politi-
cal engagement and participation) is related to their exposure to political 
information in the media. 
The amount of political information over time 
For people to be exposed to information about politics, the media frst
need to present them with news. In order to examine how much political
information the news media contain, we conducted an automated content
analysis of the 14 national Danish media outlets in parallel with our fve
panel survey waves (see Chapter 3 for methodological details). Figure 4.1
shows the general results of this content analysis by illustrating the percent-
age of political information in the news media across our fve waves. We
fnd that the amount of political information across diferent news media
outlets lies within a range of 30–50 percent. We see an increase in the
amount of political information in the survey waves surrounding the elec-
tion (waves 3 and 4), with the highest amount of political information after
election day (wave 4). 
The increase in political information during the election campaign seems 
reasonable. Politics is a dynamic process, and the media’s political news cov-
erage fuctuates around important political events, such as national budget 
negotiations and parliamentary elections. As a consequence, these politi-
cal events provide citizens with more opportunities for getting exposed to 
political information in the media. Elections, in particular, structure politi-
cal work and the attention devoted to politics (Downs, 1972). As an election 
draws closer, political parties make a greater efort to obtain favourable 
media coverage, the news media pay more attention to politics, and the citi-









































Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 
(pre-elecon) (post-elecon) 
Figure 4.1 Political information in the news media over time 
Notes. The amounts of political information were estimated by calculating the average of all 
news articles/features containing political information of the total number of news articles/ 
features in each news outlet in a specifc period. For more details on the content analysis, see 
Chapter 3. 
politics (Van Aelst & De Swert, 2009). After election day, the media covers 
the election results and the formation of the new government. In Chap-
ter 10, we will turn our attention the consequences of an increase in political 
information in the news during the election period. 
Exposure to political information in the media 
across generations 
Having seen how much political information the news media contains over 
time, we will now examine how much political information diferent gen-
erations are exposed to in the news media and on social media. To examine 
exposure to political information in the news media, we link our panel sur-
vey data to the content analysis. We thereby capture the amount of political 
information that each of our respondents is exposed to in the news media 
across time. To examine exposure to political information on social media, 
we rely on smartphone-based diary measures (see Chapter 3 for method-
ological details). Following the Engagement-Participation-Information-
Generation (EPIG) model, which we presented in Chapter 2, we expect 
 
  
























W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 
Figure 4.2 Average political news exposure over time across generations 
Notes. Estimates are based on the mean exposure to political information in news media within 
each generation in each panel survey wave. Exposure to political information is estimated by 
linking the panel survey data to the content analysis (see Chapter 3 for methodological details). 
higher political news use among the older generation and higher political 
social media use among the younger generation. 
Figure 4.2 shows the average political news exposure over time across 
generations. As seen from the fgure, there are clear diferences in the 
amount of political information that each generation is exposed to in the 
news media. The Traditionalists are exposed to the highest amount of politi-
cal information in the news media, followed by Baby Boomers. Genera-
tion X is exposed to the third highest amount of political information in 
the news media, followed by Millennials, while Generation Z is exposed to 
the lowest amount. These diferences are maintained throughout the whole 
period of investigation. 
Generally, across all generations, citizens get exposed to more political 
information as the election nears, while political news exposure drops after 
the election. By then, political information stabilizes to a level similar to 
the period before the election was called. This drop, however, appears to 
be largest for the younger generations. The pattern of exposure follows the 
amount of political information in the news media that we identifed in our 
content analysis earlier (see Figure 4.1). This correspondence suggests that 
the amount of political information supplied by the news media conditions 
the level of information that citizens receive. Thus, news media seem to 
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Figure 4.3 Average political social media exposure over time across generations 
Notes. Estimates are based on the mean exposure to political information on social media 
within each generation in each mobile wave. The political social media exposure measure is 
based on the mobile media diary study (see Chapter 3), in which the respondents reported daily 
whether they had been exposed to political content on social media. 
have an important role in determining the level of political information that 
citizens are exposed to. 
As mentioned previously, citizens are exposed to political information 
not only in the news media; social media likewise ofer ample opportunities 
for gaining political information. Figure 4.3 shows political social media 
exposure for each of the three mobile waves across the fve generations. 
The amount of exposure is estimated from respondents’ reports on how 
often they were exposed to political information on social media relative 
to the number of days they participated in the diary study. An amount of 
20 percent, for example, means that respondents were exposed to political 
information on social media on 20 percent of the days for which they have 
reported their exposure in general (for more details see Chapter 3). 
As seen from Figure 4.3, the youngest generations (Millennials and Gen-
eration Z) most often and almost equally reported being exposed to politi-
cal information on social media sites, whereas the older generations are 
exposed to political information less often on such platforms. As was the 
case with political news exposure, we also see an increase in political social 
media exposure as the election nears. In particular, the younger genera-
tions experience a large increase in this type of exposure, while the other 
generations also experience an increase, albeit less noticeably. Once again, 
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exposure after the election drops to approximately the same level as before 
the election. 
According to the generational perspective, which we presented as part of 
the EPIG model in Chapter 2, these diferences in levels of political news 
exposure can be understood in two ways. The result that older cohorts use 
more news media via traditional sources is in line with the life-cycle argu-
ment, posing that people, the older they get, turn more towards news in 
general. On top, a cohort efect might be present, since older generations 
became socialized with using traditional media sources for political infor-
mation. In turn, the fnding that younger generations turn more to social 
media to receive news can most likely be explained by a cohort efect. Social 
media platforms have only been around for a decade, hence all citizens had 
equal amount of time to start using them for news exposure. The fnding 
that young people do so more is most likely caused by their socialization in 
a digital media environment. 
Why is the post-election drop in exposure to political information most 
pronounced for the younger generations—Millennials and Generation Z? 
One reason may be that they engage heavily in personally relevant projects 
for a short period of time before turning their attention to other projects 
(Andersen, 2011; Dalton, 2017; Mangelsdorf, 2014; Milkman, 2017). Fur-
thermore, since they are not as familiar with voting and not as certain who 
to vote for as are older generations, they may have a greater need to consult 
news media during an election campaign (Aalberg & Jenssen, 2007; Colwell 
Quarles, 1979). Hence, generational diferences in media exposure during 
election times compared to non-election times may be related to varying 
generational life cycles. Nevertheless, our results clearly show that both 
older and younger generations make use of the opportunities that are avail-
able to them to gain exposure to political information in the media. The 
next question is how the antecedents outlined in our EPIG model relate to 
this behaviour. 
Antecedents of exposure to political information in the media 
Though we can identify diferent patterns across generations, not everyone 
is equally likely to be exposed to political information in the news and on 
social media. Beyond the generational diferences seen earlier, motivational 
and behavioural factors are likely to play an important role in determin-
ing exposure to political information. Gaining information about politics 
is a costly afair, and it takes time and energy. Consequently, more politi-
cally involved citizens are more likely to seek out and hence get exposed to 
political information in the media. Following the EPIG model (see Chapter 
2), we therefore investigate whether political engagement and participation 
function as antecedents of political information exposure across each gen-
eration. By political engagement, we refer to political interest, knowledge, 
and efcacy. Political participation is divided into three types: participation 
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targeted at the political sphere (PP II), participation targeted at the com-
munity (PP III), and politically motivated but non-political activities (PP 
IV). As argued in Chapter 2, we expect that both political engagement and 
participation are positively related to exposure to political information in 
the news media and on social media. 
The following analysis shows how the diferent dimensions of political 
engagement and participation lead to exposure to political information in 
the news media and on social media within each generation. We look at 
each generation separately to show how the antecedents explain exposure 
to political information across the whole period of investigation. First, we 
investigate how political engagement relates to political news media use and 
to political social media use. Next, we look at how political participation 
relates to political news media use and to political social media use. The 
efects of each antecedent were estimated in separate models in which politi-
cal news exposure and political social media exposure are predicted by an 
interaction between the antecedent under consideration and each genera-
tion. In addition, we added gender and education as controls in the models 
(full models can be seen in Tables A4.1–A4.4 in the Appendix). 
The efects from both static and dynamic models are presented, which 
give us diferent insights into the nature of the relationship between politi-
cal involvement and exposure to political information. As we discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 3, the relationships between political involvement and polit-
ical media exposure are susceptible to endogeneity, which makes it difcult 
to estimate how the antecedents afect news use in the static models. We 
accommodate these issues by including a lagged dependent variable in the 
dynamic models, which controls for prior levels of political news exposure 
and political social media exposure. 
Political engagement and exposure to political 
information in the media 
According to the EPIG model, political interest, knowledge, and efcacy are 
all expected to be positively related with news media use. We frst examine 
whether political interest functions as an antecedent to exposure to political 
information in the media for each of the fve generations. We then turn to 
political knowledge and efcacy. 
Political interest is an intrinsic motivation that gives people joy when 
engaging in politics. Political interest can thus be viewed as a factor that 
drives people to seize opportunities to seek out information about politics 
in the news media (Lecheler & de Vreese, 2017; Strömbäck et al., 2013). 
Panels A and B in Figure 4.4 show the efect of the interaction between 
political interest and the generations on political news exposure. The fgure 
shows the average marginal efects of political interest for each generation 
estimated in the static and dynamic models. Results from the static models 
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across all generations. The relationship is a bit weaker among Traditional-
ists but not to a large extent. The pattern repeats itself when we look at the 
dynamic model, where more political interest is associated with an increase 
in exposure to political news. Political interest is thus an important anteced-
ent to political news exposure for all generations. 
Turning to social media, Panels D and C in Figure 4.4 show the rela-
tionship between political interest and exposure to political information on 
social media for each generation. The results reveal that political interest is 
positively related to exposure to political information on social media for all 
generations, except the Traditionalists. Earlier in this chapter, we saw that 
the three oldest generations were exposed to roughly the same amount of 
politics on social media (see Figure 4.3); these levels of exposure, however, 
seem to be fostered by political interest only for Baby Boomers and Genera-
tion Z. When we look at the dynamic model, we can see that when Baby 
Boomers and Generation Z are more interested in politics, they also experi-
ence an increase in exposure to political content on social media. Interest-
ingly, political interest does not foster more political social media exposure 
among the Millennials, though they belong to one of the generations that 
receive the most information on politics through this type of media. 
We now turn to the relationship between political knowledge and expo-
sure to political information in the media. In Chapter 2, we defned political
knowledge as knowledge about recent events in politics and society. Political
knowledge can be seen as an ability to seize opportunities for seeking out
political information in the media, which is why we expect it to function as an
antecedent of exposure to political news in the EPIG model. Panels A and B in
Figure 4.5 show the relationship between political knowledge and exposure
to political information in the news media for each generation. The results
reveal a positive relationship in both the static and dynamic models. Individu-
als with higher political knowledge are likely to be more exposed to political
information in the media. In addition, for Baby Boomers, Generation X, and
Millennials, the more they know about politics, the greater the likelihood that
their exposure to political information will increase over time. 
In contrast to exposure to political information in the news media, politi-
cal knowledge is not associated with more exposure to political information 
on social media, as seen in Panels C and D in Figure 4.5. The fgure also 
reveals that more political knowledge does not lead to an increase in expo-
sure to political information on social media for all generations. In other 
words, political knowledge cannot be considered an antecedent of exposure 
to political information on social media. 
Next, we look at political efcacy, which we defne as ‘individuals’ self-
perceptions that they are capable of understanding politics and competent
enough to participate in political acts’ (Miller et al., 1979, p. 253). We under-
stand political efcacy as both a motivation and an ability since believing in
your own abilities to understand politics motivates you to seek out political
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54 Being exposed to political information 
who feel more comfortable engaging in politics also have a higher exposure to
political information in the news media. Next, the dynamic model in Panel B
of Figure 4.6 shows that people who are more politically efcacious are more
likely to increase their political news media use over time. Political efcacy is
thus an important antecedent to political news exposure for all generations. 
When it comes to political social media exposure, Panel C in Figure 4.6
reveals a positive relationship with political efcacy for all generations,
except the Traditionalists. At the dynamic level, as illustrated in Panel D of
Figure 4.6, we see that only for Baby Boomers and Generation Z does politi-
cal social media exposure increase over time as they feel more efcacious. So,
even if political efcacy is an antecedent associated with high political social
media exposure, only for Baby Boomers and Generation Z does political
efcacy lead to increased political information exposure on social media. 
To sum up, our analysis shows that higher political interest, knowledge, 
and internal efcacy are associated with more exposure to political infor-
mation in the news media for all generations. Political interest and efcacy 
predict more exposure for all generations, whereas political knowledge does 
so only for Baby Boomers, Generation X, and Millennials. Thus, in general, 
political engagement gives us the ability and motivation to seek out politi-
cal information in the news media. A more mixed picture emerges when 
we look at exposure to political information on social media. While politi-
cal interest and efcacy lead to higher political social media exposure only 
for Baby Boomers and Generation Z, political knowledge does not lead to 
higher political social media exposure for any generation. 
Political participation and exposure to political 
information in the media 
In this section we look at how each generation’s political participation 
afects their political media use. Political participation is divided into three 
types of participation: PP II is targeted at the political system, PP III is tar-
geted at the community, and PP IV is politically motivated but non-political. 
In the following analysis, we will look at each of these participation types 
separately. In Chapter 2, we argued that citizens who participate in diferent 
political activities are more likely to turn to the media to get information 
about politics and to seek out more information on the topics that they are 
engaged in or even to search for new issues to get involved with. 
Panel A in Figure 4.7 shows how participation targeted at the political sys-
tem is associated with political news media use. For all generations, except 
the Traditionalists, political participation targeted at the political system is 
positively related to political news use, with the relationship being strongest 
for Generation Z. The dynamic model, illustrated in Panel B of Figure 4.7, 
reveals that more political participation targeted at the political system leads 
to higher news media use for Baby Boomers and Generation Z. These results 
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activities that aim at afecting the political system, they subsequently turn to 
the traditional news media to follow up on the most recent developments or 
to engage in new topics. 
As seen from Panels C and D in Figure 4.7, political participation targeted 
at the political system is not positively related with political social media 
exposure for any generation. In other words, no matter which generation 
citizens belong too, chances are low that PP II activities drive them to expose 
themselves more often to political information on social media. 
A diferent picture emerges when we look at political participation tar-
geted at the local community. As seen from Panels A and B in Figure 4.8, 
both the static and dynamic models show that only Baby Boomers’ political 
participation is positively related to—and leads to—higher political news 
exposure. These results are probably due to the nature of the news media 
outlets that we examine. These national media outlets cover local events 
only to a limited extent. Awareness of activities related to participation tar-
geted at the local community is more likely to be picked up through direct, 
personal observation of the local area or through the local news. The dif-
ferent behaviour of Baby Boomers compared to other generations may be 
because Baby Boomers were the frst to spend a good share of their spare 
time on political activities, mostly in a collective way (Mangelsdorf, 2014). 
Participating in local activities may therefore also lead them to keep a closer 
look on general political developments in the news media. 
Panels C and D in Figure 4.8 reveal yet a diferent picture when it comes to 
the efect of participation targeted at the local community (PP III) and social 
media use. Again, participating in such activities is not related to political 
social media exposure, no matter what generation the participants come 
from. The high diversity of political information that people can encounter 
on social media platforms may explain this disconnectedness of participa-
tion and exposure. Though being active in one specifc local activity could 
make people seek out more information about this project on social media, 
no general pattern can be observed that increased political participation at a 
local level results in more exposure to political information on social media. 
Finally, we observe how non-political but politically motivated partici-
pation and news media exposure are related. Panel A in Figure 4.9 shows 
that this type of participation is positively related to political news media 
exposure for Baby Boomers, Generation X, Millennials, and Generation Z. 
The dynamic model presented in Panel B of Figure 4.9 further shows that 
more participation in non-political but politically motivated activities leads 
to more political news media exposure only for Baby Boomers and Genera-
tion Z. As with participation targeted at the political sphere (PP II), par-
ticipating in non-political but politically motivated activities (PP IV) fosters 
more political news media use among Baby Boomers and Generation Z. The 
nature of the relationship between these two types of participation is likely 
to be diferent, however. People who participate in non-political but politi-
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Being exposed to political information 59 
activities in the same way as those participating in activities targeted at the 
political sphere (PP II) since the former is inherently not targeted towards 
any political system and will hardly result in the media’s coverage of poli-
tics. Because these actions are politically motivated, however, they might 
encourage people from these two generations to seek out more political 
information in the news media, fuelling future behaviour. 
Panel C in Figure 4.9 reveals a positive relationship between political
social media use and non-political but politically motivated participation (PP
IV) for all but Generation Z. However, as seen in Panel D in Figure 4.9,
only the non-political but politically motivated participation (PP IV) of Baby
Boomers and Generation X leads to a higher political social media exposure.
It is hence the older generations who follow up on political information on
social media when they are actively participating in non-political but politi-
cally motivated activities. Possibly, information that is relevant to people
participating in PP IV activities is more accessible on social media since users
themselves defne what is relevant and, in their eyes, ‘political.’ The fact that
we do not see this relationship for Millennials and Generation Z may point
to diferences of social media use by these two generations, where they less
often seek political information but are more often incidentally exposed to it. 
Taken together, this part of our analysis has shown that political partici-
pation targeted at the political system (PP II) and politically motivated but 
non-political activities (PP IV) for most generations are associated with high 
political news consumption in the media. In addition, participating in these 
types of activities gives Baby Boomers and Generation Z experiences that 
engender the motivation and ability that are necessary to seek out political 
information in the news media. These fndings suggest that the youngest 
generations’ political participation creates a springboard for entering the 
positive spiral of political involvement and political news exposure, just like 
for their older and historically politically active Baby Boomer counterparts. 
We further uncovered that only Baby Boomers’ political news exposure 
correlates with political activities targeted at the local community (PP III). 
This fnding points towards a generational efect such that participation in 
community-based political activities (PP III) leads to higher political news 
exposure for Baby Boomers, whose political habits were formed in a period 
characterized by societal problems being addressed and solved by local, col-
lectivistic, and social movements (Andersen, 2011). The grassroot approach 
to politics that dominated this generation’s formative years is now refected 
in our analysis, which shows that their political participation targeted at the 
community level (PP II) leads to more political news exposure. 
Political social media exposure is less dependent on previous levels of 
political participation. It thus seems that social media exposure is a less 
demanding type of news consumption compared to political news expo-
sure. But this result also shows that previous political participation leads 
people to seek additional political information on social media platforms 














60 Being exposed to political information 
political activities associated with higher exposure to political content on 
social media for all generations, except Generation Z. This type of political 
participation leads to more political social media use for older generations 
like Baby Boomers and Generation X and not, as one would expect, for the 
two younger generations. 
Summing up 
In this chapter we have examined the amount of political information in the 
news media over time, how exposure to political information in the media 
varies across generations, and how political involvement is related to this 
exposure. When elections draw close, the amount of political information 
in the media increases. Subsequently, during election time, citizens are more 
often exposed to political information in both types of media. Thus, the 
election serves as a political event when particularly the younger generations 
get more political media exposure, reducing the generational gap from non-
election times. We further see that the older generations receive more politi-
cal information from news media, whereas this pattern is turned upside 
down for social media exposure: Millennials and Generation Z attend to 
news on social media more often than the three older generations. 
We also examined how these diferent patterns of exposure to political infor-
mation in the media are related to political involvement for each generation.
Our results showed that political engagement, in general, is more strongly
associated with exposure to political information in the news media than on
social media across generations. Across generations we see that higher levels
of political interest, knowledge, and efcacy make people turn to the news
media for more political information. While higher levels of political interest
and efcacy make some generations seek out more political information on
social media (i.e., Baby Boomers and Generation Z), political knowledge is
not a necessary antecedent of news consumption on social media platforms.
In general, political participation is a less important precondition for politi-
cal news consumption compared to political engagement. Previous political
participation is more likely to increase peoples’ political news exposure rather
than their political social media exposure, with one exception: if older genera-
tions engage in politically motivated, non-political activities (PP IV), they will
more likely seek out more political information on social media. 
With the use of the EPIG model, we uncovered that even if the genera-
tions have diferent patterns of exposure to political information in the news 
media and on social media, they still utilize similar gateways and seize the 
opportunities that modern media provide. In other words, political engage-
ment and participation facilitate political exposure to some extent but 
through diferent types of media. This chapter implies that the youth might 
not be that diferent from older generations since they follow the same road 
to the world of politics but just enter through a diferent door. 
 
5 Getting interested in, learning 
about, and feeling capable of 
participating in politics 
Being interested in politics, having political knowledge, and feeling 
competent to participate politically are core dimensions of political 
engagement. In this chapter we show that older generations hold 
higher levels of political engagement—understood as political inter-
est, knowledge, and efcacy—than younger generations. However, 
we also show that political news exposure has a positive efect on 
political engagement and is especially benefcial for engaging younger 
generations in politics. Thus, political news exposure can help bridge 
generational gaps in political engagement. 
How does exposure to political information in the news media afect citi-
zens’ political interest, knowledge, and efcacy? In this chapter we examine 
this question with a focus on diferences across generations. Political inter-
est, knowledge, and efcacy are core dimensions of political engagement 
and are often seen as important forerunners to political participation (see 
Chapter 2). In an ideal world, citizens should have a high interest in poli-
tics and thus be motivated to engage in democracy (Prior, 2010). Likewise, 
they should base their political activities on knowledge about the political 
issues at stake (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). In addition, citizens should 
view themselves as capable of acting on their beliefs for participation to be 
meaningful (Finkel, 1985). If political news exposure has a positive efect on 
these engagement dimensions, then the news media play an important role 
for the health of democracy. 
Exposure to political news may, however, infuence political engagement 
diferently across generations. While knowledge about current political 
afairs is likely to vary depending on the amount of political information 
that citizens are exposed to in the news media, it is unclear whether politi-
cal interest and efcacy are open for changes throughout life (Jennings & 
Markus, 1984) or at specifc points in life, such as in earlier life stages (Kros-
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Hepburn, 1995; Prior, 2010). We argue that political news exposure is likely 
to infuence political engagement more among younger than older genera-
tions (see Chapter 2). Young citizens’ political attitudes are still under devel-
opment. Further, young citizens are typically more curious and are searching 
for ways to express or promote themselves. In contrast, older generations 
are more tied to routines and habits. Thus, political news exposure is more 
likely to infuence engagement in younger citizens since they are likely to be 
more open and fexible. By the same token, young people are likely to be 
more susceptible to media efects. 
In what follows, we examine how political interest, knowledge, and ef-
cacy vary across generations and over time, including election and non-
election time. In addition, we examine how exposure to political information 
in the news media afects these diferent dimensions of political engagement. 
Getting interested in politics 
Political interest is an important dimension of political engagement. Citi-
zens with a high interest in politics are more likely to use the news media
(Prior, 2007; Strömbäck et al., 2013; see also Chapter 4) and to participate
in political activities (Verba et al., 1995). As Van Deth and Elf (2004,
p. 478) write: ‘Without a minimum level of curiosity about politics, citizens
would not even be aware of the political process or of opportunities to
defend their well-being or contribute to collective decisions.’ Thus, devot-
ing some attention to the levels of political interest across generations and
to the role of political news exposure in this regard is of vital importance
for understanding the dynamics of political engagement in contemporary
democracies. In the absence of a clear-cut defnition of this central dimen-
sion of political engagement, ‘political interest can be considered an intrin-
sic motivation to pay attention to and engage in politics—not because of
external pressures or as a means to achieve distinct outcomes, but for per-
sonal pleasure and the inherent satisfaction of doing so in itself’ (Shehata
& Amnå, 2017, p. 3). 
Though political interest has been found to be very stable at the indi-
vidual level (Prior, 2010), studies have shown that news media use can have 
a positive infuence on political interest. Thus, not only do more-interested 
citizens seek out news to a higher extent than less-interested citizens (see 
Chapter 4), but those who consume news may, in fact, also become more 
interested in politics (Kruikemeier & Shehata, 2017; Lecheler & de Vreese, 
2017; Strömbäck & Shehata, 2010, 2018). Political news exposure might 
foster political interest by capturing people’s attention and presenting them 
with diferent perspectives and arguments on political issues. The news 
media thereby help citizens make sense of the political world. This efect 
may be especially likely among younger generations, who are new inhabit-
ants of the political world and therefore hold less stable political attitudes 
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Figure 5.1 Average political interest over time across generations 
Notes. Estimates are based on the mean of political interest within each generation for each 
online survey wave. 
We begin by examining average levels of political interest over time and 
across generations, as illustrated in Figure 5.1. In general, we see that older 
generations hold a higher level of political interest than younger genera-
tions. In addition, we fnd that the levels of political interest fuctuate over 
time. This is particularly the case during election time (waves 3 and 4), when 
we fnd a slight increase in political interest. It may come as no surprise 
that citizens become more politically interested during election time—the 
highlight of democracy—as they likely consider and perhaps even choose to 
participate in politics by casting votes on election day. As expected, this ten-
dency towards increased interest seems to be especially pronounced among 
younger generations. However, after election day, the levels of political 
interest drop and the generational gaps increase again. 
How does exposure to political information in the news media afect citi-
zens’ political interest? Figure 5.2 shows the efect of exposure to political 
information in the news media on political interest across generations. The 
efects are shown at a static level, where we focus on correlational relation-
ships and at a dynamic level, where we look at changes in the dependent 
variable—political interest—by including a lag on the dependent variable. 
The results show that exposure to political information is generally posi-
tively related to political interest. Importantly, our results from the dynamic 
models also show that political news exposure has a positive efect on polit-
ical interest. Thus, citizens get more interested in politics when they are 
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Figure 5.2 Marginal efects of exposure to political information in the news media 
on political interest across generations 
Notes. The estimates are displayed with a 95 percent confdence interval. Bonferroni correc-
tion used to counteract the problem of multiple comparisons. Full models in the Appendix, 
Table A5.1. 
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exposed to political news. Strikingly, this efect is especially positive among 
the younger generations. 
Taken together, we fnd that political interest varies across generations, 
being higher for older generations—and that it varies over time—increasing 
during election campaigns, especially among younger generations. We also 
fnd that political interest is positively infuenced by exposure to political 
information in the news media. The efects, however, vary across genera-
tions and are especially pronounced among the younger generations. These 
patterns follow our expectations. As the younger generations are still devel-
oping their political interest, they are more malleable and hence more sus-
ceptible to media efects. In other words, exposure to political news helps 
decrease gaps in political interest between older and younger generations. 
Learning about politics 
Politics is a complicated topic to follow. Every day, political actors present, 
discuss, implement, or dismiss many political problems and solutions. In 
today’s mediated democracies, it is literally impossible for citizens to follow 
such political processes without relying on the news media to prioritize and 
segregate relevant from irrelevant information. Given the fact that most citi-
zens primarily gain their political information from the news media (Ström-
bäck, 2008; Zaller, 2003), it becomes vital to understand how people learn 
from the information that they are exposed to. 
It seems self-evident that we learn about politics when it is covered by the 
news media—for example, when we are informed about a newly appointed 
minister of social afairs, the outbreak of a war, or an immigration bill 
passed in parliament. Several studies have also empirically shown that citi-
zens generally learn about politics from news media consumption (Aalberg 
& Curran, 2013; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Jerit, Barabas, & Bolsen, 
2006; Prior, 2007). This knowledge may subsequently be used when we act 
politically in a democracy by, for example, attending a protest against a 
newly passed labour market reform. 
We will now focus on current afairs knowledge, defned as knowledge 
about recent happenings in politics and society that have been covered by 
the media (see Chapter 2). In each survey wave, political knowledge was 
measured as the number of correct answers to four new questions about 
current afairs that had been covered in the news between each of the indi-
vidual survey waves—for instance, the appointment of a new minister (see 
Chapter 3). Thus, it was impossible for citizens to know the answers to 
these questions prior to being exposed to the relevant political information. 
As seen from Figure 5.3, political knowledge varies across generations, 
with older generations knowing more about ongoing political happenings in 
society. The results also indicate that levels of political knowledge vary over 
time, with people learning more during election time. Nonetheless, care-
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Figure 5.3 Average political knowledge over time across generations 
Notes. Estimates are based on the mean of political knowledge within each generation for each 
online survey wave. 
tap political knowledge changed from survey to survey, though we strived 
to make them equally difcult. Based on prior studies showing that citi-
zens become more attentive towards politics as they are about to cast votes 
on election day (Van Aelst & De Swert, 2009), it makes sense that politi-
cal knowledge increases during election campaigns. In addition, the results 
show that knowledge gaps between generations become smaller during elec-
tion time, suggesting that the younger generations catch up with the older 
generations as the election day draws near. After election time, however, the 
generational gaps increase again. 
Turning to the factors that infuence the levels of knowledge about cur-
rent afairs, Figure 5.4 illustrates the efects of political news exposure on 
current afairs knowledge across generations. Again, the efects are exam-
ined both in a static and in a dynamic model, where the latter tests changes 
in current afairs knowledge by including a lagged dependent variable in 
the model. As expected, we fnd that the efects of exposure to political 
information on current afairs knowledge is positive both on a static and a 
dynamic level across generations. Citizens simply learn from being exposed 
to political information. Again, this is especially true for younger genera-
tions. Thus, political news exposure can help bridge generational gaps in 
knowledge about current political afairs. 
Summing up, we fnd a gap between what younger compared to older 
generations know about politics, with younger people generally being less 
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Figure 5.4 Marginal efects of exposure to political information in the news media 
on political knowledge across generations 
Notes. The estimates are displayed with a 95 percent confdence interval. Bonferroni correc-
tion used to counteract the problem of multiple comparisons. Full models in the Appendix, 
Table A5.2. 
 68 Getting interested, knowledgeable, and efcacious 
knowledgeable than older generations. The gap decreases during the elec-
tion campaign, indicating that the younger generations keep up with the 
older generations, probably due to motivation associated with the fast-
approaching election. Turning to the explanation of gained knowledge, we 
fnd that exposure to political information in the news media has a posi-
tive efect on political knowledge. The efect, however, varies across gen-
erations and is especially pronounced among the younger generations. As 
the younger generations are still forming their political engagement, they 
are likely to be more open-minded and curious, hence more susceptible, to 
media efects. As a consequence, the younger generations beneft more from 
exposure to political information in the news media, which thereby can help 
bridge generational gaps in political knowledge. 
Feeling capable of participating 
Next, we focus on the importance of feeling politically competent to engage 
in political activities. Political efcacy refers to ‘individuals’ self-perceptions 
that they are capable of understanding politics and competent enough to 
participate in political acts’ (Miller et al., 1979, p. 253). Political efcacy 
thus captures the basic questions that citizens may ask themselves when 
facing options of political participation: do I feel that I understand politics? 
Am I competent to participate? We argue that these perceptions of oneself 
are important for citizens to move from engagement to actual participation 
in politics (see Chapter 2). 
Though this link seems logical—that is, you act because you feel that 
you understand politics and possess the skills to participate—less scholarly 
attention has been devoted to political efcacy as a dimension of engage-
ment compared to political interest and knowledge. However, we argue that 
political efcacy is likewise a key component of political engagement. If 
you feel that you do not understand what is happening in politics and are 
not competent to participate, why would you participate? The answer to 
this question determines whether you feel efcacious or not. We argue that 
exposure to political information in the news media is likely to have a posi-
tive efect on the feeling of being efcacious. The more political information 
you are exposed to in the news media, the more capable and competent you 
will feel. 
Levels of political efcacy vary over time, with an increase during election 
time, as illustrated in Figure 5.5. Interestingly, as the election comes to an 
end, political efcacy stays at the same level. Compared to the patterns of 
political interest and knowledge, this trend indicates that the possibility of 
casting a vote may have a more lasting efect on the feeling of understanding 
and of being competent to act politically. We also fnd generational difer-
ences. Older generations have a higher degree of internal efcacy than the 
youngest generation, Generation Z. In other words, older citizens feel to a 
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Figure 5.5 Average political efcacy over time across generations 
Notes. Estimates are based on the mean of political efcacy within each generation for each 
online survey wave. 
gap may be that during their lifespans, citizens build up a better understand-
ing of what politics is all about and develop a skill box enabling them to 
deal with political matters, which makes them feel competent to act. At the 
least, they may have acted politically by casting votes at several elections, 
or they may have felt obliged to do so. Naturally, such generational gaps 
decrease over time as younger generations go through the process of becom-
ing more experienced with politics and therefore catch up with the older 
generations. 
Moving on to the factors that infuence political efcacy, Figure 5.6 shows 
the efects of exposure to political news across generations. Again, the fgure 
illustrates the efects for both a static and a dynamic model, where the latter 
model tests changes in political efcacy by including a lag on the dependent 
variable in the model. As for political interest and knowledge, we fnd a 
positive efect of exposure to political information in the news media, again 
particularly for the younger generations. In other words, exposure to politi-
cal news has the largest efect on the younger generations. Thus, once again, 
political news exposure seems to have a bridging potential for narrowing 
generational gaps. 
Taken together, we fnd that political efcacy varies over time and that 
it is especially high during election campaigns. Further, political efcacy 
is positively infuenced by exposure to political information in the news 
media. This efect, however, varies across generations and is particularly 
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Figure 5.6 Marginal efects of exposure to political information in the news media 
on political efcacy across generations 
Notes. The estimates are displayed with a 95 percent confdence interval. Bonferroni correc-
tion used to counteract the problem of multiple comparisons. Full models in the Appendix, 
Table A5.3. 
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pronounced among the younger generations. Older generations may have 
already gained a more solid understanding of their self-perceptions, whereas 
the younger generations are still forming an understanding of themselves 
as democratic citizens. Thus, they are more susceptible to the informa-
tion they receive, including political news. These young citizens are still in 
the formative phase of life and may therefore be more infuenced by the 
amount of information they receive compared to older generations with 
more grounded self-perceptions. As a result, political news exposure has 
the potential to bridge generational gaps in internal efcacy when younger 
citizens are exposed to political news in the media. 
Summing up 
Political interest, knowledge, and efcacy are core dimensions of political 
engagement. Being interested in, being knowledgeable about, and feeling 
capable of participating in politics are all important components of fos-
tering a healthy citizenship. In this chapter we have examined how each 
of these components of political engagement varies across generations and 
over time as well as how news media exposure afects them. We have shown 
how older generations, in general, hold higher levels of political interest, 
knowledge, and efcacy than younger generations. However, political inter-
est, knowledge, and efcacy all increase during election time. This increase 
is especially pronounced for the youngest generations. Thus, elections can 
work as a kick-of into democracy for young citizens. 
Most importantly, we have shown that exposure to political news 
increases political interest, knowledge, and efcacy. This efect is especially 
pronounced for the youngest generations. Thus, exposure to political infor-
mation in the media helps younger citizens, in particular, to engage in poli-
tics. The news media play an important role in narrowing generational gaps 
in political engagement. As we showed in Chapter 4, however, younger gen-
erations are not exposed to political information in the news media to the 
same extent as older generations. They thus miss out on important currency 
for their democratic citizenship. Instead, younger generations are turning to 
social media. In Chapter 9, we explore whether exposure to political infor-



















Participating in activities targeting the political system is a key dimen-
sion of citizens’ political involvement. In this chapter we show that 
political participation targeting the political system is generally rather 
stable and low during non-election times, especially for Generation Z, 
the youngest generation. Political news exposure has a positive efect 
on this type of political participation, again especially for Generation 
Z. This infuence seems to be the result of an indirect efect of political 
interest, knowledge, and internal efcacy, which all positively mediate 
the relationship between political news exposure and political partici-
pation targeting the political system. 
A democratic political system is expected to address and be responsive to
problems that the public formulates. Besides voting in elections, citizens pro-
vide input to politicians (Easton, 1953) through participatory actions targeted
directly at the political system. Citizens may, for instance, contact politicians,
sign petitions, and organize or join demonstrations. When addressed in this
way, a well-functioning political system will take such input into account— 
for example, in parliamentary debates, in administrative reviews, or through
immediate or long-term legislative changes. This type of participation refers
to Political Participation II in our taxonomy and can be described as partici-
pation directly targeted at the political system (Chapter 2). It comes close to
what others have called institutionalized participation (McLeod et al., 1999)
or elite-directed participation (Inglehart, 1990). 
This chapter examines whether and how citizens’ participation in activities
targeting the political system varies across generations and over time. First,
we map out how frequently citizens participate in these types of activities
and whether this changes over time. Next, we examine how political news
exposure afects this type of participation. Finally, we also examine whether
the potential efect of political news exposure is mediated through political
interest, knowledge, and efcacy. This chapter focuses on non-election time,
whereas we examine political participation during election time in Chapter 10. 
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Targeting the political system 
Citizens engage in activities targeting the political system in various ways, 
such as signing petitions, making donations, contacting politicians, and 
attending or inviting others to demonstrations. Based on their age and polit-
ical socialization, citizens may difer in how familiar they are with certain 
types of political actions and how natural it seems to engage in them. Most 
activities that directly address the political system existed before the digital 
age; yet, today many of them can be performed via online platforms (Gibson 
& Cantijoch, 2013; Theocharis, 2015). For some types of participation, the 
threshold to engage in politics has been lowered in the new digital age. For 
example, it is no longer necessary to sign petitions only on paper since there 
are online platforms available. And you no longer need to write letters to 
politicians or meet them face to face; instead, you may reach them via emails 
and social network sites. Hence, in some respects, participation targeted at 
the political system has become more easily accessible, especially for com-
petent digital media users. 
Across the fve generations, Figure 6.1 reports the frequency of partici-
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Figure 6.1 Frequency of participatory activities targeted at the political system 
(PP II) across generations 
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12 months as measured in the frst survey wave. Frequencies range from 0 
to 4 (or more) times. Signing petitions online is the most frequent type of 
participation, whereas signing petitions ofine is less common. The second 
and third most frequent types of participation are donations and contacting 
politicians—again, with the online option being more popular. Citizens are 
least likely to participate in demonstrations or to invite others to join them. 
On average, citizens engaged in each of these activities one time or fewer 
during the past 12 months. Opportunity structures clearly matter for politi-
cal participation: digital activities ofer lower thresholds for participation 
and may therefore be more popular. 
Though the patterns are similar across the fve generations, we neverthe-
less see some variations. Millennials, for example, most often invite others 
to join demonstrations and to sign petitions online, whereas Traditional-
ists along with Baby Boomers most often sign petitions ofine and contact 
politicians (both ofine and online). These results suggest that the genera-
tions participate diferently. An explanation from a generational perspective 
could be that diferent generations are raised under diferent societal circum-
stances, which may infuence their preferred choice of activities. Growing 
up in times when direct contact with political actors was more common 
may explain why older generations still seek to get in touch with elected 
representatives. For younger generations, however, politicians appear more 
distant; connecting with other citizens to collect signatures may seem more 
efective (and convenient) to them. 
Altogether, two things are clear. First, citizens’ participation in activi-
ties targeted at the political system is generally low. During a period of 
12 months (in non-election times), the political system only received a lim-
ited amount of participatory input from its citizens. Second, the diferent 
participatory activities are not equally popular across generations. In the 
following, we pay closer attention to whether the participatory levels for 
activities aimed at the political system are stable or difer over time. 
Combining participatory activities targeted at the political system into 
an index, Figure 6.2 shows the average level of participation across genera-
tions over time. While we asked for frequency of participation in the past 
12 months in the frst survey wave, we asked about participation frequency 
in the past four months in the second and the ffth waves, which corre-
sponds to the time periods between the waves. Naturally, the average fre-
quency drops from the frst wave to subsequent waves. Even so, we observe 
two interesting patterns. 
First, older generations are more likely to participate in activities tar-
geted at the political system than younger generations. Though the dif-
ference decreases over time, we still see indications that the diference is
substantial, indicating that the youth participate less in this type of political
activity. Second, if we focus on the second and ffth survey waves, which

































Figure 6.2 Average level of political participation targeted at the political system 
(PP II) over time across generations 
Notes. Average levels of political participation II are higher in wave 1 since the reference period 
in the survey questions for this wave was the last 12 months, whereas for waves 2 and 5, it was 
the last four months. 
seems quite stable. Despite the occurrence of an election between waves
2 and 5, we still fnd a high level of stability. Studies have suggested that
political activity increases during an election campaign (Van Aelst & De
Swert, 2009), but the elections do not seem to infuence activity in the
months following, at least when it comes to activities targeting the political
system. In Chapter 10, we turn more specifcally to political participation
during campaign time. An exception seems to be Generation Z, who show
slightly more political activity targeting the political system in the post-
election wave (wave 5). If we take this result into account together with
similar patterns for political interest and efcacy that were examined in
Chapter 5, we fnd an indication that elections may function as entry points
into the political system for young citizens. It seems that Generation Z’s
level of participation approximates the levels of the two older generations,
reducing the generation gap over time. 
Taken together, these fndings suggest that citizens rarely participate in 
activities targeted at the political system. During non-election times, the 
political system does not receive a great amount of participatory input from 
its citizens, no matter what participatory action we look at. This state of 
afairs may create disparities between those who make their voice heard and 
those who do not. 
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The efect of political news exposure on activities 
targeting the political system 
One reason why citizens show diferent levels of activity when addressing 
the political system may be the political information they have gained in the 
news media. As argued in our Engagement-Participation-Information-Gen-
eration (EPIG) model (see Chapter 2), political information can function 
as a basis for political participation. We therefore explore whether receiv-
ing political information in the news media mobilizes citizens to participate 
politically, and we test for generational diferences. 
Overall, we fnd a positive infuence of political news exposure on political 
participation targeted at the political system (see Table A6.1 in the Appen-
dix). Figure 6.3 shows the marginal efects of exposure to political news 
on political participation targeting the political system. Both a static and a 
dynamic perspective are taken into account. In the static setting, we pool 
observations from the second and ffth survey waves and explore the corre-
lation between political news exposure and participatory activities targeted 
at the political system while controlling for gender, education, and genera-
tion. In the dynamic setting, we utilize all three survey waves by including 
a lagged dependent variable in our models and thus examine changes in 
participation over time (for full models, see Appendix 6.1; for methodologi-
cal details, see Chapter 3). 
Overall, we fnd a positive efect of political news exposure in both the 
static and the dynamic models. The more often citizens are exposed to 
political news via news media, the more often they participate in activi-
ties targeted at the political system. However, not all generations beneft 
equally from their political news consumption. As seen in Figure 6.3, the 
relationship between political news exposure and political behaviours tar-
geted at the political system is visible for all generations but the Traditional-
ists. Interestingly, in the more demanding dynamic models, we see that the 
four younger generations beneft positively from political news consump-
tion. Even if we take their previous level of participation into account, fol-
lowing the news more closely makes them more likely to engage in political 
behaviours targeting the political system. Still, there are diferences between 
the cohorts. 
The positive efect of political news consumption is strongest for the 
youngest generation, Generation Z, and less so for the other four genera-
tions. This pattern holds for both the static and the dynamic models, being 
even more pronounced in the latter. This result suggests that exposure to 
political news has an especially strong efect on younger generations’ behav-
iour. Furthermore, it shows that younger generations’ use of political infor-
mation from the news media can serve as an entry point into the political 
system despite changes in their news consumption patterns. For Tradition-
alists, political news consumption does not infuence their level of politi-
cal participation targeting the political system. Though they are the second 
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Figure 6.3 Marginal efects of exposure to political information in the news media 
on political participation targeted at the political system (PP II) across 
generations 
Notes. The estimates are displayed with a 95 percent confdence interval. Bonferroni correc-
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most active generation in this type of political participation, information 
from the news media does not seem to resonate with them (anymore). These 
results seem to refect a life cycle, in which younger generations, still being 
in their formative years, are more open and curious and therefore more 
susceptible than older generations to political news afecting their political 
participation. 
However, our data do not present a linear trend. Baby Boomers, for 
example, are the second-oldest generation and the generation most active 
in behaviours targeting the political system. A life-cycle perspective suggests 
that Baby Boomers’ news consumption would afect their political participa-
tion only to a minor degree. However, the opposite is the case: Baby Boom-
ers react strongly to political news, only outnumbered by Generation Z. 
This result may be due to a cohort efect, in which Baby Boomers, having 
grown up in times of political confict and protest, even in later life stages 
hold the political system and its representatives accountable when receiving 
political information from the news media. 
Pathways to activities targeting the political system 
We now examine whether the positive impact of political news exposure on
political behaviours targeting the political system, as suggested by the EPIG
model (see Chapter 2), is mediated through the three dimensions of political
engagement—that is, political interest, knowledge, and efcacy. In Chapter 5,
we saw that exposure to political news does indeed have a positive efect
on each of these three dimensions of political engagement, especially so for
younger generations. The following examination will elucidate whether this
efect translates into actual political behaviours targeting the political system. 
In general, when we include political interest, knowledge, and efcacy into 
our models, the relationship between political news exposure and participa-
tory activities targeted at the political system disappears (see Table A6.1, 
Models 6.4 and 6.8 in the Appendix). These fndings give a frst indication 
that political interest, knowledge, and efcacy mediate the efect of political 
news exposure on participatory activities targeting the political system and 
thereby support the suggested pathway of the EPIG model. We now take a 
closer look at this mediation. In order to examine the routes to participa-
tion more elaborately, we did a path model using multiple-group analy-
sis for structural equation modelling. Again, we used both a static and a 
dynamic perspective. Table 6.1 lists the fndings across generations for the 
three engagement measures: political interest, knowledge, and efcacy. 
We frst calculated the overall indirect efects across generations and 
found that indirect efects through political interest, knowledge, and ef-
cacy were overall positive, in both the static and the dynamic models. This 
fnding suggests that being exposed to political news makes citizens more 
politically interested, knowledgeable, and efcacious, which partly explains 
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Table 6.1 Indirect efects of exposure to political information in the news media on 
political participation II 
Static Dynamic 















































































Notes. SEM without/with group comparison. Unstandardized coefcients. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Models include gender and education as controls. Dynamic models also include a 
lagged dependent variable. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. NStatic = 3,490/10,470. NDynamic = 3,490/6,980. 
why they engage in behaviours targeting the political system. In general, for 
the younger generations, the indirect efects were larger in the static per-
spective, suggesting that political information from news media transforms 
more often into interest and, subsequently, political action. While we fnd 
indications of a positive indirect efect of political interest and efcacy for all 
generations, increased political knowledge through political news consump-
tion did not translate into political participation for all generations. When 
we control for previous levels of participation, Traditionalists’ and Genera-
tion Z’s political participation seems unafected by an increase in political 
knowledge through news consumption. A slight positive indirect efect is 
found for Baby Boomers and Generation X, while Millennials become less 
politically active the more political-news consumption increases their politi-
cal knowledge. 
Taken together with a non-signifcant, negative indirect efect for Gen-
eration Z, we may see a pattern where for younger generations, knowl-
edge gained from political news does not automatically translate into 
higher political action. A life-cycle perspective would suggest that when the 
younger generations become older, they will learn how to channel knowl-
edge into action. A cohort perspective suggests a future in which learning 
about general political issues from news consumption no longer makes 
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citizens politically active. In sum, however, we do see that political interest 
and efcacy, in particular, have a pervasive indirect efect on participation 
that targets the political system directly. This fnding provides us with a 
deeper understanding of how political news use contributes to a more active 
citizenship. 
Summing up 
In this chapter we explored how exposure to political information in the 
news media may mobilize citizens to participate in activities that target the 
political system. Since these activities are closely linked to the political sys-
tem, this type of participation is especially important for a healthy democ-
racy. If political actors and institutions are to be responsive, citizens must 
have the means to make their voices heard. Contacting politicians, signing 
petitions, or taking part in demonstrations are a means towards this end. 
This chapter uncovered that not every citizen makes use of these means but 
fnds that the news media can play an important role in sparking political 
activity among the citizenry. 
This fnding supports the suggested route in our EPIG model (Chapter 2); 
the news media help citizens voice their opinions to the political system. 
This bridge between citizens and their political leaders, which was already 
discussed by scholars like Verba and Nie in the 1970s, still works. More 
importantly, we fnd that the younger generations, which are the least active 
in behaviours targeting the political system, are the ones beneftting the 
most (or at least as much as older generations) from exposure to political 
news media. Thus, exposure to political news can help narrow generational 
gaps in political behaviours targeting the political system. 
However, two fndings from the chapter blur this positive picture. First, 
given the low levels of political participation targeted at the political system, 
the participatory contribution of the news media is also minimal. Second, 
news media consumption contributes to participation by making citizens 
more politically interested and efcacious but barely by making them more 
knowledgeable. Though enthusiasm and the feeling of being capable to act 
politically are important prerequisites of participation, informed political 
decisions are a core element in a democracy (Downs, 1957). We fnd only 
a little evidence that news media increase political knowledge in a way that 




7 Participation targeting the
local community 
Citizens’ participation in their local communities is an important part 
of a healthy democracy. In this chapter we show that local commu-
nity participation is highest among the older generations and lowest 
among the youngest. We also show that political news exposure has 
a positive efect on this type of political participation, especially so 
for the Baby Boomers, being mediated through political interest and 
efcacy. 
In this chapter we turn our attention to participation in the local community— 
or van Deth’s (2014) Political Participation III (PP III). Political citizens 
focus on matters directly connected to the political system, as described in 
Chapter 6. As social beings, however, citizens are part not only of a politi-
cal sphere but also of the local community in which they live. Their quality 
of life depends on a number of matters related to their local environment, 
be it the sports club, the church, a women’s organization of which they are 
members, the school their kids attend, or the help they can expect from 
their neighbours when needed. Decisions on such local community matters 
are often not made by distant political representatives; rather, they are dealt 
with by citizens themselves. When they participate in local community mat-
ters, people have the chance to actively shape their everyday surroundings 
and more quickly and directly see the efects of their actions. 
From a democratic viewpoint, citizens’ political activities in the local 
community may have positive efects on the political system. Taking part in 
their community can prepare citizens to participate in activities addressing 
the political system more directly. As described by John Stuart Mill (1861, 
p. 46), participation among equal citizens trains people to weigh interests 
that are not their own and to make decisions that are not purely driven 
by private partialities. Equal citizens are neighbours, fellow members of a 
citizens’ initiative, or opponents on a local, political discussion board. Van 
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reasoning when stating that an ‘activity [is] aimed at solving collective or 
community problems’ (p. 358). By having to take into account other, difer-
ent, or even conficting arguments on a political matter, people experience 
the idea of a common public good much more closely and directly (Zakaras, 
2007). Thus, political participation at the local community level—for 
instance, by volunteering in a local organization or attending and support-
ing meetings and projects in the local community (Zukin et al., 2006)—can 
be a breeding ground for a participatory democracy. Participation within 
a local community is more than just addressing the political system at the 
local level (Verba et al., 1995). Participation in such activities is important 
for the health of both the community and society more broadly since it 
fosters social capital (Putnam, 2000). As argued by Shah, Cho, Eveland, 
and Kwak (2005, p. 533), this type of participation ‘plays a central role in 
the health and functioning of democratic societies by channelling collective 
action toward community building.’ 
This chapter examines whether and how citizens’ participation in activi-
ties targeting the local community varies across generations and over time. 
First, we map out the frequency of citizens’ political participation in the 
local community and whether this changes over time. Next, we examine 
how political news exposure afects this type of participation. Finally, we 
also examine whether the potential efect of political news exposure on local 
community participation is mediated through political interest, knowledge, 
and efcacy, as suggested by the Engagement-Participation-Information-
Generation (EPIG) model (see Chapter 2). 
Being involved with the local community 
Citizens are involved in their local communities in diferent ways. Some citi-
zens participate in local organizations, such as an urban gardening commu-
nity, or attend local meetings. Others prefer to engage online on social media
sites, for example, by collecting community updates in a Facebook group.
Common to these activities is their focus on the local community and thus on
citizens’ daily interactions with each other. People’s motives to get involved
may vary. Some settle in a community and involve themselves in an efort to
shape it for the better, while for others, local involvement is a pastime activity
or a way to get to know the neighbours better. Some citizens may even delib-
erately decide not to get involved—for instance, if they are living in the local
community only temporarily. Such motivations may shift over a person’s
lifespan. Students, having moved from home to a new city, where they will
stay for only a few years before taking up their frst job in a diferent city, will
have diferent motives for getting involved in local community matters than
the young parents who have settled in a neighbourhood where they want
their children to have a safe and rewarding upbringing. It therefore makes
sense to investigate whether participation targeted at local community issues
difers between the fve generations we are looking at. 
 
  
Participation targeting local community 83 
Volunteered in local organizaon/community 
Parcipated in a meeng about your local area 
Supported a community crowdfunding project 
Maintained common facilies in your local area 
Set up websites, blog, or social media iniaves
about local community 
Parcipated in a cultural event to support projects
 in your community 
Collecng money for community projects 
Creang street art 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 
Tradionalists Baby Boomers Generaon X Millennials Generaon Z 
Figure 7.1 Frequency of participatory activities targeted at the local community 
(PP III) across generations 
Notes. Measured in frst survey wave asking about participation during the past 12 months on 
a scale from 0 to 4 (or more) times. 
Across the fve generations, Figure 7.1 reports the frequency of local com-
munity participation over the past 12 months as measured in the frst survey 
wave. The frequency ranges from 0 to 4 (or more) times. Volunteering in a 
local organization is the most frequent way of participating in one’s local 
community, followed by attending a meeting about the local area, support-
ing a community crowdfunding project, and maintaining common facilities 
in the local area. Common to these activities is that they are done mostly by 
the older generations. By contrast, activities such as setting up online initia-
tives about the local community, participating in cultural events to support 
a project in the local community, collecting money for a community proj-
ect, and creating street art, do not entail the same generational diferences. 
To assess age versus cohort diferences, it is worth looking at participation 
frequencies among Millennials and Generation Z. Notable diferences are 
visible when it comes to cultural and benefciary activities. 
Generation Z seems to be more motivated to support local crowdfunding 
and other fundraising and to participate in cultural events. These activi-
ties are often spontaneous and oriented towards a singular event. Millen-
nials, in turn, participate slightly more in activities that point to a longer 
lasting engagement with the local community—for example, by setting up 
citizen initiatives online or maintaining local facilities. Though diferences 
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people are certain about their future location compared to a younger gen-
eration that is still being educated. The low level of local community par-
ticipation among young people may also indicate that when people have a 
more permanent job and have had more experience with political participa-
tion, they also become more engaged in their local community. 
In sum, two patterns stand out. First, as expected, the older generations
participate more in political activities targeting the local community than
the younger generations. But second, the older generations are much more
active than the younger generations in only a few specifc activities, which
suggests that younger citizens engage nonetheless in local community
afairs. 
Across generations, Figure 7.2 shows the average level of a combined 
index of the participatory activities targeting the local community over time. 
While we asked for frequency of participation in the past 12 months in the 
frst survey wave, we asked about participation frequency in the past four 
months in the second and the ffth waves, which corresponds to the time 
periods between the waves. Naturally, the average frequency drops from 
the frst wave to subsequent waves. Even so, we observe how older genera-
tions are more likely than younger generations to participate in activities 
targeting the local community. These generational diferences remain the 
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Figure 7.2 Average level of political participation targeted at the local community 
(PP III) over time across generations 
Notes. Average levels of participation are higher in wave 1 since the reference period in the 
survey questions for this wave was the last 12 months, whereas for waves 2 and 5, it was the 
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Taken together, we see that citizens do participate in activities targeting 
the local community. However, older citizens participate in such activities to 
a higher extent than younger generations. 
The efect of political news exposure on local 
community participation 
As argued in our EPIG model (see Chapter 2), political information can 
function as a basis for political participation. It might also fulfl this func-
tion in regard to behaviours that target the local community. By using the 
news media, citizens obtain political information that may have positive 
consequences for their political involvement. Previous studies have con-
frmed that newspaper reading, local news viewing, and internet use for 
informational purposes are positively related to local community partici-
pation (McLeod et al., 1996, 1999; Shah et al., 2001). However, little is 
known about how these efects vary across generations. In the following, we 
explore whether receiving political information in the news media mobilizes 
citizens to participate in political activities targeted at the local community 
and test whether such efects difer between generations. 
Overall, we fnd a positive infuence of political news exposure on political
participation targeted at the local community (see Table A7.1 in the Appen-
dix). Figure 7.3 reports the marginal efects of exposure to political news on
local community political participation. Both a static and a dynamic per-
spective are taken into account. In the static setting, we pool observations
from the second and ffth survey waves and explore the correlation between
political news exposure and local community participation while controlling
for gender, education, and generation. In the dynamic setting, we utilize all
three survey waves by including a lagged dependent variable in our models
and thus examine changes in participation over time (see Table A7.1 in the
Appendix for full models; for methodological details, see Chapter 3). 
In general, we fnd a positive efect of political news exposure on local 
community participation targeting the local community in both the static 
and the dynamic modes. In other words, the more citizens are exposed to 
political information in the news media, the more likely they are to partici-
pate in political activities targeting the local community. Not all generations 
beneft equally from using the news media. As seen in Figure 7.3, the rela-
tionship between political news exposure and local community participa-
tion is strongest for Baby Boomers and less so for the other four generations. 
This pattern holds both for the static and the dynamic models. Baby Boom-
ers grew up in politically fairly stable and economically prosperous times. 
That early period afects their societal engagement: they are the frst genera-
tion to use their newly won spare time for voluntary societal engagement 
(Howe & Strauss, 2007; Mangelsdorf, 2014). Based on our fndings, their 
involvement is ongoing. They are still the ones who pick up information 
from the news media and act upon it voluntarily and politically. This result 
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Figure 7.3 Marginal efects of exposure to political information in the news media 
on political participation targeted at the local community (PP III) across 
generations 
Notes. The estimates are displayed with a 95 percent confdence interval. Bonferroni correc-
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is in line with the results in Chapter 4, where we found that only for Baby 
Boomers is local community participation a predictor of political news use. 
Thus, for Baby Boomers, a functioning circle exits in which political news 
use afects their participation at the community level, which, in turn, leads 
to more political news consumption. In this case, the EPIG model provides 
a useful explanation for how political engagement, news media use, and 
political participation are related. 
For all other generations, participation on a local level remains unafected 
by their political news consumption. This result suggests a specifc cohort 
efect, where Baby Boomers’ upbringing may be the core determinant of 
their strong reaction to news media information when it comes to their local 
community participation. Growing up in the heyday of local newspaper 
subscriptions and strong, local citizen initiatives seems to have shaped the 
way Baby Boomers respond to new information about politics in the media 
even today. 
Though our descriptive results do not indicate high local orientation for
the youngest generation, Generation Z, and though they include statistical
uncertainty, we should not neglect the comparatively strong relationship
between news media consumption and local community participation for this
generation. A potential reason may be that many still live in the community
where they grew up, with Baby Boomers as parents, which, on the one hand,
points towards a life-cycle efect. On the other hand, the results for local par-
ticipation are similar to the results found in Chapter 5, where Baby Boomers
and Generation Z were also the two generations whose participation targeted
at the political system (PP II) was most clearly mobilized by news media con-
sumption; this result points instead to a potential cohort efect. 
Pathways to political activities targeting the local community 
We now examine whether the positive impact of political news exposure on 
local community political participation—as suggested by the EPIG model 
(see Chapter 2)—is mediated through the three dimensions of political 
engagement: political interest, knowledge, and efcacy. In Chapter 5, we 
saw that exposure to political news does indeed have a positive efect on 
each of these three dimensions of political engagement. Thus, the following 
examination will provide us with insight into whether this efect translates 
into actual political behaviours targeting the local community. 
In order to examine the pathways to local political participation, we did a
path model using multiple-group analysis for structural equation modelling.
Again, we did this both from a static and from a dynamic perspective. Table 7.1
lists the overall indirect efects and the fndings across generations for the three
engagement measures: political interest, knowledge, and efcacy. Overall,
political interest generally acts as a positive signifcant mediator in a static
setting and in a dynamic setting. Furthermore, an indirect efect of political
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Table 7.1 Indirect efects of exposure to political information in the news media on 
political participation III 
Static Dynamic 















































































Notes. SEM without/with group comparison. Unstandardized coefcients. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Models include gender and education as controls. Dynamic models also include a 
lagged dependent variable. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. NStatic = 3,490/10,470. NDynamic = 3,490/6,980. 
suggest this indirect relationship to be less pronounced than the mediation
through political interest. Turning to diferences between generations in the
dynamic setting, we see that particularly the political interest of Baby Boomers
and Generation X is positively afected by their political news consumption
and therefore contributes to higher levels of local community political partici-
pation. No indirect efect, however, was found for political knowledge. This
fnding indicates that an increase in knowledge through political news con-
sumption does not mobilize political participation at the local level. 
Though the results are similar to those in Chapter 5, we have to keep in 
mind that we measure knowledge about current political afairs at a national 
and an international level, which may be of less relevance for participation 
in local activities. As was the case with political interest, it is once again 
the Baby Boomers and Generation X whose participation on a community 
level is strengthened because their political news consumption contributes 
to their feeling of being politically efcacious. The participation of Millen-
nials and Generation Z in activities that address community issues, however, 
cannot be explained by an increase in political interest, knowledge, or ef-
cacy through news media use. 
Hence, though our results in Chapter 6 supported the idea suggested in the 
EPIG model of an indirect relationship between news media consumption 
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and participation targeting the political system through political engage-
ment, this indirect relationship is less pronounced for local community par-
ticipation, especially among the younger generations. 
Summing up 
In this chapter we examined citizens’ political participation in their local 
communities and the importance of exposure to political information in 
this regard. Local participation is valuable in itself since it determines the 
circumstances under which people live their lives on an everyday, practical 
level. Furthermore, this type of participation can prepare for other types of 
participation since it trains interaction with other citizens and strengthens 
political decision-making that is more public- than self-minded (Mill, 1861). 
Our results show that participation in the local community is highest 
among the older generations and lowest among the youngest. This result 
may refect that the generations are at diferent stages of their lives. Members 
of the younger generations may be about to fy—or have just fown—from 
the nest and thus have a lower interest in the local community, whereas 
older generations have settled and are thus more interested and motivated 
to involve themselves in the local community. News media consumption 
changes little in this pattern. While it has a positive efect on local commu-
nity participation for Baby Boomers, all other generations are less afected. 
This fnding speaks for a cohort rather than a life-cycle efect. A life-cycle 
efect would be visible if we were to fnd younger generations more afected 
by political news consumption, with older generations being less responsive. 
Only Baby Boomers are conspicuous, which suggests that they are a special 
cohort, indicating that political socialization in the formative years of a gen-
eration determines the relationship between political news consumption and 
participation, even at the local level. 
We furthermore fnd an indirect efect through political interest and 
efcacy, both of which mediate the relationship between political news 
exposure and political participation targeting the local community. Thus, 
citizens’ level of political interest and the feeling of being capable of par-
ticipating are important determinants for local community participation. 
Knowledge does not mediate the relationship. However, this result may be 
due to the way knowledge is measured. We focus only on current afairs 
knowledge on a national level, while it may be that knowledge about cur-
rent afairs on the local level mediates the relationship. Likewise, if we had 
measured local political news exposure, the relationship might have been 
even stronger. 
All in all, the EPIG model is useful to understand local political participa-
tion. The model may have been even more useful had we measured news 
consumption and knowledge with a stronger relation to the local commu-
nity itself. 
8 Being politically motivated 
Citizens do not need to target the political system or their local com-
munity in order to act politically. They can also do so by participating 
in other types of politically motivated activities, such as boycotting 
specifc products or expressing opinions on social media sites. In this 
chapter we show that participation in behaviours that are non-politi-
cal but politically motivated is highest among the middle generations 
(Baby Boomers, Generation X, and Millennials) and lowest among 
the oldest generation (the Traditionalists) and the youngest generation 
(Generation Z). We show that political news exposure has a positive 
efect on this type of political participation, especially so for the Baby 
Boomers and Generation Z. This efect seems to be the result of an 
indirect efect mediated through political interest and efcacy. 
We now turn our attention to non-political activities that are nonetheless 
politically motivated and therefore considered a specifc type of political 
participation. These are the types of activities that van Deth (2014) labels 
Political Participation IV (PP IV). This somewhat unorthodox categoriza-
tion emerged due to recent changes in the political landscape. Over the last 
two decades, citizens discovered new ways of expressing their political goals 
and viewpoints, believing that such expressions can result in real-world 
changes (Anduiza, Perea, Jensen, & Jorba, 2012; Ekström & Östman, 2015; 
Ratto & Boler, 2014; Stolle et al., 2005; Xenos et al., 2014). The increase 
in buying or boycotting certain products is an example of this new trend 
of individual behaviour (i.e., one person boycotting one product), which 
in and of itself has little impact on the resolution of a political or societal 
problem, but when it becomes part of larger scale behaviour (i.e., a mass 
of people boycotting unethically produced products), it has the potential to 
alter real-world developments (Micheletti, Stolle, & Follesdal, 2004). 
The emergence of these new participatory actions was linked with new 
means of political expression, mostly—but not only—in the digital sphere, 
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which are (1) low cost in terms of time and energy and (2) easily spread 
among interested citizens. To some extent, this development is related to 
the globalization of political participation: while previously citizens’ own, 
national political systems or local communities were the targets of their 
political actions, new forms of participation are aimed at more-difuse tar-
gets and entail more-uncertain political outcomes. Some scholars have coined 
such activities ‘unconventional participation’ (Linssen et al., 2014; see Pitti, 
2018), distinguishing them from ‘traditional’ types of participation. Others 
have called them ‘online participation’ (e.g., Bakker & de Vreese, 2011; Gil 
de Zúñiga et al., 2012), stressing the digital nature of many such activities. 
The latter has contributed to giving these new forms of participation a repu-
tation of being slacktivist (i.e., feel-good activities involving little efort or 
commitment), mostly inefective, and done for narcissistic reasons (Moro-
zov, 2009). Nonetheless, such new forms of participation can be efective, 
are fuelled by various motivations, and though they can be conducted with 
the help of digital media, they need not be (Van Deth, 2014; Dennis, 2019; 
Theocharis & Van Deth, 2016). 
A common denominator of these new forms of participation is that they 
utilize behaviours that are per se non-political to express or pursue politi-
cal goals—and as such these behaviours are politically motivated. They are 
mostly part of citizens’ everyday lives, such as shopping, wearing clothes, 
or sharing information on social media but get a political twist if performed 
with political motivation. Hence, behaviours and practices are considered 
political participation if people are motivated by political or ethical con-
siderations or wish to cause societal change ‘either with or without relying 
on the political system’ (Stolle et al., 2005, p. 255). Such non-political (i.e., 
not relying on the political system) but at the same time politically moti-
vated behaviours include boycotting products, wearing clothes with politi-
cal statements, and sharing information on social media sites. 
This chapter examines whether and how citizens’ participation in these 
non-political, politically motivated practices varies across generations and 
over time and how political news exposure afects this type of participation. 
First, we map out the frequency of citizens’ non-political, politically moti-
vated participation and whether this changes over time. Next, we examine 
how political news exposure afects this type of participation. Finally, we 
also examine whether the potential efect of political news exposure is medi-
ated through political interest, knowledge, and efcacy. 
Non-political but politically motivated behaviours 
A range of participatory behaviours exists that are targeted neither directly 
at the political system nor the local community. Nevertheless, when some-
one wears a shirt bearing the words ‘Nuclear power? No thanks!,’ carries 
a tote bag stating ‘This is NOT plastic,’ or changes pictures on his or her 
social media profle to express support for a political cause, such behaviours 
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Bought or boyco—ed products for polical, ethical, 
or environmental reasons 
Shared posts by others about a polical or societal 
issue on Facebook or similar social media sites 
Expressed your opinion in a post about a polical or 
societal issue on Facebook or similar social media 
sites 
Worn a badge, other accessories, or clothes with a 
polical message 
Iniated a polical discussion or supported a 
polical issue, e.g., by creang a group or donang 
money to a polical project or event 
Changed personal informaon or picture on your 
social media profle informaon because of a 
polical or societal issue 
0.0  0.2 0.4  0.6 0.8  1.0 1.2  1.4 1.6 
Tradionalists Baby Boomers Generaon X Millennials Generaon Z 
Figure 8.1 Frequency of participation in non-political but politically motivated 
behaviours (PP IV) across generations 
Notes. Measured in frst survey wave asking about participation during the past 12 months on 
a scale from 0 to 4 (or more) times 
are politically motivated. They send a signal about a person’s political stand. 
The question is, do these participatory practices vary across generations? 
Across the fve generations, Figure 8.1 shows the frequency of non-polit-
ical but politically motivated participation over the past 12 months as mea-
sured in the frst survey wave. The frequency ranges from 0 to 4 (or more) 
times. Buying or boycotting products for political, ethical, or environmen-
tal reasons is the most frequent behaviour. These actions are followed by 
expressing one’s own opinion or sharing others’ posts about a societal or 
political issue on a social media site. It is less common to wear badges, other 
accessories, or clothes with a political statement or, on social media sites, to 
initiate a discussion or change personal information or pictures because of 
a political or societal issue. 
In general, Generation X most often engage in these types of practices, 
followed by Baby Boomers and Millennials. Across generations, Figure 8.2 
reports the average level of a combined index of the non-political but politi-
cally motivated participatory practices over time. While we asked for par-
ticipation frequency in the past 12 months in the frst survey wave, we asked 
about participation frequency in the past 4 months in the second and the 
ffth waves, which corresponds to the time periods between the waves. Nat-
urally, the average frequency drops from the frst wave to subsequent waves. 
Even so, we see clear generational diferences. Generation X, Baby Boom-
ers, and Millennials are the most active, whereas the oldest generation, the 
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Figure 8.2 Average level of participation in non-political but politically motivated 
behaviours (PP IV) over time across generations 
Notes. Average levels of participation are higher in wave 1 since the reference period in the 
survey questions for this wave was the last 12 months, whereas for waves 2 and 5, it was the 
last four months. 
Traditionalists, and the youngest generation, Generation Z, are the least 
active. These generational diferences remain the same over time. 
Generation X have been characterized as independent and autonomous. 
They have less faith in promises made in politics or about the economy 
and are known as the frst generation for whom political protest against 
existing power structures in society was regarded as an appropriate means 
of not only political but also personal self-expression (Mangelsdorf, 2014, 
see Chapter 2). Compared to earlier generations, Generation X grew up in 
a highly modern world with less stable social structures, in which the indi-
vidual has to choose his or her own education, job, sexuality, family type, 
lifestyle, friends, and the like, with no clear path to follow (Giddens, 1991). 
This increased individualism seems to be refected in their high level of non-
political, politically motivated practices. Only when it comes to wearing 
clothes or badges with political statements is Generation X slightly outnum-
bered by the Baby Boomers, who, as a generation, were introduced to this 
form of political practice already in the more collectivistic peace or anti-
nuclear power movements. 
All in all, citizens do engage in non-political, politically motivated prac-
tices, but generational diferences exist. Interestingly—and in contrast to 
the assumption of an unpolitical, unengaged youth that only participates in 
non-binding, low-risk activities (Morozov, 2009)—the youngest generations 
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do not lead in these practices. In fact, Generation Z engages the least in 
non-political but politically motivated practices, followed by Traditional-
ists. Millennials, however, engage more frequently in these practices than in 
the political activities discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. Millennials grew up in 
times of afuence, social security, and higher levels of education, leading to 
a ‘rise in post-material or self-expressive values among younger generations’ 
(Dalton, 2017, p. 86; Inglehart, 1990). This trait is refected in their higher 
level of participation when it comes to non-political, politically motivated 
activities. The level of involvement in these new forms of participation can 
more likely be attributed to the cohort that citizens belong to, rather than 
the life-cycle stage they are in. 
The efect of political news exposure on non-political 
but politically motivated participation 
As argued in our Engagement-Participation-Information-Generation (EPIG) 
model (Chapter 2), political information can function as a basis for political 
participation, including non-political but politically motivated participatory 
practices. Though rarely studied, there is clear indication that news con-
sumption can positively afect participation in these new, often digital forms 
of participation (Dennis, 2019; Dimitrova, Shehata, Strömbäck, & Nord, 
2014; Xenos et al., 2014). Most previous studies have explicitly focused on 
the youth when examining the role that media can have in mobilizing this 
type of participation, but little is known about how these efects vary across 
generations. In the following, we therefore explore whether receiving politi-
cal information in the news media mobilizes citizens to participate in non-
political but politically motivated practices and test whether such efects 
difer between generations. 
Overall, we fnd a positive infuence of political news exposure on non-
political but politically motivated activities (see Table A8.1 in the Appen-
dix). Figure 8.3 reports the marginal efects of exposure to political news on 
this type of participation. Both a static and a dynamic perspective are con-
sidered. In the static setting, we pool observations from the second and ffth 
survey waves and explore the correlation between political news exposure 
and non-political but politically motivated participation while controlling 
for gender, education, and generation. In the dynamic setting, we utilize all 
three survey waves by including a lagged dependent variable in our models 
and thus examine changes in participation over time (see Table A8.1 in the 
Appendix for full models; for methodological details, see Chapter 3). 
In general, we fnd a positive efect of political news exposure on non-
political but politically motivated participation in both the static and the 
dynamic models. In other words, the more citizens are exposed to politi-
cal information in the news media, the more they engage in non-political 
but politically motivated practices. Not all generations beneft equally from 
using the news media. The relationship between political news exposure 
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Figure 8.3 Marginal efects of exposure to political information in the news media 
on non-political but politically motivated participation (PP IV) across 
generations 
Note. The estimates are displayed with a 95 percent confdence interval. Bonferroni correc-
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and non-political but politically motivated participation is strongest for the 
youngest generation, Generation Z. When looking at the dynamic model, 
the news media has a positive efect only for Generation Z and Baby Boom-
ers. We found a similar pattern between Baby Boomers and Generation Z 
when we looked at the efect of political news consumption on participation 
targeted at the political system (PP II); that is, they were the two generations 
most afected. This raises the question whether their political socialization 
during their formative years can explain why they become mobilized more 
strongly than other generations. Interestingly, the generation that engages 
most often in non-political but politically motivated practices, Generation 
X, benefts the least from political news media exposure. Receiving political 
information from traditional news information sources does not therefore 
seem to explain why they are so active in this type of political participation. 
Pathways to being politically motivated 
As suggested by the EPIG model (Chapter 2), we now examine whether the 
positive impact of political news exposure on non-political but politically 
motivated participation is mediated through the three dimensions of politi-
cal engagement: political interest, knowledge, and efcacy. In Chapter 5, we 
saw that, sure enough, exposure to political news has a positive efect on 
each of these three dimensions of political engagement. Thus, the following 
examination will provide us with insight into whether this efect translates 
into non-political but politically motivated participation. 
In order to examine the pathways to participating in non-political, politi-
cally motivated activities, we did a path model using multiple-group analy-
sis for structural equation modelling. Again, we did this both from a static
and from a dynamic perspective. Table 8.1 lists the fndings across genera-
tions for the three engagement measures: political interest, knowledge, and
efcacy. Overall, we fnd clear indication that a positive relationship exists
between political news consumption and non-political, politically moti-
vated participation since media consumption also contributes to higher
levels of political interest, efcacy, and knowledge. If we compare the coef-
fcients with indirect efects examined in previous chapters, it becomes clear
that the mediation of the efect that political news media consumption has
on non-political, politically motivated participation is stronger than for
the two other types of political participation (PP II, PP III). Here again,
we fnd an indication of generational diferences, especially in the dynamic
models: the stronger the indirect efect of political interest, the younger the
generation. 
In the case of Generation Z, which is most strongly afected, political news 
consumption contributes to their political interest and therefore strengthens 
the youngest generation’s engagement in non-political, politically motived 
practices. The rather strong efect we fnd for Generation Z in the analysis 
displayed in Figure 8.3 partly stems from an indirect efect through political 
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Table 8.1 Indirect efects of exposure to political information in the news media on 
political participation IV 
Static Dynamic 
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Notes. SEM without/with group comparison. Unstandardized coefcients. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Models include gender and education as controls. Dynamic models also include a 
lagged dependent variable. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. NStatic = 3,490/10,470. NDynamic = 3,490/6,980. 
interest. Only political interest, however, has an indirect efect for this gener-
ation, while no indication is found for mediation by political knowledge or 
interest. The non-political, politically motivated participation of Generation 
X and Millennials can most consistently be explained by an indirect efect of 
interest, knowledge, and efcacy. Interestingly, while we do not fnd a direct 
efect of political news consumption on these two generations’ levels of 
participation, strong indirect efects exist. The political news consumption 
of Generation X and Millennials increases their levels of political interest, 
knowledge, and efcacy, which has a positive efect on their level of non-
political but politically motivated participation. This pathway, to a weaker 
extent, also exists for Traditionalists and Baby Boomers; the contribution of 
their political news consumption to political knowledge, however, is not a 
determining factor for their involvement in this type of participation. 
Summing up 
In this chapter we explored the efect of exposure to political information 
in the news media on citizens’ engagement in non-political but politically 
motivated practices. When walking in the streets, we often see people carry-
ing bags or wearing T-shirts and badges with political statements. And when 
scrolling through the news feed on social media, we often see that somebody 
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has changed his or her profle picture to support a political cause. In other 
words, citizens do things that are not directly targeted at the political sys-
tem but are nonetheless politically motivated. They want to express their 
stand on a current political matter but may do so in a subtler manner than 
by participating in a demonstration. Though the outcomes are harder to 
assess than, for example, voting in a referendum, engaging in such practices 
has become a core phenomenon of participation in the twenty-frst century. 
Such actions have global clout since people can become inspired and express 
their political stance digitally across borders. 
Our results show that citizens do indeed engage in these types of non-
political but politically motivated practices. This is especially true for the 
middle Generation X, who seem to have found ‘their’ type of participa-
tion in these highly expressive practices. However, the youngest and most 
digitally native generation, Generation Z, does not engage in these types of 
practices to the same extent. These results indicate that the level of partici-
pation is more strongly connected to the cohort that people belong to rather 
than their current stage of life. 
More importantly for the EPIG model (Chapter 2), we show that political 
news exposure has a positive efect on this type of political participation, 
especially so for Generation Z. This fnding supports our life-cycle argu-
ment, according to which younger generations are more malleable and open 
to political information, reacting more strongly to it. However, Baby Boom-
ers also react strongly to political news consumption with non-political, 
politically motivated participation. This fnding speaks more for a cohort 
efect, since Baby Boomers stand out from their bordering generations. 
Moreover, the similar way in which Baby Boomers and Generation Z mem-
bers respond to political news consumption fuels the idea that these cohorts 
share similarities regarding their political upbringing, which causes them to 
react with the same patterns of behaviour. We cannot tell from the results 
whether only one or both perspectives (i.e., life-cycle and cohort) apply, but 
taken together, the relationship between political media consumption and 
political participation is less likely to be driven solely by a life-cycle efect. 
The efects we fnd seem to be partly indirect through, in particular, political 
interest and efcacy, which both mediate the relationship between politi-
cal news exposure and non-political but politically motivated participation. 
Thus, being interested in politics and feeling capable of changing political 
matters are important steps towards participating and engaging in politi-
cally motivated but non-political practices. 
9 Social media, political 
engagement, and participation 
Compared to traditional media, social media possess the opportu-
nity to deliver political content in a more relevant, diverse, and direct 
way, which constitutes an alternative route for the diferent genera-
tions to encounter political information. Some generations may fnd 
this gateway to political information more appealing, which may, in 
turn, afect their political engagement and participation diferently. 
In this chapter we show how exposure to political content on social 
media has diferent efects on each generation’s political involvement. 
We also uncover how political social media exposure has limited and 
diverse indirect efects on political participation through the diferent 
types of political engagement. This chapter shows how social media 
possess the potential for afecting political involvement in diferent 
ways for each of the diferent generations. 
The use of digital media for consuming news and political information has 
added a new layer to the question of generational diferences in the efects 
of news on political participation. Political social media exposure has a 
diferent modus operandi than general news exposure, and platforms like 
Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter are used to varying degrees by diferent 
generations. This chapter addresses the question: what efects does the use 
of political social media have on political involvement in diferent genera-
tional contexts? We focus on three diferent possibilities: frst, social media 
use may be responsible for a shift of mobilization patterns in diferent age 
segments of the population; second, social media use may afect citizens’ 
political engagement (i.e., political interest, knowledge, and efcacy) in dif-
ferent ways than do traditional media, resulting in distinct pathways to par-
ticipation; third, political social media exposure may trigger some types of 
participation more while triggering other types less. 
The chapter proceeds with the presentation of an argument for why we 
can expect social media to have distinct efects on diferent age brackets of 
the population. Afterwards, we explore the levels of political engagement 
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and political participation in society and how political social media expo-
sure may be driving these key democratic variables. Lastly, we compare the 
indirect efects of political engagement that may be responsible for the efect 
of political social media use on participation among diferent generations. 
Why social media may be diferent 
In line with the model presented in Chapter 2, social media may alter the 
antecedents of political media exposure and the consequences for political 
involvement. Hence, diferent generations may turn to political information 
on social media to diferent extents compared to legacy media, and, in turn, 
political social media exposure may afect political involvement of these 
generations to varying degrees. 
A frst indication of potential diferences in selecting political information 
on social media between generations can be found in Figures 4.4 to 4.9 in 
Chapter 4. While we see strong efects of political interest and knowledge 
predicting political news media use, political interest only modestly predicts 
political social media exposure. Furthermore, the frequency of exposure 
makes no diference to whether people are politically knowledgeable or not. 
This is in line with previous research that found low levels of political learn-
ing through social media use (Boukes, 2019; Cacciatore et al., 2018; Edg-
erly, Thorson, & Wells, 2018; Shehata & Strömbäck, 2018; Lee & Xenos, 
2019). Hence, the content of political information and the way in which 
it is presented on social media attract diferent groups of the population, 
most noticeably citizens belonging to Millennials and Generation Z, who 
have less political interest and knowledge than older news consumers. Pre-
vious research has furthermore shown how people who encounter political 
information on social media do not always actively seek it but encounter it 
inadvertently (Fletcher & Nielsen, 2017; Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2017). These 
fndings provide us with some evidence that political involvement as an ante-
cedent of exposure to political information in social media plays a minor 
role compared to legacy media. But it is still an open question whether this 
shift in exposure results in diferent engagement and participation patterns. 
How are social media actually diferent when comparing political infor-
mation accessed on these platforms to more traditional media channels? 
While we expect the general pathways leading to participation to be less 
afected, our argument focuses on the diferences in content that citizens 
receive on social media. We argue that the content people encounter on 
platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram is potentially more person-
ally relevant, diverse, and directed compared to information that people, on 
average, receive outside social media. Hence, the consequences of political 
social media exposure will be explored. 
To begin with, content consumed on social media is more relevant because 
it can be personalized: algorithms determine the selection of information 
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proximity of users due to the platforms’ network character (Messing & 
Westwood, 2014; Klinger & Svensson, 2015). The result is a curated news 
diet, tailored to the interests of users (Thorson & Wells, 2016). Moreover, 
the content in a social media news diet comes from more diverse sources. A 
personalized media diet frees space to consume more information of actual 
interest (Beam & Kosicki, 2014). Since basically every person, societal actor, 
organization, and institution can maintain profles on social media, informa-
tion from very diferent sources about any feld of interest can be accessed 
in a single location (Messing & Westwood, 2014). The likelihood of inad-
vertent exposure to content that a user did not seek may further increase the 
diversity of sources (Fletcher & Nielsen, 2017; Valeriani & Vaccari, 2016). 
Importantly, this diversity does not necessarily pertain to political leanings 
(potentially quite the opposite; see the ‘flter bubble’ discussion in Flaxman, 
Gael, & Rao, 2016), but citizens may receive information from a greater 
number of sources in general. Lastly, content received via social media does 
not stand alone but is accompanied by diferent social cues, which makes 
it more directed than information without such cues. Posts in a news feed, 
for example, can have a commenting lead, a comment by the friend who 
recommended it, or a number of likes (or emoticons). Such cues attached 
to an informational item on social media can drive selection, serve as inter-
pretation aids, and shape how information is processed, what citizens learn 
from it, and how they act upon it (Messing & Westwood, 2014; Messing, 
Westwood, & Lelkes, 2011; Ohme & Mothes, 2020). 
Implication of social media use for political 
engagement and behaviour 
These diferent features of social media platforms can have important impli-
cations for political media exposure and its efects on engagement and par-
ticipation. One can argue that the diferent nature of political information 
on social media is especially appealing to younger generations—who see 
politics as boring and restricted in terms of topics—and the legacy media 
as not being focused on younger generations (Briggs, 2017; Mindich, 2005; 
Moeller, Kühne, & de Vreese, 2018). Added to the easy and ubiquitous 
access on social media, which connects them with each other, personal rel-
evance, diversity, and directedness may explain the high uptake of social 
media platforms for political information use among the young. 
Furthermore, we may see distinct efects of political social media exposure
on citizens’ political engagement and participation. Opportunity structures
matter for citizens to act politically, and people have diferent capacities to
participate fully in society (Leighley, 1995). Citizens need information to act
upon, and media can be an important provider of information that mobilizes
(Colwell Quarles, 1979). With high personal relevance, diversity, and direct-
edness, information on social media can therefore be an important anteced-
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on social media to the geographic proximity of users may help them become
informed about topics that they can easily relate to and feel the need to act
upon. At the same time, exposure to a greater diversity of political informa-
tion sources increases the likelihood of topics or cases that citizens fnd worth
supporting or becoming involved with. On social media, it is possible for
users to stumble upon a niche topic, such as information about animal wel-
fare, which they fnd relevant enough to want to pursue. Lastly, information
that has an immediate connection to other users in the network—be it via
recommendations, social cues, or direct calls for action—may be perceived
to be of a higher order than information without any social utility (Chafee
& McLeod, 1973). Being addressed by one’s social contacts is an important
antecedent of political participation, as outlined in Verba et al.’s (1995) Civic
Voluntarism Model, and the directedness of social media information may
enforce the likelihood of acting on that information. 
Though all generations, in theory, can select the same information on 
social media, we argue that variations in efects on political involvement 
can stem from the ability—or lack thereof—to use social media in a fruitful 
and efective way. Millennials and particularly members of Generation Z 
are better prepared to use social media in political information contexts and 
therefore beneft more from it than older generations (Prensky, 2001). Dis-
parities of social media literacy among diferent generations may exist. By 
and large, the instinctive use of social media should be higher for members 
of the two youngest generations. If that is the case, we should fnd genera-
tional diferences as part of a cohort efect as regards social media use and 
its relation to citizens’ political behaviour and engagement. 
In our analysis, we test how strongly the use of social media for political
information exposure predicts both political engagement and political partici-
pation and if these efects occur indirectly through political interest, knowledge,
and internal efcacy. We rely on the ffth wave of our panel study, in which a
ten-day period of smartphone-based media diaries preceded the measurement
of the mediating and dependent variables in the model. Therefore, only a sub-
sample of our general sample is analyzed here (see Chapter 3 for details). 
Levels of political interest, knowledge, and internal efcacy 
At frst, we take a look at the average levels of political engagement among 
our fve diferent generations (Figure 9.1). As we have already seen in the 
main analysis of Chapter 5, the younger generations have a lower level of 
political interest. Similarly—but on a smaller scale—the level of knowledge 
about current political afairs decreases as the generations get younger. Only 
the level of internal political efcacy is rather stable across generations, with 
Generation X feeling efcacious most strongly. Interestingly, the feeling of 
being capable of understanding politics is not much lower among Millenni-
als and members of Generation Z. In this regard, prerequisites for political 

























Tradionaliss Baby Boomers Generaon X Millennials Generaon Z 
Figure 9.1 Average levels of political engagement across generations in mobile sur-
vey subsample 
Notes. Levels of political engagement from the wave 5 of online panel survey among the mobile 
survey sample (n = 534). Scale endpoints present minimum and maximum values. 
We proceed by looking into the relationship between political social 
media exposure and the three types of political engagement (political inter-
est, knowledge, and internal efcacy) shown in Figures 9.2 to 9.4. The 
efects are shown at a static and a dynamic level per type of political engage-
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Tradionalists Baby Boomers Generaon X Millennials Generaon Z 
Figure 9.2 Marginal efects of exposure to political information on social media on 
political interest across generations 
Notes. The estimates are displayed with a 95 percent confdence interval. Bonferroni correction
used to counteract the problem of multiple comparisons. Full models in the Appendix, Table A9.1. 
 
  
Social media, political engagement 105 











Tradionalists Baby Boomers Generaon X Millennials Generaon Z 











Tradionalists Baby Boomers Generaon X Millennials Generaon Z 
Figure 9.3 Marginal efects of exposure to political information on social media on 
political knowledge across generations 
Notes. The estimates are displayed with a 95 percent confdence interval. Bonferroni correc-
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Tradionalists Baby Boomers Generaon X Millennials Generaon Z 
Figure 9.4 Marginal efects of exposure to political information on social media on 
political efcacy across generations 
Notes. The estimates are displayed with a 95 percent confdence interval. Bonferroni correc-
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political social media use is associated with their engagement with politics. 
Overall, in the static models, we fnd a positive relationship between politi-
cal social media exposure and political interest, political knowledge, and 
political efcacy. In the dynamic models, political social media use predicts 
political interest and knowledge but not political efcacy (see Tables A9.1– 
A9.3 in the Appendix). Hence, even when controlling for previous levels of 
engagement, a general efect of political social media exposure on two of the 
three political engagement variables becomes visible. 
Nonetheless, we also fnd strong generational diferences. The most prom-
inent relationship is found for political interest: for all but Traditionalists, 
a high level of political social media use is positively related with political 
interest. Only for Generation Z, however, can we establish a positive efect 
of political social media exposure on political interest when controlling for 
previous levels of interest (Figure 9.2). Turning to political knowledge, we 
see that a positive relationship exists only for Millennials, and it remains 
signifcant in the dynamic analysis as well (Figure 9.3). For political efcacy, 
we see a positive relationship only for Generation X, but we cannot estab-
lish an efect of political social media use for any of the generations. 
A comparison of the generations reveals an interesting pattern. The two
ends of our generational spectrum react most coherently to receiving political
information on social media. While Traditionalists’ political interest, knowl-
edge, and political efcacy do not change with an increasing level of political
social media exposure, the opposite is the case for Generation Z. Here, we
apparently see a traditional age gap. But interestingly, the political engage-
ment of not only young citizens is contingent upon political social media
exposure; so is the political engagement of Baby Boomers, Generation X,
and Millennials. In general, the relationship between political social media
exposure decreases slightly with increasing age, indicating a life-cycle efect
rather than a cohort efect. However, since social media were not around
when the older generations came of age, we do not know whether the higher
efect of political social media exposure on political engagement will remain
a distinctive feature of Millennials and Generation Z when they grow older. 
In sum, levels of political engagement difer across generations. Though 
political social media exposure contributes to variations in political engage-
ment across generations, such variations do not clearly follow a life-cycle 
pattern; in general, young citizens’ political engagement is not more suscep-
tible to political information from platforms like Facebook, YouTube, and 
Instagram than that of older generations. 
Diferences in participation levels 
We now turn to the efects of political social media exposure on political
participation. As a frst step, we explore diferences in participation levels
across generations. As was the case in the analysis of the main sample, the


































Tradionaliss Baby Boomers Generaon X Millennials Generaon Z 
Polical Parcipaon II Polical Parcipaon III Polical Parcipaon IV 
Figure 9.5 Average levels of political participation across generations in subsample 
Source: Notes. Levels of political participation (0–4) from wave 5 of the online panel survey 
among the mobile survey sample (n = 534). 
Boomers have the highest levels of participation across all three types of par-
ticipation—PP II, III, and IV—followed by Traditionalists, with the young-
est cohort, Generation Z, exhibiting the lowest levels. Participation directly
addressing the political system (PP II) is rather stable across generations, with
Traditionalists and Baby Boomers participating slightly more than the three
younger cohorts. This pattern is even more pronounced for participation tar-
geted at the local and community level (PP III): for Generation X, Millennials,
and Generation Z, this type of participation is far less prominent than for
Traditionalists and Baby Boomers. However, the very low levels of local par-
ticipation among Millennials and Generation Z should not be overinterpreted
since we know that local issues only increase in importance when a person has
found a permanent place to live. All generations participate the most in non-
political but politically motivated activities. Contrary to the assumption that
mostly younger generations undertake this type of participation, we see that
the generations who, in general, participate politically the most are also the
most active when it comes to non-political but politically motivated activities
(PP IV). Therefore, it cannot be concluded that these new activities function
as a substitution for other forms of political activity only for the young. 
The degree to which the diferent generations participate in the three types 
of political activity is one thing. Another is the relative importance that the 
diferent generations ascribe to each type of participation. Figure 9.6 shows 
the share of each type of participation for each generation. In other words, 
it shows the participatory priorities of the diferent generations. The share 
of political activities targeted at the political system (PP II) is larger for 
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Figure 9.6 Share of participation types of total political participation across genera-
tions in subsample 
Note. Levels of political participation from wave 5 of the online panel survey among the 
mobile survey sample (n = 534). 
political participation at the local level, which is of higher relative impor-
tance for the two oldest generations. Interestingly, even if younger genera-
tions participate less in non-political, politically motivated activities than do 
older generations, we fnd indications that this type of activity increases in 
relative importance the younger the generations get, with the exception of 
Generation Z, thus constituting a larger part of their overall participation 
compared to Traditionalists and Baby Boomers. 
Social media efects on political participation 
Next, we investigate to what extent political social media exposure explains 
variations in participation levels and if generational diferences can be traced 
back to social media use. 
Overall, we fnd a positive infuence of political social media exposure on 
political participation (see Tables A9.4–A9.6 in the Appendix). The more 
often citizens are exposed to political news via social media, the more often 
they are active in political participation targeting the political system (PP II) 
and in non-political but politically motivated activities (PP IV). Only a weak 
relationship exists between political social media exposure and participa-
tion targeting the local community (PP III). Figures 9.7 to 9.9 show the 
unstandardized efects of political social media exposure on the three types 
of participation across the generations. 
Almost equally for all generations but Traditionalists and Millennials,
receiving political information on social media seems to be related to partici-
pation targeted directly at the political system (PP II; Figure 9.7). When taking
previous levels of exposure into account, however, only Generation Z benefts
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Tradionalists Baby Boomers Generaon X Millennials Generaon Z 
Figure 9.7 Marginal efects of exposure to political information on social media 
on political participation targeted at the political system (PP II) across 
generations 
Notes. The estimates are displayed with a 95 percent confdence interval. Bonferroni correc-
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efectively from political social media exposure. Figure 9.8 indicates that for
no generation does social media exposure contribute to participation in com-
munity-based activities (PP III). A diferent picture emerges for non-political
but politically motivated participation (PP IV; Figure 9.9). Here, social media
is a clear driver for the three oldest—but not for the younger—generations. 
Is political social media use responsible for generational diferences in
political participation? Traditionalists become mobilized by political social
media exposure only to a limited extent—in fact, solely when it comes to
local, community-oriented activities (PP IV). By contrast, Baby Boomers are
afected the most by social media exposure. This result is much in line with
our expectation that Baby Boomers are currently the most politically active
generation. In fact, the result indicates that political information on social
media can very well translate into political action if a generation is suscep-
tible to it. For Generation X, social media use is related to PP II and IV, but
only weakly to PP III. Since Millennials grew up with social media and, com-
pared to their younger fellow citizens, entered the political system some time
ago, they may be expected to be afected the most by political social media
exposure. However, the opposite is true. Millennials are the frst cohort for
whom participation in the new non-political but politically motivated activi-
ties by far outweighs other types of political participation; yet, Millennials
are the least afected by their political social media use. Hence, their high
levels of PP IV participation must be explained by factors other than political
social media exposure. Lastly, the youngest cohort, Generation Z, partici-
pate politically the least, most likely due to their young age. Nevertheless, we
fnd a positive efect of their social media exposure on political participation
targeted at the political system but not on local-level participation. Unex-
pectedly, receiving political information on platforms like Facebook or Ins-
tagram does not contribute to their participation in non-political, politically
motivated activities. Generation Z, who receive political information much
more frequently from social than traditional news media, is the only genera-
tion for whom high levels of social media exposure are in sync with high
levels of participation. So, though exposure to political news from legacy
media had a strong efect on the political participation of this generation,
they did not use legacy media content to a great extent; by contrast, we see
that their exposure to political social media—the media source they use the
most—actually contributes to some of their political participation. 
In sum, we see a mixed picture when we look at the generational efects of 
political social media exposure on political participation. In some respects, 
the older generations, with higher levels of participation, beneft the most 
from political social media exposure. The younger generations are likewise 
afected by social media use but less so than expected. Millennials, in par-
ticular, beneft rather little from their high levels of political social media 
use. Hence, political social media exposure does not automatically translate 
into equally high levels of participation. 
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Tradionalists Baby Boomers Generaon X Millennials Generaon Z 
Figure 9.8 Marginal efects of exposure to political information on social media 
on political participation targeted at the local community (PP III) across 
generations 
Notes. The estimates are displayed with a 95 percent confdence interval. Bonferroni correc-
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Tradionalists Baby Boomers Generaon X Millennials Generaon Z 
Figure 9.9 Marginal efects of exposure to political information on social media 
on non-political but politically motivated participation (PP IV) across 
generations 
Notes. The estimates are displayed with a 95 percent confdence interval. Bonferroni correc-
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Pathways to political participation 
How does social media exposure actually drive participation among citi-
zens by afecting their political engagement—that is, their political interest, 
knowledge, and internal efcacy? Again, we focus on generational difer-
ences in the pathways to political participation by exploring potential medi-
ation efects, using path model analysis. 
For Baby Boomers and Millennials, political social media exposure con-
tributes to their political interest and thereby strengthens their participation 
in activities targeted at the political system (PP II). For this type of par-
ticipation, Baby Boomers and Generation X are subject to a weak media-
tion efect through an increase in political efcacy (Table 9.1). Efects on 
participation in non-political but politically motivated activities (PP IV) 
are mediated through an increase in political interest and internal efcacy 
(Table 9.3). However, no evidence is found that social media use drives PP II 
and PP IV through political knowledge. Nothing indicates that local partici-
pation (PP III) is afected by the efects of political social media exposure on 
political engagement (Table 9.2). This fnding is no surprise since political 
social media use has limited power to mobilize this type of participation 
in the frst place. Hence, exposure to political news on social media does 
Table 9.1 Indirect efects of exposure to political information on social media on 
political participation II 
Static Dynamic 















































































Notes. SEM without/with group comparison. Unstandardized coefcients. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Models include gender and education as controls. Dynamic models also include a 
lagged dependent variable from wave 1. 
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Table 9.2 Indirect efects of exposure to political information on social media on 
political participation III 
Static Dynamic 















































































Notes. SEM without/with group comparison. Unstandardized coefcients. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Models include gender and education as controls. Dynamic models also include a 
lagged dependent variable from wave 1. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01. N = 543. 
Table 9.3 Indirect efects of exposure to political information on social media on 
political participation IV 
Static Dynamic 















































































Notes. SEM without/with group comparison. Unstandardized coefcients. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Models include gender and education as controls. Dynamic models also include a 
lagged dependent variable from wave 1. 
+ p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. N = 543. 
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not make people more knowledgeable in a way that increases their politi-
cal participation. However, the middle generations become more politically 
interested and efcacious when consuming political news on social media, 
and this seems to translate into an increase in their participation in certain 
types of political activity. 
When it comes to generational diferences, Baby Boomers are the genera-
tion whose political participation is most consistently afected by political 
social media exposure through political engagement. Their participation 
targeted at the political system (PP II) and in non-political but politically 
motivated activities (PP IV) is afected by political social media use through 
political interest and efcacy, as is—with some statistical uncertainties—the 
case with Generation X. Political social media exposure only afects Millen-
nials’ participation targeted at the political system (PP II) through political 
interest. So, even if political interest is mostly afected by social media expo-
sure (see Figure 9.2), it is responsible for an increase in political participa-
tion only for Baby Boomers, Generation X, and Millennials. 
Political participation among the youngest and oldest generations is not 
at all indirectly afected by political social media exposure. Hence, it may be 
worth exploring additional reasons for what drives political participation 
among these generations. Of particular relevance is the mobilizing efect 
that we fnd among Traditionalists in regard to PP IV; social media exposure 
increases this type of participation, but this increase seems not to be related 
to an increased political engagement. 
Are social media responsible for participation gaps? 
This chapter explored the potential of social media to spark political engage-
ment and participation among diferent generations. Overall, gaps between 
types of participation are bigger than between generations. Nonetheless, 
political involvement does vary across generations, and the cohort in which 
citizens come of age also leads to notable diferences in the levels of political 
engagement and behaviour. 
Political social media exposure contributes to how strongly people are 
engaged in politics. Across generations, the strongest relation is found 
between political social media exposure and political interest, whereas 
political knowledge and internal political efcacy are less afected. But not 
all generations beneft equally: on average, the interest, knowledge, and ef-
cacy of the youngest cohort, Generation Z, rises the most with increased 
political social media use. As for political participation, across generations 
there is indication that exposure to political information on platforms like 
Facebook or YouTube contributes to citizens’ political behaviour. Not only 
is non-political, politically motivated participation (PP IV) afected by social 
media use—but so too is participation directly targeted at the political sys-
tem (PP II). Hence, political social media exposure contributes to citizens’ 
political participation in activities that are directly as well as only indirectly 
 Social media, political engagement 117 
connected to the political system. The two youngest and the oldest genera-
tions, however, beneft only to a limited extent from their political social 
media use exposure. 
Our analysis fnds that a change in the media environment, such as the 
increasing social media platforms, may alter political behaviour. Such behav-
ioural changes are not caused by technology itself. Instead, diferent media 
provide diferent opportunities to be informed about politics (Prior, 2007). It 
thus seems as if political social media content with high personal relevance, 
diversity, and directness has the potential to afect political behaviour. The 
easy, no-cost, and low-threshold access to political information from a vari-
ety of sources may increase opportunities to learn about political issues and 
become politically engaged. At the same time, algorithm-supported content 
curation and recommendations, as well as reactions or comments by other 
users, potentially minimize the need to be motivated as a prerequisite for 
processing political content and extracting relevant information. 
Only weak support is given to our expectation that the upbringing of, 
in particular, Millennials and Generation Z in a digital media environment 
makes them the strongest benefciaries of using social media platforms for 
political information. Their political social media exposure seems to result 
in higher levels of political participation in only a few cases. Interestingly, 
regarding political participation, the older generations’ (Traditionalists, 
Baby Boomers, and Generation X) response to the availability of political 
information on social media platforms is also positive and includes new 
types of political participation. Thus, social media use does not seem to be 
responsible for generational gaps in political participation. 
But from another perspective, our fndings indicate that political social 
media use may contribute to participation disparities between diferent 
cohorts. Millennials and Generation Z are among the citizens most exposed 
to social media news; their exposure, however, translates into political par-
ticipation only to a limited extent. Older generations are skilled in transform-
ing political information—even when extracted from social media—into 
action. The two youngest generations never acquired such skills in an ofine 
media environment, and our study indicates that they did not fully develop 
them in a digital media environment either. If so, the fact that they primarily 
expose themselves to political news on social media contributes to a genera-
tional participation gap. 
Factors other than social media exposure may explain the participation 
patterns of younger generations. Millennials grew up in a in a time of great 
political uncertainty, which may make them question the meaningfulness of 
political participation, no matter how well informed they are about politics. 
If that is the case, we are dealing with a cohort efect. In addition, these 
generations, being at the early stages of their life cycles, are preoccupied 
by eforts to fnd their own positions in life and therefore may not have 
the individual resources, such as spare time and money, that are important 
preconditions for political participation (Verba et al., 1995). There is no 
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indication that Millennials tune out from political and current afairs in 
their news consumption, but though they inform themselves and participate 
online, in their stage of life it may be difcult to turn the possession of politi-
cal information into everyday political action. This speaks for a life-cycle 
efect. Though we fnd similar patterns for Generation Z, it is too early 
to say whether the weak efects of social media exposure on participation 
remain once their formative years lie behind them. 
We conclude that the capability of political information to spark political 
engagement and participation among Danish citizens is not endangered by 
a shift in news exposure from legacy to social media. Social media exposure 
contributes not only to a form of participation that that has been described 
as rather lightweight (Morozov, 2009) but also to more demanding ways of 
addressing the political system. Older generations seem to proft the most 
from the personally relevant, diverse, and directed content that they encoun-
ter on social media. On a more worrisome note, political information expo-
sure on platforms like Facebook, YouTube, and Instagram does not seem 
to spark local political participation. It is important to explore further why 
social media’s ability to mobilize is restricted in this respect. However, over-
all we fnd that political social media exposure, just like legacy media expo-








10 Election times: special times? 
In previous chapters we found a rise in political participation and expo-
sure to political information in traditional news media and on social
media during an election. This chapter further explores the efects of
media exposure on political participation during an election across dif-
ferent generations by also looking at the role of political engagement:
interest, knowledge, and efcacy. Our analyses show that the political
news consumption of Millennials and Generation Z contributes little
to their high levels of campaign participation. In line with the fndings
in the previous chapter, mostly older generations beneft from political
social media exposure as regards their campaign participation. 
In this chapter we investigate whether elections are indeed special when it 
comes to media exposure and its mobilizing efects on political participa-
tion. As seen in previous chapters, media attention to political topics goes 
up during campaign time, and these reoccurring, politically heightened days 
seem to increase the political involvement of citizens. We now test the rela-
tionship between news media consumption and political participation in 
greater detail, applying the Engagement-Participation-Information-Gener-
ation (EPIG) model to the Danish election campaign period in 2015. Our 
focus lies on the efects of political news and political social media consump-
tion as predictors of campaign participation. This allows us to compare not 
only the efects of news media and political social media consumption on 
campaign participation but also campaign to non-campaign times. We can 
thus determine if they difer, in particular, between our fve generations. 
Political participation in election times 
Election times are important to democracy. To make a competitive model 
of democracy work, citizens are expected to be aware of political issues 
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incumbent government, and to be informed about the political alternatives 
(Strömbäck, 2005). The media can play an important role in helping citizens 
gather the relevant information that is needed to cast informed votes on 
election day (Colwell Quarles, 1979). Research has found that the media are 
especially relevant for younger voters since they have just entered the politi-
cal system and are more uncertain than older generations about whom to 
vote for in their frst elections (Aalberg & Jenssen, 2007; Colwell Quarles, 
1979; Gerber, Green, & Shachar, 2003; Ha et al., 2013; Ohme, de Vreese, 
& Albæk, 2018b; O’Keefe & Liu, 1980). For the youngest generation in 
our sample, Generation Z, the election under investigation was the very frst 
national election they were eligible to vote in. They are also the frst digital 
natives to enter the electorate (Moeller et al., 2014). It is therefore of special 
interest to investigate how they use digital media during the campaign and 
how it shapes their political behaviour. 
Voting decisions are based on a number of diferent factors. For older citi-
zens, the party orientation and political leanings they have developed over
their lifetimes play an important role, though voter volatility is increasing also
for older generations (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2002; Fournier, Nadeau, Blais,
Gidengil, & Nevitte, 2004). Media exposure guides voters in high times of
political competition—and not least the young, frst-time voters (Aalberg &
Jenssen, 2007; Ha et al., 2013; O’Keefe & Liu, 1980, Strömbäck, 2005). But
so does active participation in the election campaign: it helps citizens make
informed voting choices and decide which positions or candidates to support
(Verba et al., 1995). This type of engagement with the campaign, beyond
mere media use, may be especially important for younger citizens since it
helps them get in touch with political candidates, fnd issues important to
them, and identify spaces where they can connect with other voters. In short,
active engagement with the campaign can help them cast informed, confdent
votes (Ohme et al., 2018b). We therefore investigate the relationship between
political media exposure and active campaign participation as an additional
type of political participation that comes closer to participation within the
political system (PP I) but still difers from Van Deth’s (2014) initial approach.
We keep the proposed EPIG model in mind and look further into the indirect
efects that diferent types of media use can have on campaign participation
by increasing political engagement during an election campaign. 
Media exposure and campaign participation 
In Chapter 4, we already saw how exposure to political information increases
considerably during election time. Hence, an upcoming election leads people
to dedicate more attention to politics than they do in non-election times.
While this pattern holds for all generations, we see generational diferences
between types of media consumption. The increase in political news exposure
is almost equal for all generations (see Figure 4.2), which keeps the distance
between generations stable: the older citizens are, the more they consume
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exposure also becomes visible for political social media exposure, though
with an opposite generational pattern: the political social media exposure of
Millennials and Generation Z increases almost by 15 percent in contrast to
non-election times, whereas the three older generations show a more mod-
est growth in their exposure to political content on social media. After the
election, however, the level of social media use returns to its relatively low
starting point. Political social media use may be more appealing to younger
generations, also during election times, because this type of political news
can be a by-product of other types of media exposure and is more easily
digestible (Fletcher & Nielsen, 2017; Brundidge, 2010). In addition, political
actors, such as parties or candidates, increasingly use social media to directly
reach citizens, thereby bypassing journalistic flters. This personalized style of
communication (Kruikemeier, Sezgin, & Boerman, 2016) may be especially
appealing to younger generations and thus further contributes to their high
level of political social media exposure during election times (Ohme, 2019). 
Citizens participate in various activities related to the election campaign. 
At campaign events, they can get in touch with politicians and other voters, 
they can support a party or convince others to vote, or they may involve 
themselves in actions online, such as discussing political issues in social 
media groups or using a vote advice application. What these actions have 
in common is that they go beyond mere political information exposure and 
may thereby help citizens be more closely connected with the upcoming 
elections, thus helping them to cast more-informed votes. 
Looking at overall participation patterns (Figure 10.1), the two younger 
generations more often participate in campaign-related activities than the 
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Figure 10.1 Levels of campaign participation across generations 
Notes. Levels of campaign participation measured in wave 4. 
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down during an election campaign, compared to non-election times. While 
either Traditionalists, Baby Boomers, or Generation X exhibited the high-
est levels of activity in one of the three types of non-electoral participation 
in previous chapters, Millennials and Generation Z are leading, with equal 
levels of participation in election times. Thus, election campaigns have the 
power to especially engage and excite young citizens about politics. 
However, a more diferentiated picture emerges when we compare the 
diferent activities across generations (Figure 10.2). Millennials and Gen-
eration Z more often discuss election-related issues on social media, talk 
about the election, or take a vote advice application test. Traditionalists, 
Baby Boomers, and Generation X more often make others aware that they 
will vote, share information on social media about the election, or support 
a candidate with the help of social media. All generations score equally low 
when it comes to volunteering for a political party in an ofine context. 
Though clear diferences between generations exist, the fault line does not 
run between online and ofine options of campaign participation. Rather, 
we see that Millennials and Generation Z strongly engage in activities 
through which they receive additional input on the election, either through 
Talked about elecon 
Done elecon test 
Visited candidate’s website/social media 
profle 
Made others aware that you will vote 
Convinced others to vote via social media 
Shared informaon about elecon 
Supported a candidate or a party via social 
media 
A“ended public elecon meengs 
Taken iniave to discuss elecon on social 
media 
Expressed your opinion to a polician via 
mail/social media 
Volunteered for a polical party or candidate 
Contacted polician in elecon me 
0  20  40  60  80 100 
Tradionalists Baby Boomers Generaon X Millennials Generaon Z 
Figure 10.2 Frequency of campaign participation across generations 
Notes. Measured in online survey wave 4. 
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the use of dedicated websites or through discussions with others, whereas 
the three older generations are active in behaviours that are more directed 
towards making others aware about the election or issues related to it. This 
diference between young people informing themselves and older citizens 
informing others speaks for a life-cycle efect, resulting in less-experienced 
voters seeking information and more-experienced voters sharing informa-
tion in various ways. 
Drivers of campaign participation 
How much are these diferences in participation patterns related to political 
information exposure during the election campaign? We frst look at a static 
model (Figure 10.3), which shows that political news consumption is more 
strongly related to campaign participation for the two youngest generations, 
followed by Baby Boomers. This pattern, however, changes when we look at 
the dynamic model. As explained in Chapter 3, our modelling strategy here 
difers from previous dynamic models, in which an actual lagged depen-
dent variable was included. As a proxy for a lagged dependent variable, the 
dynamic models that enable us to predict campaign participation instead use 
the intention to participate that the respondents expressed at the beginning 
of the campaign. In the dynamic models, political news consumption posi-
tively changes the level of active campaign participation across campaign 
time only for Traditionalists, Baby Boomers, and Millennials. This pattern 
is similar to the one found in Chapter 6 for the mobilizing efects of political 
news consumption on participation directly targeted at the political system 
(PP II), though the efect on campaign participation is slightly weaker. The 
similarity in patterns may not be all that surprising given that campaign 
participation and PP II are both closely related to the political system. What 
is diferent is that political news consumption infuences Millennials posi-
tively, whereas for Generation Z, higher levels of political news consump-
tion during the election campaign do not lead to more activity in campaign 
participation, at least in a dynamic assessment. 
With respect to political social media exposure, we fnd a diferent mobi-
lization pattern. As estimated in the static model, being exposed to political 
information on social media during an election campaign is correlated with 
campaign participation for all generations (Figure 10.4). The relationship is 
stronger for the three older generations. Hence, though their use of social 
media during the election campaign is lower than for younger generations, 
it corresponds more with active campaign participation. In our dynamic 
models, this pattern is further solidifed. Here, political social media use 
positively afects the campaign participation of only Traditionalists, Baby 
Boomers, and Generation X, while no signifcant infuence is found for Mil-
lennials and Generation Z. The change between their intended participation 
and actual campaign participation over the campaign period cannot there-
fore be explained by the frequency of their political social media use. 
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Figure 10.3 Marginal efects of exposure to political information in the news media 
on campaign participation 
Notes. The estimates are displayed with a 95 percent confdence interval. Bonferroni correc-
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Figure 10.4 Marginal efects of exposure to political information on social media on 
campaign participation 
Notes. The estimates are displayed with a 95 percent confdence interval. Bonferroni correc-
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Though the results are contrary to our initial assumption that younger
citizens beneft the most from political social media use (e.g., Holt, Shehata,
Strömbäck, & Ljungberg, 2013; Xenos et al., 2014), the pattern is strikingly
similar to the mobilizing efect we found for political social media exposure in
Chapter 9. Here, non-political but politically motivated activities (PP IV) were
likewise afected by social media exposure for only the three older generations
but not for Millennials and Generation Z. The similarities between the mobi-
lization of campaign participation found in this chapter with the mobiliza-
tion of, on the one hand, participation targeted at the political system (PP II;
see Chapter 6) and, on the other hand, non-political but politically motivated
activities (PP IV; see Chapter 9) indicate that we have found somewhat sys-
tematic patterns: political news consumption afects types of participation that
are closely related to the political system, and political social media use afects
older generations more than younger generations. In sum, we fnd support for
the direct relationship between political media consumption and political par-
ticipation as proposed in the EPIG model, in election as well as non-election
contexts, and we also fnd generational diferences in both contexts. 
Furthermore, the EPIG model suggests that these efects are partly caused
by a strengthening of political engagement. We therefore look at indirect
efects of media exposure on campaign participation through increased
political interest, knowledge, and efcacy (for direct efects, see Tables
A10.1–A10.2 in the Appendix). In Table 10.1, we see substantial efects.
Table 10.1 Indirect efects of exposure to political information in the news media on 
campaign participation 
Static Dynamic 















































































Notes. SEM without/with group comparison. Unstandardized coefcients. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Models include gender and education as controls. Dynamic models also include a 
lagged dependent variable. 
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Overall, the static models indicate higher levels of campaign participation,
apparently because the respondents’ political news consumption increases
their levels of political interest, knowledge, and efcacy. This efect is
strongest for the two younger generations. However, in the dynamic mod-
els, there is little evidence that political media exposure afects campaign
participation positively as a result of an increase in political engagement
during campaign time. This is true for almost all generations. Millenni-
als are the exception, with a mediation through political knowledge and
efcacy. 
Political engagement also mediates the relationship between politi-
cal social media exposure and campaign participation. Here again,
the static models indicate that high political engagement due to social
media exposure increases the campaign participation of Millennials
and Generation Z (see Table 10.2). In the dynamic models, we find a
much weaker support for an indirect effect on campaign participation.
While there are no indirect effects for Traditionalists, Baby Boomers,
Millennials, and Generation Z, Table 10.2 indicates that the campaign
participation of Generation X is affected positively by social media
exposure due to the latter contributing to an increase in political inter-
est and efficacy. 
Table 10.2 Indirect efects of exposure to political information on social media on 
campaign participation 
Static Dynamic 















































































Notes. SEM without/with group comparison. Unstandardized coefcients. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Models include gender and education as controls. Dynamic models also include a 
lagged dependent variable. 
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Importance of political campaigns for younger generations 
While most fndings refect the patterns between media use and participa-
tion that we found in previous chapters, two fndings in the present chapter 
deserve special attention. First, the efects that media consumption has on 
Millennials stand out compared to other generations. Millennials exhibit 
high levels of campaign participation and are especially afected by politi-
cal news exposure. Their political news consumption not only has a direct 
positive efect but also contributes to higher levels of knowledge and ef-
cacy. Hence, when it comes to short-term engagement around a specifc, 
high-profle political event, Millennials apparently can be mobilized by both 
types of political news consumption. For a generation that is otherwise con-
sidered lethargic and difcult to mobilize, an election campaign appears to 
be the right moment in time to activate them. 
Second, Generation Z difers markedly from Millennials. Neither political
news nor political social media consumption seems to mobilize their cam-
paign participation, whether directly or through an indirect political engage-
ment pathway. Research suggests that the media may play a greater role in
afecting the turnout and vote choice of young, inexperienced voters com-
pared to older voters (Holt et al., 2013; Ohme et al., 2018b); for Generation
Z, however—who had their frst chance to vote for parliament in the elections
under investigation—the mobilizing potential that we found for political news
exposure (Chapters 6 and 8) and for political social media exposure (Chapter
9) works more weakly, if at all, in a campaign context. Strikingly, however,
this youngest generation exhibits relatively high levels of campaign participa-
tion, even on par with Millennials. So what mobilizes them to actively engage
with the campaign, if not their political media consumption? One reason for
this missing relationship may be that frst-time voters still have to establish
patterns of media use during election time, fnding the right outlets and topics
that interest them. Moreover, perhaps we do not fnd statistically signifcant
efects of social media exposure on the campaign participation of Generation
Z because we examine overall political media exposure instead of specifc
content types. Young citizens’ electoral behaviour is strongly shaped by their
social networks—that is, family, peers, and even teachers at school (Bhatti &
Hansen, 2012). With our focus on media efects, we did not dedicate atten-
tion to political interaction within peer networks, as done by other research
(Lee, Shah, & McLeod, 2012; Marquart, Ohme, & Möller, 2020). 
Nonetheless, election campaign participation among our youngest gen-
erations shows a positive pattern according to both a competitive and a 
participatory model of democracy. It remains to be seen if their activity level 
stabilizes or even increases when todays’ frst-time voters have established 
more stable patterns of campaign information-gathering through the use of 
(social) media. But we do see that an election campaign has the potential to 





















11 Are the kids alright? 
Saturday morning, 2025: the family is gathered at home. Father Peter
and mother Sarah are still subscribers to the same newspaper, though
they have skipped the print edition on weekdays and receive it only on
weekends. The youngest kid, 18, still lives at home and, at the age of
15, followed the older sibling in boycotting meat. Other than living a
healthy and sustainable lifestyle, he doesn’t show any great interest in
politics and only occasionally sees news on social media or when his
parents or friends send a news piece via messenger apps. When living at
home, the middle kid, now 20, was a strong supporter of animal rights
and a member of the Fridays for Future movement, travelling across
Europe for demonstrations and boycotts. From those days, she still has
a subscription to a left-wing news magazine and regularly informs her-
self about political developments, mostly via podcasts. Being busy with
her studies, she rarely goes to protests anymore but holds an adminis-
trative position at her university’s animal rights group. The oldest, now
24, lives with her partner and their one-year old child. They moved to
a bigger city for work and now struggle with a challenging housing
market and afordable childcare. The little spare time they have after
being at work and taking care of their daughter is not spent on follow-
ing the news. The challenges faced by them have made them become
increasingly cynical about a political system that, in their opinion, is
unable to support young families. Though politics is still a frequently
discussed topic when the oldest visits the family home, she tries to hold
back with her political views and tends to air them in a personal mes-
saging group, to which she was invited by a colleague. 
Our book set out to explore, on the one hand, how political involvement can 
lead to diferent types of political media exposure and, on the other hand, 
how this media exposure can afect political engagement and participa-
tion. In this chapter we frst summarize the fndings from previous chapters 
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to have an authoritative overview of the empirical sections. We then look 
across the diferent chapters through the lens of ‘generational diferences.’ 
Finally, we revisit our Engagement-Participation-Information-Generation 
(EPIG) model and look ahead in this landscape of rapidly changing media 
and politics. 
In Chapter 1, we outlined the parameters of the changing media land-
scape, the diferences between generations in informing themselves, and the 
new opportunity structures in political participation. We also presented this 
book’s key puzzle—namely, how diferent younger generations are com-
pared to older generations in regard to media use and political participation. 
To provide a framework for this key puzzle, we developed and presented 
our EPIG model in Chapter 2. The model describes how political engage-
ment and participation are both outcomes of using political information as 
well as potential antecedents of seeking out political information. We also 
laid out our generational perspective. A generational perspective enables us 
to explore diferences in the levels of—and relationships between—exposure 
to political information in the media and political involvement and to 
assess how the future might look in regard to mobilizing citizens through 
the media to take part in democracy. We dubbed this the Engagement-
Participation-Information-Generation (EPIG) model. In Chapter 3, we out-
lined the empirical backbone of our work: a fve-wave online survey and a 
three-wave smartphone-based survey with a large national sample as well as 
an automated content analysis of the major news media. 
In the empirical section of the book, we frst, in Chapter 4, looked at gen-
erational diferences in political news exposure. These diferences are rather 
clear-cut. Political news exposure almost linearly increases from younger to 
the older generations. Social media are used much more by younger genera-
tions, with a clear demarcation between Millennials and Generation Z, com-
pared to the three other generations. Election times change things, however. 
There is more political information in the news media during election time. 
On social media, the gap between older and younger generations increases 
during election times: the young use social media much more during elec-
tion times. In other words, elections draw the attention of young citizens to 
political information on social media. 
Turning to the infuence of political engagement, this is in general posi-
tively related to citizens’ exposure to political information in the media. 
For young citizens, higher political engagement is a more important pre-
condition for news exposure on both traditional media and social media. 
This result speaks for a ‘rich-get-richer’ perspective, in which generations 
who had more time throughout their lives to develop political interest and 
efcacy more easily consume news—thereby creating a life-cycle diference. 
It also clearly indicates the higher threshold that news use still presents for 
younger citizens, regardless of platform. Social media seem to lower the 
levels of political engagement that are necessary for political exposure, but 
they do not diminish the diferences between generations. Still, compared to 
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older generations, young citizens need to be more interested or efcacious to 
turn to political information on social media in the frst place. 
Levels of participation in the three types of political activity addressed in 
this book are quite stable over time across generations. The prevalent pat-
tern is that older generations are more politically active than the younger 
ones. All generations show the lowest levels of activity in political participa-
tion that directly targets the political system (PP II), with rather small gen-
erational gaps. These gaps become more pronounced for participation on a 
local level (PP III), where Generation Z and Millennials are clearly lagging 
behind Generation X, Baby Boomers, and Traditionalists. The only type of 
participation in which the younger-to-older pattern is broken is for non-
political but politically motivated participation (PP IV). Here, Generation 
X leads. But even though more activities that may be especially appealing 
to younger generations are subsumed under this last type, Millennials and 
Generation Z are still the least active. As outlined in Chapter 2, the dif-
ferences in participation levels speaks more strongly for a cohort efect, in 
which each generation fnds ‘their’ way of participation, with the constraint 
that neither Millennials nor Generation Z have found such a way of fre-
quently participating outside election times. This diference in participation 
patterns between the young and older generations also speaks against the 
common idea that young people participate most often in activities that are 
less connected to the political system. However, political activity seems to 
resonate in election times, when the two youngest generations are the most 
active in short-term, case-oriented, campaign activities. An election cam-
paign seems to narrow gaps in political engagement, suggesting that election 
campaigns give impulse to youth engagement. 
When it comes to mobilization through political information exposure, 
more clear-cut, generational diferences become visible. We see a clear indi-
cation that the youngest generations beneft most from news exposure. 
News exposure leads to higher levels of participation targeted at the politi-
cal system (PP II) for almost all generations, but it is strongest for Genera-
tion Z. Participation on a local level (PP III) is afected by news exposure 
only for Baby Boomers. Both Baby Boomers and Generation Z, however, 
become more active in non-political, politically motivated activities (PP IV) 
through news exposure; this fnding suggests that more news exposure con-
tributes to this type of participation, challenging the assumption that it is 
sparked only by social media use. 
Exposure to political information on social media does indeed mobilize 
participation in non-political, politically motivated activities and also par-
ticipation that is targeted at the political system. The youngest generation 
benefts most from social media use in regard to the latter. In particular, 
the more older generations are exposed to political information on social 
media, the more strongly they participate in activities least connected to the 
political system (i.e., PP IV). This fnding speaks strongly against the great 
equalizer perspective (Xenos et al., 2014): political social media use seems 
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rather to increase inequality in participation between the generations. We 
fnd a similar mobilization pattern through social media exposure for cam-
paign participation during election time. In both cases, older citizens beneft 
more from political social media use than younger generations. The only 
diference is that young generations are at their most active in campaign 
participation, which begs the question, what does actually activate them if 
not media exposure? 
Generational similarities and diferences 
A number of our fndings deserve closer attention and need to be put into 
perspective. First, we summarize the fndings, per generation and per dimen-
sion of the EPIG model, looking at how political involvement afects media 
use (antecedents) and how media use afects political involvement (efects). 
Table 11.1 provides an overview of the main fndings. 
Traditionalists developed high levels of political engagement that helped 
embed political participation in their lives. High levels of involvement, how-
ever, are unrelated to their exposure to political information in the media, 
and this exposure does not shape their political involvement. Traditional-
ists can thus be described as the unchangeables, who no longer need strong 
external infuences to be—and to remain—politically active. They have 
internalized political participation into their lives. 
Baby Boomers are in a functioning circle between involvement and politi-
cal information. Previous engagement sparks more news media use, which, 
in turn, increases levels of political engagement and participation. With this 
pattern, Baby Boomers clearly give credit to the label evergreen activists, 
and they seem to have adapted seamlessly to new opportunity structures in 
media exposure and participation. 
Generation X’s previous political participation draws them especially to 
more political social media exposure, which, in turn, increases their political 
participation. Despite being in their late 30s and 40s right now, they seem 
to be the real social media profteers, though they use these platforms only 
to a modest extent. 
The situation is diferent for Millennials, whose political media diet 
strongly relies on social media, but, in contrast to the generation that pre-
cedes them, their political involvement hardly profts from this exposure. 
This generation clearly benefts more from political news exposure but 
largely fails to put it to good use, creating a dilemma that makes Millenni-
als, to some extent, a generation lost in transition. 
Similar to their preceding generation, Generation Z is difcult to mobilize. 
Only if they have been politically involved do they turn to more political 
information, which they receive mostly through social media. In compari-
son to Millennials, Generation Z show signs of being mobilized by the new 
information opportunity structure. Nevertheless, political participation is 
not an integral part of their lives, making them the short-term activists in 
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Looking across the generations, it is a striking result that not one gen-
eration leads in all types of participation, but almost each generation leads 
in a specifc type of participation. Traditionalists participate most often in 
political activities taking place in their local communities. Baby Boomers 
most often address the political system directly with their political activities, 
and Generation X is leading when it comes to participation in non-political 
but politically motivated activities. The two youngest generations, however, 
participate most often in campaign activities. This pattern makes sense if 
we consider that more case-oriented and short-term types of participation 
seem to be most appealing to Millennials and Generation Z. The results 
point in the direction of specifc cohorts fnding ‘their’ way of participating 
politically. 
While it is clear for the three oldest generations which type of participa-
tion they prefer, it is more difcult to determine which type of participation, 
if any, the two younger cohorts are fnding for themselves. Of all participa-
tion types, Millennials are most active when it comes to supporting political 
causes with non-political behaviour and may therefore follow Generation X 
in their high levels of activity in this participation type. For Generation Z, 
the question seems to be more open. Other than their high level of activity 
during campaign times, no clear pattern is visible. It is possible that they will 
not adopt one specifc type of participation but rather adhere to supporting 
short-term causes with the means that they fnd the most appropriate or 
necessary. This way may prove more efective than persevering mainly with 
one specifc type of participation; it bears the risk, however, that future gen-
erations will, for example, address the political system less often directly or 
will care less often about the communities that they are living in. Given that 
participation types are very much in fux, younger generations may possibly 
develop their own, new modes of participation that, at this point in time, 
we cannot foresee. 
We fnd a number of generational diferences (1) for political involvement 
that motivates news use and, even more prominently, (2) for how news 
media can contribute to political involvement. Our panel design is not fully 
suited to determine whether we are dealing with life-cycle or cohort efects. 
However, some pronounced patterns might help us attribute diferences to 
either one of the possibilities. Whenever we fnd linearity in our results— 
that is, an increase or decrease in levels of efect sizes per generation—it is 
more likely that we are dealing with a life-cycle efect. The diferent political 
socialization paths described in Chapter 2 make clear that though diferent, 
it is unlikely that each cohort simply becomes less susceptible to news media 
or politically less active just because the members of each were born in a 
diferent time. With generations ‘sticking out’ of a linear pattern, what we 
therefore apparently see is an indication of a cohort efect. 
The pattern of linearity becomes especially visible for the relationship 
between news media exposure and how strongly generations beneft in 
regards to their political interest, knowledge, and efcacy. Though less 
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clear-cut, we also fnd an indication that, compared to older generations, 
younger generations’ political interest and knowledge beneft more strongly 
from political social media exposure. These fndings show that, in general, 
younger generations are more susceptible to political information, poten-
tially due to its novelty and to their own curiosity, inexperience, ignorance, 
and lack of party identifcation and fxed political views. Perhaps lower lev-
els of disillusionment with the political system also have a role to play. This 
fnding also speaks for the argument (Shehata, 2016) that when it comes 
to news media’s power to increase political engagement, we do not only 
experience a ceiling efect in terms of what our survey measures can achieve 
but also that the older citizens become, the less the news media moves their 
interest, knowledge, and efcacy—potentially because they have already 
achieved relative strength in these areas. 
However, when it comes to news media exposure encouraging political 
participation in various areas, we fnd neither a linear pattern nor any other 
pattern that speaks for strong life-cycle efects. More than that, specifc 
similarities between cohorts become visible. One striking similarity exists 
between Baby Boomers and Generation Z. These two generations become 
mobilized in equal ways, though difering in scale, by their news media 
use—in most instances, more strongly than other generations. This patterns 
also holds for certain (but not all) types of mobilization based on social 
media exposure. 
The relevant question is whether the two generations have similarities in 
their upbringing and therefore exhibit similar patterns in mobilization by 
the news. One could consider that Baby Boomers and Generation Z, more 
than other generations, share the feeling that they not only need but also can 
act upon information that they receive in the political world. Baby Boom-
ers grew up at a time when they wanted to diferentiate themselves from 
their Traditionalist parents. A number of societal challenges gave them the 
opportunity to do so, be it demonstrations around Cold War developments 
or increasing environmental pollution as a result of new industrial develop-
ments and policies. Undoubtedly, the times in which Generation Z came of 
age were characterized by important upheavals, from climate change to the 
Arab Spring and a major economic crisis in the Western world. But unlike 
Millennials, who experienced 9/11 and the rise of global terrorism as a shock 
to the old world order, Generation Z became socialized in a more enduring 
political-crisis mode that became a normality over time (see Mangelsdorf, 
2015). Hence, they may not have the Millennials’ sense of powerlessness or 
feeling of being overwhelmed when entering the political system. Growing 
up when they did may have made them more immune to—or decreased their 
respect for—the great challenges of our time, with the result that they act 
politically with less fear and resignation than do Millennials, who experi-
enced bigger political shocks during their political socialization. 
Furthermore, like Baby Boomers, Generation Z does not want to repeat 
the way their parents and older siblings dealt with political problems. They 
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appear to want to try something new, not least because they realize that the 
world will be a less liveable place, certainly when they have their own kids, 
if they do not act now. The conviction that acting half-heartedly like their 
parent’s generation will not leave the world a better place is one that they 
share with Baby Boomers. The two generations therefore may be connected 
through a shared sense of urgency to act and a willingness to make a difer-
ence. Hence, when they receive political information—which often includes 
political turbulence and strife, as in the past—their political socialization 
makes them more susceptible to act on this information. 
Lastly, collective actions were a formative experience in the political 
socialization of Baby Boomers; in a diferent sense, such actions are the 
same for Generation Z today, though one should speak rather of connective 
actions than collective actions (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013). Generation Z 
is the frst fully digital-native generation who do not have any reservations 
about using or working with digital technologies but rather see them as a 
normality. Contact with others may contribute to Generation Z acting on 
political information since their social online networks present them with 
the opportunity to make diverse connections and to refect upon and dis-
cover important political topics. 
Though more in-depth analysis (in particular, using qualitative methods) 
is necessary to confrm that the described similarities in socialization do, in 
fact, result in comparable patterns of mobilization through media use, the 
conspicuousness of these two generations compared to the others speaks 
more for a cohort efect than a life-cycle efect when it comes to the rela-
tionship between media exposure and political participation. How long will 
it take for a new generation to appear that is as politically active as Baby 
Boomers were and still are? This remains to be seen. We should not for-
get that Generation Z still shows the lowest level of participation of all. 
Notwithstanding, if their reaction to political information remains stable 
over the course of their lives, they may yet become a more politically active 
generation. A precondition of such a development, however, would be con-
tinuous and stable patterns of news use. But with the fast-changing media 
environment, such stability is rather unlikely. 
New research: what can be done better? 
We were in a privileged position to develop a research design that takes us 
a long way in addressing the core questions at stake. However, we want to 
emphasize a number of aspects that are open to further consideration and 
improvement. 
First, the underlying model adapted in this book is essentially a ‘national 
model,’ in the sense that it focuses strongly on general political news use 
and does not look specifcally at the use of local or regional media for politi-
cal information. This approach might work for a country the size of Den-
mark and with its media landscape, but for other (often bigger) countries 
 Are the kids alright? 137 
with more regional diversity and a greater media supply, a broadening of 
scope would be an important consideration. The weak connection between 
both our media use measures and political participation on a local level is a 
likely result of this selection. We acknowledge that this fnding should not 
be generally understood as the impotency of media use to motivate partici-
pation on a local level; rather, it could possibly be just the opposite. How-
ever, if news media use is understood as a general mechanism that mostly 
includes information with relevance for the nation or beyond, the connec-
tion between news use and political participation on a local level appears 
weak. Future research should therefore focus more strongly on the role of 
local news media for participation and, specifcally, the diferences between 
more traditional ways of receiving local news (i.e., newspapers, radio, and 
television) and new digital and social ways. The role of hyperlocal news 
media—such as blogs and Facebook groups—is largely understudied, while 
these very specifc and personalized information oferings may potentially 
lead to a closer connection between citizens and the community that they 
are living in. 
Second, we note that the efect sizes, generally speaking—and, in particu-
lar, in our dynamic models that explain change—are modest to small. On 
the one hand, we simply note this observation and also acknowledge that 
it is not exceptional in rather fully specifed models. On the other hand, we 
also use this fact to ofer a few thoughts on this phenomenon. The standard 
model specifcations in the feld, including ours, have implicit assumptions 
about growth and increases. That makes sense given the core interest in the 
(reciprocal) relationship between involvement and media use. All the same, 
for many citizens it is probably unrealistic to expect a continuous growth 
in both. For most people, both media use and political involvement prob-
ably have some level of equilibrium. When that state occurs, it might be 
useful to consider changes as modest and mostly temporary. In that sense, 
we should perhaps rethink the ‘efect size issue’ and consider the contri-
bution of individual involvement and of media use to maintain levels of 
both. A spiral of maintenance—where media use is a repeated antecedent 
for sustaining a certain level of political involvement—is a substantively 
important dynamic and probably not one that should be discarded on sta-
tistical grounds by modest efect sizes or limited variation and change in the 
dependent variables. 
Third, our design is very much ‘state of the art.’ We use panel surveys, 
mobile data collection, and automated content analysis. Even within these 
diferent study components, challenges emerge—such as using diferent 
measures when looking at regular news media versus social media, which 
inhibits direct comparisons. However, more broadly, we also emphasize that 
current developments in digital technologies raise questions about the inclu-
siveness of such an approach. Digital technologies, algorithms, and artifcial 
intelligence further expand the opportunities for a ubiquitous information 
supply. They are reshaping the communication and news industry, forcing 
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us to rethink how we study communication efects on science and society. 
For that, we need new, additional methods to assess efects and collect data. 
Fourth, and fnally, we have been open about the difculty in assessing 
cohort versus life-cycle efects. Essentially, we can never fully disentangle 
whether youth are exhibiting a unique type of behaviour (e.g., in terms of 
involvement) or whether they merely show this pattern before transitioning 
and socializing into the habits of older generations. This challenge has led 
us to exert caution throughout the book. Of course, on some accounts, we 
know that the youth are behaving diferently than previous generations, 
simply because some media supply opportunities, and political involve-
ment opportunities were unavailable in the past. In the future, even more 
extended studies that gather data over a longer period of time can help us to 
better pinpoint these diferences (see for example Shehata, 2016). This book 
is an example of how applying a generational perspective can help pinpoint 
gaps in democratic behaviour that otherwise remain unseen. This suggests 
that future research can beneft from cross-generational studies of the levels 
and relationships between media use and behaviour. 
Moving on 
In the closing part of our book, we return to our starting point and refect 
on the empirical fndings in the light of our theoretical model and the chang-
ing nature of both the media landscape and citizens’ political participation 
patterns. At the very end, we even engage in hyperbole and discuss how 
some of the core themes addressed here may develop in the future, in an age 
of datafcation, artifcial intelligence, misinformation, and threats to liberal 
democracies. 
But frst a broader perspective on our fndings: the results in this book 
provide strong evidence for pathways from political involvement to media 
exposure and from news consumption from various sources to political 
engagement and participation, as described in our EPIG model. However, 
though our book shows that media efects apply across a number of difer-
ent types of engagement and participation, they are highly dependent on 
the generation that citizens belong to. The generational diferences suggest 
that the G in our EPIG model must be seriously considered when looking at 
media efects in a population. 
Our results draw a picture according to which older generations con-
sume news through traditional news channels to a higher extent, whereas 
the younger generations, specifcally Millennials and Generation Z, receive 
political information increasingly through social media channels, in which 
information from news media, political actors, and friends and followers 
blend to create a unique political information diet. While we do not fnd 
general diferences in the gateways to news consumption between tradi-
tional media and social media, the younger generations fnd their way to 
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in particular, beneft from political news exposure in regard to political 
interest, knowledge, and efcacy, increasingly these positive efects fail to 
materialize with the change in news consumption. News exposure through 
traditional channels alone will therefore not address the lower levels of 
engagement and participation. 
Our results imply a virtuous cycle, though we do not explicitly test for it. 
News media use contributes to political involvement, which, in turn, leads 
to more news media exposure. Based on the results, one may wish to estab-
lish how to draw more young people into this virtuous cycle, which is still 
efective for the few who use it. One hoped-for solution is that social media 
initiate a virtuous cycle for younger generations. Our fndings show little 
support for such optimism, though social media in some instances have the 
power to motivate even the youngest citizens to become more active in their 
political systems. Time and again, we see that social media make the ‘politi-
cally rich’ older generations even richer by mobilizing them, especially in 
activities with little connection to the political system. A virtuous circle 2.0 
therefore seems rather out of sight. 
One could also ponder whether a virtuous cycle could be a twentieth-
century solution to a twenty-frst-century problem. Though participation
levels in our study are generally low, we fnd that in certain political areas or
at certain times, younger generations are politically active and generational
gaps in political engagement close. Looking at diferences only in general
levels of participation may mask activities that are specifc to young citizens;
participation in these activities may intensify over time as these citizens grow
older. In non-election times, Millennials are leading when it comes to partici-
pating in demonstrations and initiating political discussions on social media.
No other generation participates more often in fundraising—in particular,
for the communities in which they live—than Generation Z. And during
election times, compared to citizens from older generations, the two younger
generations are most active overall. Hence, these generations are far from
politically inactive. But closer examination of their participation patterns
reveals a strong case-orientation, as in fundraising and demonstrations, as
well as more spontaneous and short-term activities, as in election campaigns. 
Our results show a much lower continuous connection between young 
citizens’ political involvement and their media use patterns. This result may 
be interpreted in the light of the new participation patterns (i.e., short-term, 
spontaneous, case-oriented). Hence, engaging spontaneously for a specifc 
cause may go along with more erratic consumption of news about the cause 
in question. Rather than a continuous circle, the relation between news use 
and participation may look like the trace of a heart on a hospital moni-
tor, where spikes of diferent amplitude alternate with rest periods. Though 
these breaks where nothing happens may be shorter or longer, the spikes are 
evidence that participatory democracy is still alive. During the heartbeats of 
a participatory democracy, media use and political activity will, more than 
ever, be strongly connected and intertwined. 
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It is likely that social media will be playing an increasingly important 
role in this process. While we see a general positive relationship between 
news media and political participation, the relationship is more apparent for 
social media. Social media usage is positively related to more global types of 
participation. It might foster online expression more than it encourages, for 
example, interpersonal interaction. Social media could therefore contribute 
more to individualistic participation, whereas mainstream media are more 
conducive to collective participation. Specifc social media afordances con-
tribute to this situation. The specifcity of information is important in such 
a scenario. But platforms like Facebook or Instagram will not necessarily 
be the main players in the future. More likely, the characteristics of today’s 
social media platforms will prevail such that all news media will eventu-
ally turn into social media: fragmented information environments with high 
levels of personalization, which are determined by algorithmic selection, 
which, in turn, is strongly driven by users’ previous interests and social 
networks. Such specifc information delivery already characterizes social 
media. The weak connection that we see in our study between social media 
use and political involvement may be indicating a time when the general 
connection between news use and political participation is diminishing. This 
period of change makes future measurements of this connection challeng-
ing. The weak relationship between social media use and participation that 
we have found in our study, despite using a state-of-the-art method, may 
indicate that already our measures cannot keep up with the way that politi-
cal information is sparking political behaviour nowadays. 
We would also like to refect on the use of Denmark as the case for our 
study. As argued in Chapter 3, Denmark presented a good context for our 
study—a context that ofers variation in the supply side of political informa-
tion and variation in the opportunities to engage and participate in politics. 
Danish political media consumption is comparable to that of other Western 
democracies. Furthermore, it is a well-functioning democracy with a broad 
spectrum of participatory activities that citizens can engage in. The rela-
tively modest importance of political participation—besides turning out to 
vote—makes Denmark an interesting case in which to observe media efects 
on political involvement because the threshold for political information to 
spark engagement is rather high. This is a methodological point. There is 
also a substantive consideration. Citizen engagement does not stand out. 
Is Denmark therefore a kind of Western ‘hibernation democracy’—a well-
functioning state with high electoral turnout but with modest levels of citi-
zen engagement? And if so, is that necessarily bad? Is the hibernation a sign 
of citizen satisfaction? A modestly participating citizenry that does turn out 
in great numbers at elections is perhaps adequate and sufcient for a well-
functioning state. Indeed, not all models of democracy advocate for maxi-
mum participation—except at elections (Strömbäck, 2005). In our case, the 
media contribute to both more knowledge and a reduction of the genera-
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sufcient. In such a democracy, citizens might rely on the news media to fnd 
them in times of need, serving as a kind of alarm clock (Zaller, 2003). News 
alerts will fnd you when needed, but mostly, such action is not required. A 
fundamental discussion of both the news media’s role and citizens’ expecta-
tions will determine if the current level of participation is a blessing or a 
cause for concern. 
Outlook 
If we step back even further from our book, we may address the broader
context in which the often intricate and detailed questions about media use
and citizens’ political involvement arise and are answered. In the book, we
look at this relationship from a perspective of Western liberal democracies.
Many of the questions or answers would look diferent if asked from a per-
spective of authoritarian regimes or transitioning societies. But even within
liberal democracies, fundamental questions should be asked. Levitsky and
Ziblatt (2018) provocatively warn against the gradual breaking down of
liberal democracies in their book How Democracies Die. They argue that
the built-in respect, tolerance, and acceptance of the legitimacy of virtually
all political voices and forces—a cornerstone in liberal democracies—can
destroy a democracy from within (see also Rijpkema, 2018). In both the
United States and in diferent European countries, political movements
have gained traction that openly criticize not only existing political elites
but also core institutions of liberal democracies such as an independent
judiciary and media system. These developments put the relationship
between media use and participation in a diferent light. How are media
used by power holders and political elites? Are media free to voice diferent
viewpoints? Do some media encourage some types of participation? It is
clear that political developments in Western democracies in the past decade
have changed our ways of thinking about some of these questions and have
revived interest in fundamental questions about a free and independent
press and media system. 
Parallel to the turn of events in politics, developments in the media land-
scape also continue. While this book has been concerned with the role of
both traditional legacy media and social media for political information,
the book in its entirety implicitly assumes that politics and political infor-
mation are part of open, transparent public spheres. As social media plat-
forms evolve, serious questions arise about the spaces and confgurations
in which the exchange of political information occurs. Social media plat-
forms like Twitter and Facebook have quasi-open confgurations allowing
some level of scrutiny. Other platforms like WhatsApp and Snapchat are
much more ephemeral and closed in nature. What will these developments
mean for the relationship between (social) media use and political engage-
ment? Will more closed, private platforms be conducive to participation?
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Will they encourage polarization? Will politics be driven to the margins
of social media platforms? Will social media be an instrument to those
attacking or defending core institutions in liberal democracies? Will social
media use lead to new generational gaps? These bigger, contextual ques-
tions will need to be considered by following studies on media and politi-
cal engagement. 
Related to this possible migration of the space that is occupied by politi-
cal information is the ongoing debate about the ‘health’ of the information
ecology. From the supply side, the political information environment has
never been more accessible and omnipresent (Van Aelst et al., 2017), but
for users, the nature of available information is also changing. Debates
around elections from 2016 onwards have focused on the deliberate
spread of disinformation. This development is important to consider in
the context of not only changing platforms (see earlier) but also the infor-
mation-participation nexus. Our fndings concerning the positive impact
of exposure to political information on engagement implicitly presuppose
this information to be genuine, factually correct, and sincere. What if a
portion of the information ecology is in fact polluted by ill-intentioned,
factually incorrect information that is disseminated in bad faith? It is rea-
sonable to assume that such information might also lead to diferent forms
of political engagement. If so, the disinformation debate takes on an addi-
tional layer of complexity since disinformation would essentially lead to
participation based on a false understanding of what is at stake. In these
circumstances, the generally positive relationship between information use
and participation would need to be revisited. Moreover, it would need to
be established whether some generations are more prone to such pitfalls
than others. 
Taking it one step further, imagine the following: an incorrect news story
about a political scandal (disinformation with bad intent) is shared pur-
posely in a closed, encrypted communication network, then gets spread
on public social media sites, which leads to a demonstration resulting in
a riot and the imprisonment of counter-demonstrators. Can such a chain
of events be caused by computer systems augmented by artifcial intel-
ligence? Arguably, the creation of the inaccurate story can be automated.
So can dissemination, targeted at a closed network. Same for the wider
spread in the broader information ecology. The call for demonstrations
and counter-demonstrations can also be largely automated and orches-
trated. In this context can automated processes plus artifcial intelligence
ultimately ignite unrest? And would older or younger citizens be more
likely or less likely to be victims in such a dynamic? Such questions seem
very distant from this book’s central questions, but the core relationships
in the changing media landscape, the diferences between generations in
how they inform themselves, and new opportunity structures in political
participation remain the same, regardless of the nature of the information
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are both outcomes and potential antecedents of using political informa-
tion remains. But the premise—namely, the quality of that information, its
dissemination, and the diferent generational likelihood of fnding, shar-
ing, and responding to it—is diferent. Before going dystopian, however, it
is perhaps more conducive—going forward—to ask what mechanisms and
safeguards can be built into a system to ensure that, across generations,
the basic relationship between political information exposure and partici-




Table A3.1 Comparison of gender, age, and region for general population sample 
(18+) and population (pct.) 
Popu- W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 Dif. Dif. 
lation Pop.− Pop.− 
W1 W5 
N 4.641 3.419 2.946 2.68 2.084 
Gender Males 49.24 49.17 49.14 49.42 49.7 50.48 −0.07 1.24 
Females 50.76 50.83 50.86 50.58 50.3 49.52 0.07 −1.24 
Age 18–29 19.33 15.15 12.31 11.17 10.67 8.64 −4.18 −10.69 
30–39 15.19 14.59 13.37 12.49 12.46 11.52 −0.6 −3.67 
40–49 17.97 15.28 15.06 14.36 14.25 13.58 −2.69 −4.39 
50–59 16.67 25.08 26.06 26.58 26.23 26.92 8.41 10.25 
60–69 15.4 22.43 24.77 26.65 27.5 29.22 7.03 13.82 
70+ 15.46 7.41 8.42 8.76 8.88 10.12 −8.05 −5.34 













































Notes. Population numbers on November 1, 2014, from Danmarks Statistik (www. 
statistikbanken.dk), except ‘Age (Epinion)’ and ‘Region (Epinion),’ for which Epinion provided 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Mean SD Min Max Alpha 
Gender (female = 1) .52 .50 0 1 
Education 4.08 1.97 0 7 
Exposure to political information
in the news media 
Wave 1 6.55 4.73 0 32.64 .69 
Wave 2 6.76 4.70 0 31.75 .67 
Wave 3 8.65 5.88 0 37.45 .68 
Wave 4 10.89 7.34 0 46.26 .67 
Wave 5 7.72 5.40 0 37.43 .65 
Exposure to political information
on social media 
Mobile wave 1 .12 .19 0 1 .90 
Mobile wave 2 .24 .29 0 1 .92 
Mobile wave 3 .13 .21 0 1 .88 
Political interest 
Wave 1 6.75 2.44 0 10 
Wave 2 6.78 2.39 0 10 
Wave 3 6.91 2.25 0 10 
Wave 4 7.03 2.23 0 10 
Wave 5 6.92 2.30 0 10 
Political knowledge 
Wave 1 2.10 1.25 0 4 .60* 
Wave 2 2.68 1.21 0 4 .58* 
Wave 3 2.91 1.13 0 4 .58* 
Wave 4 3.28 .82 0 4 .33* 
Wave 5 2.92 1.04 0 4 .54* 
Political efcacy 
Wave 1 3.60 .74 1 5 .75 
Wave 2 3.62 .71 1 5 .74 
Wave 3 3.63 .75 1 5 .77 
Wave 4 3.71 .76 1 5 .80 
Wave 5 3.71 .73 1 5 .77 
Political participation II 
Wave 1 .42 .60 0 4 .73 
Wave 2 .27 .48 0 4 .71 
Wave 5 .28 .46 0 4 .70 
Political participation III 
Wave 1 .59 .68 0 4 .72 
Wave 2 .44 .63 0 4 .76 




Mean SD Min Max Alpha 
Political participation IV 
Wave 1 .62 .79 0 4 .70 
Wave 2 .53 .72 0 4 .68 
Wave 5 .53 .72 0 4 .68 
Campaign participation 
Wave 3 .27 .19 0 1 .88 
Wave 4 .22 .17 0 1 .73 
Notes. ‘Exposure to political information on social media’ was measured in the mobile survey. 
All other variables were measured in the online survey. Nonline survey = 3,490. Nmobile survey = 534. 




(‘Enhedslisten’ OR “Socialistisk Folkeparti*” OR “SF” OR “SFs” OR 
“SFer” OR “SFeren” OR “SFerens” OR “SFerne” OR “SFernes” OR 
‘socialdemokrat’ OR “Radikale*” OR “Alternativet*” OR ‘Nation-
alpartiet’ OR ‘Kristendemokrat’ OR “Konservative*” OR “Venstre*” 
OR “Dansk Folkeparti*” OR “DF” OR “DFs” OR “DFer” OR 
“DFeren” OR “DFerens” OR “DFerne” OR “DFernes” OR “Liberal 
Alliance*” OR “~politik” OR “~politiken*” OR “~politiker*” OR 
“~politisk*” OR ‘folketing’ OR ‘regionsråd’ OR ‘byråd’ OR “EU” 
OR “EUs” OR “NATO” OR “NATOs” OR “FN” OR “FNs” OR 
‘borgmester’ OR ‘rådmand’ OR “~*minister*” OR ‘partiformand’ 
OR ‘partileder’ OR ‘regering’ OR ‘opposition’ OR “~blå blok*” OR 
“~rød blok*” OR ‘venstreføj’ OR ‘højreføj’ OR ‘folkeafstemning’ 
OR “~*valgkamp*” OR ‘interesseorganisation’ OR ‘fagbevægelse’ 
OR “Dansk Industri*” OR “Kommunernes Landsforening*” OR 
“KL” OR “KLs” OR “Dansk Erhverv*” OR “LO” OR “LOs” OR 
“3F” OR “3Fs” OR “Forbrugerrådet*” OR “Danske Regioner*” OR 
“FOA” OR “FOAs” OR “Danmarks Lærerforening*” OR “Land-
brug & Fødevarer*” OR “Landbrug og Fødevarer*” OR “Arbejder-
bevægelsens Erhvervsråd*” OR “Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening*” OR 
“DA” OR “DAs” OR “Dansk Byggeri*” OR “Finansrådet*”) 
Figure A3.1 Search string for political information in the news media 
Source: Bjarnøe et al. (2020) 
Notes. The search string was applied using the search engine Infomedia. The following signs 
were used in the search string: ‘refers to a phase search covering all versions of a phase’; refers 
to the exact wording of a word or an expression; ~ refers to the frst letter of a word should 
be spelled with either capital or small letters; * allows for deviation in the beginning or the 
ending of a word. The words used to identify political content were party names (and their 
abbreviations), general political words (e.g., politics, politicians, political), selected political 
institutions and positions (e.g., council, major, minister, left-wing, right-wing, red bloc, blue 
bloc, government, opposition, party leader), supranational political bodies (EU, NATO, UN), 
elections (e.g., referendum, election campaign), and interest organisations. Besides using the 
words ‘interest organisations’ and ‘trade unions,’ the names of the 15 most prominent interest 
organisations in the news media were included in the search string (identifed using interarena. 






















Where have you heard information about politics 
today? 
On the radio off ine 
On the radio online 
From friends, family or colleagues 
Others (please specify) 
I haven’t heard anything about politics today 
Page 
Where have you read information about politics 
today? 
In a printed newspaper 
On a website of a newspaper 
On other websites of media outlets (e.g. DR, 
TV2) 
On other websites, (e.g. blogs) 
On social media platforms like Facebook or
Twitter 
Others 
I haven’t read anything about politics today 
How much of the information you’ve read online 
about politics today did you reach following links 
from social media? 
Most of it 
Some of it 
None of it 
I don’t remember 
What did you read on social media platforms
about politics today? 
Posts, comments, tweets or links… 
…by parties, politicians, political organizations 
or political actors 
…by news media 
…by other pages or blogs 
…by friends and followers 
Paid ads from parties, politicians, political 
organizations or political actors 
Others 
Were the posts or tweets by friends or followers
mostly from… 
... people you know personally and have a close 
relationship with (e.g. good friends, family)? 
... people you know personally without having a 
close relationship (e.g. mutual friends)? 
... people you don’t know personally? 
Stream 
Where have you watched information about 
politics today? 
On TV offine 
On broadcasters’ websites (on demand or
streamed live) 
On other websites (e.g. news pages or video
platforms, e.g. YouTube) 
On social media platforms like Facebook 
Others (please specify) 
I haven’t watched information about politics 
today 
How much of the information you’ve watched 
online about politics did you reach following links 
from social media? 
Most of it 
Some of it 
None of it 
I don’t remember 
What did you watch on a social media platform 
about politics today? 
Political ads (e.g. suggestions, commercials) 
Videos posted by parties, political organizations 
or candidates 
Videos posted by TV or radio stations or
newspapers 
Videos posted by other pages or profles (e.g. 
news pages or blogs) 
Videos posted or shared by friends and 
followers 
Others 
Were the videos posted or shared by friends or
followers mostly from... 
... people you know personally and have a close
relationship with (e.g. good friends, family)? 
... people you know personally without having a 
close relationship (e.g. mutual friends)? 
... people you don’t know personally? 




Table A3.4 Political knowledge questions 
Wave 1 1) Which post has Margrethe Vestager been appointed to in the 
European Commission? (Commissioner for Competition) 
2) In what country is there currently war against IS (Islamic State)? 
(Iraq) 
3) Who is the Conservative People’s Party’s spokesperson on politics? 
(Mai Mercado) 
4) Who is Minister of Employment in Denmark? (Henrik Dam 
Kristensen) 
Wave 2 1) Which party was Klaus Riskær Pedersen recently excluded from? 
(The Alternative) 
2) Which country is currently experiencing ferce fghting after a rebel 
group overthrew the president? (Yemen) 
3) What did a majority in the parliament recently decide that the Danes 
must hold a referendum about? (The EU legal reservation) 
4) Who is Minister of the Environment in Denmark? (Kirsten Brosbøl) 
Wave 3 1) Which party is Søren Gade running for at the upcoming national 
election? (Venstre—The Liberal Party of Denmark) 
2) Who was recently elected as Prime Minister in Great Britain? (David 
Cameron) 
3) Which politician from the Red–Green Alliance is not running again 
in the national election? (Frank Aaen) 
4) Which minister was recently criticized for his/her role in the sale of 
Dong? (Bjarne Corydon) 
Wave 4 1) Which party did not run for the national election? (The National 
Party) 
2) Which country has started negotiations on its future relationship 
with the EU? (Great Britain) 
3) What was also celebrated on Constitution Day on June 5 this year? 
(100 years of women’s sufrage) 
4) Which party got the most mandates at the national election? (The 
Social Democrats) 
Wave 5 1) Who is chairman of the Danish parliament? (Pia Kjærsgaard) 
2) Which country recently started air-strikes in Syria? (Russia) 
3) Which of the following parties suggest voting ‘no’ in the referendum 
about the Danish justice opt-out in EU? (Danish People’s Party and The 
Red–Green Alliance) 
4) Who is the Danish minister of defence? (Peter Christensen) 









Table A3.5 Political efcacy statements 
1. Sometimes politics is so complicated that a person like me cannot really 
understand what is going on 
2. Generally speaking, I do not fnd it difcult to take a stand on political issues 
(reversed) 
3. When politicians debate economic policy, I only understand a small part of what 
they are talking about 
4. Citizens like me are qualifed to participate in political discussions (reversed) 
5. Citizens like me have opinions on politics that are worth listening to (reversed) 
Table A3.6 Frequencies of political participation activities 
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 5 
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Political Participation II 
(Targeted at political system) 
Contacted a politician via e-mail or social .41 (1.01) .29 (0.84) .26 (0.79) 
media to express your opinion 
Contacted or visited a politician in person .30 (0.90) .20 (0.72) .16 (0.61) 
Participated in demonstrations, strikes, or .23 (0.74) .14 (0.59) .14 (0.55) 
other political happenings 
Signed a written petition (on paper) about a .41 (0.90) .23 (0.73) .20 (0.65) 
political or social issue 
Donated money to a political party, other .46 (1.10) .31 (0.89) .37 (0.95) 
political organization, or NGO 
Encouraged or invited people to participate .20 (0.75) .15 (0.63) .16 (0.61) 
in demonstrations, strikes, or other political 
events 
Signed an online petition .86 (1.27) .56 (1.08) .62 (1.08) 
Political Participation III 
(Targeted at community level) 
Maintained common facilities in your local .58 (1.17) .40 (1.01) .40 (1.00) 
area (e.g., kindergarten, waterworks, plants, 
roads) 
Participated in a meeting about your local .97 (1.35) .77 (1.26) .65 (1.15) 
area 
Participated in collecting money to support .35 (0.89) .24 (0.78) .20 (0.07) 
projects in your community (e.g., by 
organising or volunteering in a cultural 
event) 
Supported a crowdfunding project taking .68 (1.16) .46 (0.99) .41 (0.92) 
care of your community 
Participated in a cultural event to support .37 (0.91) .24 (0.76) .22 (0.72) 






Table A3.6 (Continued) 
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 5 
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Created street art in your own community 
(any use of creativity visible in the streets) 
Volunteered in an organization or a group in 
your local area (e.g., a residents’ association, 
museum association, food club, or common 
vegetable garden) 
Set up private websites, blogs, or social 
media initiatives about what is happening in 
your community 
Political Participation IV 
(Non-political, politically motivated) 
Initiated a political discussion or supported 
a political issue (e.g., by creating a group 
or donating money to a political project or 
event) 
Shared posts by others on Facebook or 
similar social media sites about a political or 
societal issue 
Changed personal information or picture 
on your social media profle information 
because of a political or societal issue 
Expressed your opinion in a post on 
Facebook or similar social media sites about 
a political or societal issue 
Bought or boycotted products for political, 
ethical, or environmental reasons 
Wore clothes or other visible objects with a 
political message (e.g., a badge or a bag) 
Notes. N = 3,490. 
.15 (0.66) .11 (0.58) .10 (0.53) 
1.13 (1.67) .88 (1.53) .86 (1.5) 
.47 (1.17) .38 (1.02) –.33 (0.96) 
.22 (0.79) .19 (0.73) .18 (0.68) 
.99 (1.54) .94 (1.49) .99 (1.51) 
.20 (0.73) .17 (0.66) .16 (0.65) 
.90 (1.48) .78 (1.4) .83 (1.43) 
1.33 (1.72) 1.13 (1.65) 1.03 (1.6) 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A3.7 Frequencies of (intended) campaign participation activities 
Intended Campaign 
campaign participation 
participation (wave 4) 
(wave 3) 
Talked about election 8.00 (3.03) 0.74 (0.43) 
Convinced others to vote via social media 3.88 (3.25) 0.19 (0.39) 
Volunteered for a political party or candidate 1.88 (2.23) 0.04 (0.2) 
Attended public election meetings 3.03 (2.75) 0.06 (0.24) 
Contacted politician in election time 2.10 (2.22) 0.03 (0.18) 
Visited candidates’ website/social media profle 5.07 (3.64) 0.30 (0.46) 
Taken initiative to discuss election on social 1.82 (1.89) 0.05 (0.23) 
media 
Expressed your opinion to a politician via mail/ 2.15 (2.28) 0.04 (0.21) 
social media 
Done election test 6.21 (3.89) 0.56 (0.49) 
Supported a candidate or a party via social 3.03 (3.11) 0.16 (0.36) 
media 
Shared information about election 3.60 (3.33) 0.18 (0.38) 
Made others aware that you will vote 4.29 (3.80) 0.23 (0.42) 
Notes. Intended campaign participation was measured at wave 3 on a scale from 1 (Not likely 
at all) to 11 (Very likely). Campaign participation at wave 4 was measured dichotomously (0 = 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A5.1 Efects of exposure to political information in the news media on political 
interest 
Static Dynamic 
Model Model Model Model Model Model
5.1.1 5.1.2 5.1.3 5.1.4 5.1.5 5.1.6 
Lagged DV .820*** .803*** .802*** 
(.005) (.006) (.006) 
Gender (female) −.756*** −.614*** −.613*** −.105*** −.087*** −.088*** 
(.069) (.066) (.066) (.017) (.017) (.017) 
Education .244*** .204*** .202*** .042*** .037*** .037*** 
(.019) (.018) (.018) (.005) (.005) (.005) 
Election time .153*** −.151*** −.154*** 155*** .093*** .092*** 
(.016) (.022) (.022) (.023) (.023) (.023) 
Generation (G) 
Baby Boomers −.196* −.163 −.451** −.032 −.027 −.089 
(.091) (.088) (.161) (.022) (.022) (.050) 
Generation X −.810*** −.656*** −.920*** −.106*** −.083** −.153** 
(.111) (.107) (.186) (.026) (.026) (.054) 
Millennials −.974*** −.632*** −1.246*** −.166*** −.102** −.241*** 
(.132) (.125) (.207) (.030) (.030) (.059) 
Generation Z −.774*** −.460** −1.284*** −.076 −.016 −.235** 
(.172) (.160) (.237) (.040) (.040) (.070) 
Exposure to .110*** .076*** .024*** .017*** 
pol. info. in the
news media
(.005) (.011) (.002) (.003) 
(NM) 
NM × G 
Baby Boomers .031* .006 
(.013) (.004) 
Generation X .027 .007 
(.015) (.004) 
Millennials .084*** .018** 
(.019) (.006) 
Generation Z .132*** .034*** 
(.025) (.008) 
Constant 6.631*** 5.841*** 6.166*** 1.146*** 1.079*** 1.165*** 
(.116) (.117) (.158) (.050) (.050) (.063) 
R2 .104 .172 .178 .723 .727 .727 
Notes. Pooled OLS regressions. Unstandardized coefcients. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. 










Table A5.2 Efects of exposure to political information in the news media on political 
knowledge 
Static Dynamic 
Model Model Model Model Model Model
5.2.1 5.2.2 5.2.3 5.2.4 5.2.5 5.2.6 
Lagged DV .352*** .322*** .315*** 
(.009) (.009) (.009) 
Gender −.439*** −.382*** −.381*** −.248*** −.229*** −.230*** 
(female) (.024) (.023) (.023) (.017) (.016) (.016) 
Education .095*** .078*** .076*** .053*** .046*** .045*** 
(.007) (.006) (.006) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
Election time .531*** .409*** .408*** .263*** .201*** .199*** 
(.013) (.014) (.014) (.015) (.015) (.015) 
Generation (G) 
Baby Boomers −.027 −.014 −.187** −.009 −.002 −.126** 
(.029) (.028) (.055) (.019) (.019) (.042) 
Generation X −.361*** −.299*** −.587*** −.184*** −.156*** −.389*** 
(.038) (.036) (.064) (.025) (.025) (.049) 
Millennials −.561*** −.423*** −.911*** −.276*** −.208*** −.599*** 
(.047) (.044) (.074) (.033) (.032) (.060) 
Generation Z −.872*** −.746*** −1.274*** −.550*** −.497*** −1.000*** 
(.064) (.059) (.079) (.047) (.046) (.066) 
Exposure .044*** .019*** .025*** .006* 
to pol. info.
in the news
(.002) (.004) (.001) (.003) 
media (NM) 
NM × G 
Baby Boomers .018*** .012*** 
(.004) (.003) 
Generation X .032*** .024*** 
(.006) (.004) 
Millennials .067*** .051*** 
(.008) (.006) 
Generation Z .081*** .076*** 
(.009) (.007) 
Constant 2.619*** 2.300*** 2.548*** 1.875*** 1.768*** 1.983*** 
(.039) (.040) (.054) (.037) (.037) (.048) 
R2 .185 .229 .240 .283 .300 .310 
Notes. Pooled OLS regressions. Unstandardized coefcients. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 










Table A5.3 Efects of exposure to political information in the news media on political 
efcacy 
Static Dynamic 
Model Model Model Model Model Model 
5.3.1 5.3.2 5.3.3 5.3.4 5.3.5 5.3.6 
Lagged DV .758*** .749*** .747*** 
(.006) (.006) (.006) 
Gender −.267*** −.239*** −.239*** −.058*** −.052*** −.053*** 
(female) 
(.021) (.021) (.021) (.007) (.007) (.007) 
Education .118*** .110*** .109*** .029*** .028*** .028*** 
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
Election time .026*** −.033*** −.034*** .023** .006 .006 
(.005) (.007) (.007) (.008) (.008) (.008) 
Generation (G) 
Baby Boomers .120*** .126*** .063 035*** .038*** .017 
(.027) (.027) (.048) (.009) (.009) (.019) 
Generation X .144*** .174*** .107 .042*** .054*** .024 
(.033) (.033) (.055) (.010) (.011) (.021) 
Millennials .080* .147*** −.016 .039** .062*** .001 
(.040) (.039) (.060) (.012) (.012) (.022) 
Generation Z .208*** .269*** .017 .082*** .104*** .007 
(.052) (.050) (.070) (.017) (.017) (.027) 
Exposure to .021*** .013** .007*** .003* 
pol. info. in the
news media
(.002) (.004) (.001) (.001) 
(NM) 
NM × G 
Baby Boomers .007 .002 
(.004) (.002) 
Generation X .007 .003 
(.005) (.002) 
Millennials .022*** .008*** 
(.006) (.002) 
Generation Z .042*** .015*** 
(.008) (.003) 
Constant 3.199*** 3.046*** 3.128*** .775*** .754*** .791*** 
(.034) (.036) (.047) (.023) (.023) (.027) 
R2 .128 .154 .159 .630 .632 .633 
Notes. Pooled OLS regressions. Unstandardized coefcients. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A9.1 Efects of exposure to political information on social media on political 
interest 
Static Dynamic 
Model Model Model Model Model Model 
9.1.1 9.1.2 9.1.3 9.1.4 9.1.5 9.1.6 
Lagged DV .761*** .747*** .746*** 
(.024) (.024) (.025) 
Gender (female) −.764*** −.790*** −.786*** −.092 −.113 −.106 
(.190) (.185) (.185) (.114) (.113) (.114) 
Education .239*** .230*** .224*** .048 .048 .045 
(.051) (.050) (.050) (.031) (.031) (.031) 
Generation (G) 
Baby Boomers −.415 −.361 −.535 .272 .277 .294 
(.337) (.328) (.372) (.200) (.198) (.226) 
Generation X −.979** −.881* −1.253** .046 .060 .038 
(.368) (.359) (.408) (.219) (.217) (.249) 
Millennials −1.581*** −1.619*** −2.021*** −.060 −.101 −.147 
(.369) (.360) (.431) (.223) (.221) (.267) 
Generation Z −1.381** −1.366** −1.826*** −.049 −.069 −.308 
(.455) (.444) (.512) (.271) (.269) (.312) 
Social media 2.332*** .700 .785** .660 
exposure to pol.
info. (SMEPI) 
(.430) (1.116) (.263) (.671) 
SMEPI × G 
Baby Boomers 1.103 −.183 
(1.279) (.770) 
Generation X 3.012+ .167 
(1.584) (.957) 
Millennials 2.680+ .285 
(1.578) (.952) 
Generation Z 3.247+ 1.750 
(1.854) (1.116) 
Constant 7.314*** 7.034*** 7.295*** 1.618*** 1.629*** 1.666*** 
(.392) (.385) (.413) (.293) (.291) (.310) 
R2 .129 .173 .177 .698 .702 .702 
Notes. OLS regressions. Unstandardized coefcients. Standard errors in parentheses. 








Table A9.2 Efects of exposure to political information on social media on political 
knowledge 
Static Dynamic 
Model Model Model Model Model Model
9.2.1 9.2.2 9.2.3 9.2.4 9.2.5 9.2.6 
Lagged DV .405*** .395*** .394*** 
(.034) (.034) (.034) 
Gender (female) −.364*** −.372*** −.370*** −.174* −.185* −.181* 
(.085) (.084) (.084) (.077) (.077) (.077) 
Education .073** .070** .066** .017 .016 .012 
(.023) (.023) (.023) (.021) (.021) (.021) 
Generation (G) 
Baby Boomers −.111 −.095 −.138 −.031 −.020 −.056 
(.150) (.149) (.168) (.134) (.133) (.150) 
Generation X −.421* −.391* −.508** −.150 −.134 −.218 
(.164) (.162) (.184) (.148) (.147) (.166) 
Millennials −.715*** −.727*** −.919*** −.247 −.267+ −.440* 
(.165) (.163) (.195) (.152) (.151) (.179) 
Generation Z −1.354*** −1.350*** −1.547*** −.774*** −.785*** −.984*** 
(.203) (.201) (.232) (.187) (.186) (.212) 
Social media .723*** .168 .534** .069 
exposure to pol.
info. (SMEPI) 
(.195) (.505) (.175) (.451) 
SMEPI × G 
Baby Boomers .242 .190 
(.578) (.516) 
Generation X .939 .637 
(.717) (.640) 
Millennials 1.261+ 1.119+ 
(.714) (.637) 
Generation Z 1.389+ 1.390+ 
(.839) (.749) 
Constant 3.259*** 3.172*** 3.268*** 2.282*** 2.241*** 2.327*** 
(.175) (.174) (.187) (.176) (.175) (.186) 
R2 .212 .231 .234 .377 .387 .390 
Notes. OLS regressions. Unstandardized coefcients. Standard errors in parentheses. 








Table A9.3 Efects of exposure to political information on social media on political 
efcacy (1–5) 
Static Dynamic 
Model Model Model Model Model Model
9.3.1 9.3.2 9.3.3 9.3.4 9.3.5 9.3.6 
Lagged DV .674*** .668*** .669*** 
(.030) (.031) (.031) 
Gender (female) −.328*** −.333*** −.330*** −.119** −.122** −.119** 
(.058) (.058) (.058) (.043) (.043) (.043) 
Education .107*** .106*** .105*** .035** .036** .036** 
(.016) (.016) (.016) (.012) (.012) (.012) 
Generation (G) 
Baby Boomers .078 .089 .027 .079 .082 .098 
(.103) (.102) (.116) (.074) (.074) (.084) 
Generation X .126 .145 .025 .093 .098 .110 
(.113) (.112) (.127) (.081) (.081) (.092) 
Millennials .005 −.002 −.019 .111 .108 .186+ 
(.113) (.112) (.135) (.081) (.081) (.098) 
Generation Z .031 .034 −.120 .098 .099 .066 
(.140) (.138) (.160) (.100) (.100) (.116) 
Social media .452*** −.010 .115 .227 
exposure to pol.
info. (SMEPI) 
(.134) (.348) (.099) (.253) 
SMEPI × G 
Baby Boomers .420 −.109 
(.399) (.291) 
Generation X .998* −.070 
(.494) (.362) 
Millennials .147 −.502 
(.492) (.359) 
Generation Z 1.138* .278 
(.578) (.422) 
Constant 3.419*** 3.365*** 3.430*** 1.159*** 1.164*** 1.143*** 
(.120) (.120) (.129) (.133) (.133) (.141) 
R2 .151 .167 .172 .562 .563 .563 
Notes. OLS regressions. Unstandardized coefcients. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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